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ABSTRACT

My research pivots around questions of making, its importance to all of life, and the
challenges it faces in the contemporary world. The research is grounded in simple
questions such as: what is making, what are its instruments, and can we do it on purpose? I
approach these questions as if through binoculars. With one eye, I want to establish an
account of making that is plain and somewhat quotidian. This will ensure the long-term
viability of my study. With the other eye, I look for an account of making that is
theoretically substantial and thoroughly vigorous. I apply magnification to both of these
angles in order to home in on the essential features and operations of making. Though
these two focal angles are arranged sequentially in the dissertation, they are conceptually
reflexive. One perspective informs the other.
I start with the focal chamber that is directed towards the mundane. I take the
everyday concerns of “making a living” as my point of departure and treat it as my raw
sample. I then examine that sample under the fourfold lens of SYSTEMATIC COMBINING.
These lenses spotlight and isolate three structural principles of making. Namely, all
making is comprised of agency, surface, and the process of marking. With a more
formidable sample in view, I turn to the other binocular barrel and apply more levels of
magnification. I look at “making a living” under the lenses of anthropology,
phenomenology, and architecture. These rotating magnifications reveal three critical
motifs for an account of making. Namely, making is inflected by number, touch, and
repetition.
Finally, I speculate about the way these binocular angles and their constituent parts
are held together by controlling theoretical perspectives. I claim that most making in the
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modern world has been understood under the rubric of writing and has been guided by a
philosophical assumption about exteriority. I assert that drawing—and its correlative
assumption about interiority—can rehabilitate making and achieve the goals set out from
the beginning of the dissertation. That is, drawing—both as a theory and instrument of
making—elides contemporary problems whilst remaining accessible precisely because it is
material, habitual, and tectonic.
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DEDICATION

My research is about drawing things together and drawing people forth so that
both can draw near to life. My work belongs to everyone.

Please, feel free to draw on it.
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FOREWARD
Outlining The Problem
This dissertation is about drawing. But, to set the record straight, it is not about
techniques. It is not an apology for the importance of the arts. It is not about
drawing as a way of thinking or being. It is about drawing as a way of being alive. It
is about the ability to draw a line somewhere. It is about drawing near, drawing out,
and drawing together. It is about withdrawing so that others may draw forth. It is
about the way that drawing is different than writing. It is about how drawing has
been lost in the wake of writing’s primacy. It is about rehabilitating, recovering, and
resurrecting drawing. In all, it is about how drawing is integral to the act of making
a life.
But these pursuits present a real problem. To put it bluntly, I’m not sure how to
write about drawing? If the final destination of the dissertation is drawing, then how
do I get there by writing? It is not as if this is merely an issue of content. It is not
that drawing is an unwieldy matter that simply needs to be carefully arranged and
subdued in a written argument. Writing and drawing are different forms, methods,
and processes. There are countless books dedicated to the subtleties and
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distinctions of form and content. We do not need to consult them here. We only
need to turn to the text in front of us to illustrate the problem. The dissertation
itself gives us a ready-made example of how drawing differs from writing in terms
of procedure and scheme—not just content.
Consider the outline. Now, consider the semantic ambiguity that is circling in
your mind about that term. What does he mean by outline? Which kind? Therein
lies my difficulty. Outline could mean an exercise in writing or drawing. But this is
the decisive matter: Both forms would proceed along—and produce—different
conceptual logics. In writing, the outline is a sequential arrangement of ideas for a
written composition. This kind of writing is the gold standard for dissertations. You
expect to see it right before this page. It is the first moment of the argument. This
outline moves hierarchically. It progresses by linear causality. It implies a sequence
of dependency. Point A leads to Point B which leads ultimately to Z. The written
outline gives readers a path to follow, a metric for evaluation, and repeatability.
Hence, its elevation in defenses, dissertations, and book proposals. This is not
altogether Inappropriate, though. But it is problematic for a thesis about drawing.
My conjecture directly calls repeatability, path-making, and even causality into
question. So, can I use these assumptions, even methodologically, and then discard
them like scaffolding?
But this is not the whole story. We cannot forget the drawn outline. In drawing,
the outline is the edge of a figure marked out by a stylus, painted, or imaged in
some way. It has no starting point. Its endpoint is only the figure revealed. It can
cross over and reverse itself without compromising that figure. It can change
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weights and scales freely. Some lines are thicker and others thinner. It does not
have a hierarchy but it is radically interdependent. The outline of the figure makes
sense as a gestalt totality. This strategy, if ever used in a formal academic setting, is
normally relegated to a supporting role. A table here or an illustration there
reinforces the written argument. To be clear, and balanced, this is not improper or
unsuitable. I even do it here. The point is that in these cases writing still governs.
Drawing, taken as a core conceptual logic, is rarely applied to the overarching
conjecture and demonstration. That is exactly what I want to do.
This formal problem parallels the content problem of the dissertation. Namely,
that writing and drawing are at odds. Furthermore, it is hard to bring them together
without one absorbing the other. Historically, they have always been a pair. They
mutually implicate each other. Once again, we do not have to look very far to see
this—literally. Each one of these markings in front of your eyes or being recited to
your ears are themselves drawings. They have histories. These curves that form
the alphabet are primordial markings enfolded into habits—a habit called text. But
somewhere along the way, drawing receded to hobbyism while writing became the
authority on self-expression, creativity, policy-making, law, corporate copyright, and
now code. So, both in form and content, I am tasked with rebuilding drawing from
the ground up. My burden is to let drawing appear amidst a sea of writing and then
reacquaint the two as long-lost friends. Practically, what the dissertation needs,
then, is some sort of demonstration that feels like drawing but looks like writing. It
needs to be able to build a vision that can bring these two worlds of making back
together.
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Therefore, this dissertation is an exercise in theory building. This fact should
set your expectations. The dissertation will not descend from a direct or singular
problem to a direct solution. It will not have a story arc of beginning, middle, and
end. It will not be a cross-comparative analysis. It will not be statistical or
hierarchically dependent. It is a re-imagining. It looks a outside the given state of
our thinking, assumptions, and routines to find new resources for living. It is
abductive. Therefore, the study will build from the edges like the outline of a
drawing. It will gather scattered insights and lump them together in an everevolving piece of clay. It will not be final but it will have form. It will not be original
but it will be originary. It will be written but it will not follow “writing” as divorced
from drawing. As the theory is drawn from the edge, the elements are drawn
together, and the image of making and living is drawn out.
A final metaphor will help paint the picture. In sum, this dissertation functions
like a jigsaw puzzle. As you move through it, the elements begin to come into view
in relation to each other. The puzzle metaphor is not only the big picture but
informs each stage of development. In the beginning, you open the puzzle in
anticipation of discovery. You know what you are headed towards (from the box)
but the construction itself will bring a new picture, at a new scale, with your own
failures and achievements fitted into the picture. After all, you will scuffs and bend
pieces in the process. In the same way, you already know what is on my box:
drawing invigorates making and living. And, you already know that you will scuff up
and bend the pieces I present to as you while conceptually build alongside my
descriptions.
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Of course, not everyone executes puzzles the same way. But for most, the next
moment of puzzling is to scatter the pieces and position the target image. In the
same way, my opening chapter starts with a mytheme which functions as a target
image or ideal. I then scatter the pieces. The scattering feels overwhelming when
we puzzle but it is necessary to organizing and aligning pieces. We simply cannot
build a picture in a straight line moving from one piece to another. The same goes
for theory building. The next step, for most (but not all), is to sort the edge pieces.
In the sifting, the eureka moment is the discovery of the corners. This gives us
traction in the face of a seemingly insurmountable array of pieces. My first chapter
does this too by establishing a methodological container. It has its own four corners
which constrain empirical observations (pieces) and our speculation. Once the
edge is constructed, there are innumerable strategies. In my own experience, I sort
puzzle pieces according to some kind of identifiable quality. For example, if the
pieces share an image of colorful objects, we collect those colors together. The first
chapter of the dissertation proceeds accordingly. With the edge intact, I begin to
collect insights piecemeal. I find patterns these pieces share and group them. But
much like the puzzle bunches, they are still piles. We must tend to them directly. In
the second chapter, I stitch them together.
The next step is a major one. At this point, we are staring at a puzzle box, an
edged image with a huge vacancy, an assortment of smaller sectional images, and a
side pile of generic and unspecified pieces. This last pile is critical though. We need
to merge these big clumps together with the liminal pieces drawn from this pile. By
trial matching and error, we put one color here and another there. We try to see
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which of our indefinite pieces will come to life in the puzzle and hold our other
sections together. The third chapter follows suit. It is my attempt to look in the
cracks of the image, in between the foregrounded ideas assembled in the prior
chapter, and discern how they go together.
This puzzle analogy not only explains the scope of the study but also its
rhythms and speeds. At this stage of a puzzle, two things happen to our procedural
rhythm. First, things speed up. As the structure solidifies, our liminal piles get
smaller. Therefore, we can insert formerly unrelated pieces very quickly. IF we had
not built that picture in front of us, we would stare at that piece as an unrelated
anomaly and with disinterest. But as things come together, it simply “fits.” The
same can happen to abstract ideas in this third chapter. They may have felt
insignificant and distant early on but by the time they are put in, they do not require
extensive and methodical reflection. They fit. And this implies the second thing that
can happen at this point. It may not fit. And when a piece does not, we have to stop
in our haste, backtrack, and rebuild. This happens to ideas and concepts as well. If
they do not fit we must retrace our steps to find the error.
And this is precisely where our study takes leave of the puzzle analogy. The
puzzle reconfigures according to the given image. But we, in this study, can actually
draw a new image wherein our pieces may fit more harmoniously. With the
coordinated image in front of us, we are in a position to evaluate it and change it.
Do we like the image? Is there a better way to look at this? We do not typically have
this opportunity in puzzling. But that is not important. What matters is that we have
arrived at a stage of study that is unique to abduction and theory building. We can
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evaluate this image and draw a new one. In the spirit of the metaphor, we can take
the pieces and rearrange them in hopes of seeing a different picture. Though we do
not recreate the image when we puzzle, we do still evaluate it and measure its
qualities against our desires. We came to the puzzle wanting a social experience, a
mental stimulus, or a way to bide time. Regardless of which initiative drove us to
the puzzle, it stands outside it and is critical for evaluating its performance and
quality. Thus, on the one hand, the study is different than a puzzle insofar as it has
more modular control. On the other hand, they are similar (the puzzle and
dissertation) insofar as they are both guided by some external interest. These
features apply to the second part of my third chapter. We have scattered, edged,
assembled, stitched, and seen a picture. We now wonder whether that picture fits
our desires. This is where the puzzle stops. And, this is where theory-building
reveals itself as instrumental throughout. We look, we evaluate, and we reconstruct.
This is the moment where my conjecture takes viable form. But we are not done
yet.
We stepped out of the puzzle analogy to establish the function of theory
building but now we can step back in. With the puzzle complete, we do in fact
measure what we see in our process against our other experiences of that image. If
it is camping, we speculate about camping. If it is an image of Paris, we wonder
about a future trip. We implicitly ask: is this puzzled image like the real one? Does it
miss things? Does it add things? Does what we see actually feel like this in time and
pace? What memories does this conjure? This comparison amounts to the case
study of my final chapter. I turn to another field of study to see how the elements

7

from this study (this puzzle) work themselves out in another field (“real” life). In so
doing, we can verify our findings in this study (this puzzle) according to what we
observe there in that field (that real experience).
There is one final moment, the next puzzle. When we finish and store our work,
we being to anticipate the next one. We image the process, the image, the
experience. Our speculations are brief and concise. After all, we are not there yet.
We are only forming a basic path towards that next puzzle. This parallels the
conclusion of the study. In the end, I point to the next questions waiting to be
answered. I signal towards those issues which are on the horizon of drawing,
making, and living.
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1. OUT OF THE QUESTION
1.1 The Community of Inquiry
From the very beginning, I've been interested in seeing human life through the
lens of making. Making time. Making meaning. Making furniture. Making art.
Making love. Making a difference. The list goes on. And I have always been
adamant that this creative capacity belongs to everyone—especially the poor.
Everyone should be able to make new rules at institutions, make new buildings, or
make waves in the social behaviors of a family. Humans have long been able to
make a difference where they live, in how they live, and in what they collectively
live for.1 Somewhere along the way, we abdicated or abused this function. I want to
recover it.2
1. I should point out that despite my emphasis on the ground, there will be very few footnotes from the outset of this study.
This is because I am explicitly trying to withhold the academic conversation. I am trying to find a research space that is afforded to
me rather than by colonizing an area.The footnotes and pathway markings will accumulate as our magnification increases.
2. I should also point out that this opening salvo hints at Marxist intentions. While I do in fact share Marx’s concerns, I do not
route my research question through him. There are three reasons for this. First, there is an enormous body of work dedicated to
the problems of everyday life and Marxist positions. Most of these concern the mechanisms and relations of social production.
Very few, if any, narrow in on personal operations and tools. This is my explicit focus and therefore it places me outside the
received literature. Second, the term production, central to Marx, obscures my interest in making. Making, for my purposes, lies
before any kind of mechanical or systemic fabrication. I am interested in the manual origins of any material birth. Third, I am
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Making is at the core of my research agenda but so is its corollary: life.
Throughout my study, I am trying to excavate real life. I am looking for the ground
of making. I am trying to sift through daily action and discover the practices of
making or unmaking. I want to explicate the material forces and decisions that
shape our lives. I want to know how humans have been materially involved in
developing the world that they dwell in. How that material world turns back and
shapes humans. Finally, I really want to know why it’s so damn hard now for
everyday people to make a difference in their world—in their lives.
But it does not take a Ph.D. candidate to realize that these grandiose and
ambitious interests cannot do much to help the very people they extol. At least, not
in the way I have articulated them here. Philosophy does not bake bread, as they
say. Regular people (scholars included) need an account of making that has public
value. We need one that can be accessed, practiced, and proclaimed. We do not
need one that can be delicately described but never exercised. We need one that
takes root in the mundane. But, I want to make a distinction in my advocacy right
here from the beginning. The mundane is not the same as humdrum. We do not
just need to figure out how to do what we are already doing just “a little better.” We
do not need the status quo. We do not need more skill, more class, or more writing
lessons. Those approaches have only produced that acquiescent mood that
circulates in maxims like “it is what it is.”3 Our world—our life—demands a model
explicitly targeting everyday people and the name Marx is front-loaded with misunderstanding. While I think that most
interpretations are erroneous, I wanted to challenge myself to establish an account of making that sidesteps the trite and typical
objections that are levied against Marx.
3. I want to be clear that I do not reject these idioms tout court. In the interest of thorough disclosure, these sorts of
phrasings are highly instructive when establishing new theories and models of making. Though I touch on some idioms below, I do
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of making that is practicable but also carefully explicated, novel, and restorative.
This is my charge. This is the impetus of my research.
I acknowledge in advance that I am not the first person to take up this burden.
Both economists and academics have tried to help humans navigate making as
labor, technique, or skill. But, I am not satisfied with these models. The economic
strategy tells us that the way to make a life is to acquire enough wealth to
manipulate the material lives of others. Then, you can “make your own world.” The
academic approach has been split. On the one hand, it plays that same economic
tune by endorsing more industry-recognized learning. On the other hand, if you are
not an applied scientist and you want to make a difference in the world, you will
need to have a poetic sensibility and carve out your own space. You will need to
master language. To be fair, there is some value to academia’s linguistic account of
making. Language, as a tool, can help us understand how people make a change in
the world through symbols. But it cannot give us access to the things themselves.
In fact, in many cases, symbols distance us from materiality. In the end, these
strategies elevate us or isolate us. Neither does much to advance making on the
ground.
So what is the answer? Where do we turn? How do we develop a model of
making that is useful to those who need it most? Despite their insufficiency, we can
actually start with these economic and academic models of making. If for no other
reason than their decomposition can leave behind useful impressions. And those

not take up this one as formative. But, it is worth noting that if I had, this idiom’s highly ontological shape would be a foil to my
ontic approach.

11

impressions can help us mold a proper theory of making. In other words, we can
investigate our givens and find new possibilities. The hierarchical nature of the
economic model keeps most people passive and construes making as labor. If this
is a deferral of a full life, then we need to be looking for the inverse: an account of
making that is radically common and perpetually actionable. Making must be
shared and materially effectual. When making is limited in terms of who can do it
or what it leaves behind, it is hardly making. In addition to these conditions, the
linguistic accounts derived from academia suggest that a proper theory should be
multidimensional. It needs to operate on two levels. Language has utility for every
common user but can also be placed under theoretical scrutiny. A quality theory of
making must be both a concept and a mechanism. Fortunately, this
multidimensional condition safeguards the former stipulations of commonality and
actionability. Making cannot be only an abstraction lest we risk it becoming
uncommon and unactionable. It cannot be strictly manual lest it come under the
control of a few and remain inaccessible to most. Thus by passing through these
two insufficient models, we have an early sketch of the kind of theory of making
that we need to build. In short, humans require a theory of making that is
universally livable and theoretically doable.
These early insights shed light on the nature of my research agenda and its
forthcoming conclusions. I am studying human making but the orientation of my
study is expressly constructive. I am not qualifying or quantifying findings. I am
building and building is speculative, visionary, and even tentative. What is more, I
am building in, around, and on top of other structures. Therefore my project
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requires careful plans, clear schematics, and repeatable blueprints in order to
materialize my vision. To determine the best methods and plans for construction, I
need to briefly review the building site in front of us. People on the ground need a
common, active, and practicable theory of making. The theory must be inhabitable.
But my theoretical construct will also face external factors. It will be surrounded by
an academic atmosphere of questions and challenges. Thus, the theory will need to
be a manually and conceptually sound paradigm. And, much like a building, I need
to anticipate the life of my conjecture over time. I need to prepare my model to
adapt and adjust according to new data and phenomena. Given this landscape, I will
use SYSTEMATIC COMBINING methods and abduction to build a theory of
making.4

1.2 Systematizing the Inquiry
SYSTEMATIC COMBINING is a constructive research method by nature. It is not
one of those methods where the researcher establishes a problem and then
hypothesizes a solution. It takes a phenomenon of interest and sorts out its
constitutive elements. It aligns all of those elements by distributing them into four
main categories. In no specific order, those four categories are the EMPIRICAL
WORLD, FRAMEWORK, THEORY, and CASE STUDY. This distribution has three
key benefits. First, these categories allow the researcher to observe the systemic
harmony or discord of the phenomenon without privileging any single feature.

4. Anna Dubois and Lars-Erik Gadde, "Systematic Combining: an Abductive Approach to Case Research," Journal of Business
Research 55, no. 7 (2002).
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Second, SYSTEMATIC COMBINING is multidirectional both in layout and logic.
The researcher can analyze or synthesize. By separating a phenomenon into these
four aspects, the researcher can analytically isolate causal relationships and subtle
correlations. Conversely, the researcher can synthesize these categories into a
picture of how a phenomenon acts, behaves, survives, or dies. In other words, they
can illustrate the whole life of an idea. Lastly, SYSTEMATIC COMBINING is as
experimentally prescriptive as it is diagnostic. If the researcher concludes that an
element (in any of the four fields) is disrupting the expressed purpose or holistic
stability of the phenomenon, they can test an alternative arrangement by
subtracting, adding, or replacing that element with another. Because this method is
explicitly present throughout my examination and in diagrams, I want to narrow in
on the components and their interactions.
The first category, the EMPIRICAL WORLD, provides a researcher with their
basic phenomenon of interest.5 It is the sample for the study. As I have already
intimated above, I am interested in daily life. How it is made. The habits. The
procedures. The ability or inability to make a world that I live in. But the empirical
category does not only provide raw information. It also reveals patterns or clusters
of phenomena. We cannot possibly review every data point in an EMPIRICAL
observation. But SYSTEMATIC COMBINING encourages us to take note of things
we have seen, heard, tasted, smelled, or felt, more than once. At this point, if we
were actively applying the method, we would have begun to organize and color
these patterns. We will have now crossed into another domain, the FRAMEWORK,

5. Dubois and Gadde, 557.
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which works opposite the EMPIRICAL WORLD.6 The framework is critical in
identifying key elements for a study. But this identification has guidance. The
structures that the framework provides are largely influenced by another domain,
the THEORY.7 The THEORY category can be a collection of literature related to the
phenomenon under review or drawn from a well-known conceptual model that
explains why this frame applies to the empirical world. It can also, as it will in this
case, produce a novel rationale from—or for—the phenomenon. Each of these
categories, as a study progresses, gives rise to a fourth category, the CASE. The
CASE STUDY is not a prescribed sample of the assumed THEORY.8 It is the
evolving product of the interplay of the other three. The case offers a composite
manifestation of what is concluded in each category. It gives the researcher an
anchoring product.
Beyond the categories themselves, their interplay has the most influence on my
study. The authors call this interplay “MATCHING9.” This process allows the
researcher to test one field against another. For example, does the framework
“match” empirical reality? Does the theory correspond to actual case examples?
The questions abound because the MATCHING process does not have a
prescribed beginning. It moves freely back and forth and accumulates clarity in the
process. This has a direct impact on my study. It is, broadly, my entire process.

6. Dubois and Gadde, 557.
7. Throughout the study, I will use small capitals to designate the proper categories of SYSTEMATIC COMBINING. This is to
prevent confusion between the formal THEORY category and any use of the term “theory” to designate a coordinated concept or
paradigm. Refer to the guide in the front matter for more details on textual formats.
8. Dubois and Gadde, “Systematic Combining,” 558.
9. Dubois and Gadde, 556.
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Throughout what follows, I will be aligning various elements of human making in
order to test their harmonics. But MATCHING also has a more acute function in
my work. SYSTEMATIC COMBINING, as a whole, is interested in relationality
instead of hierarchy and is therefore congenial to alternatives. MATCHING does
the hard work of examining that relationality. exposing discontinuities and
weaknesses in certain theories, empirical samples, or frameworks. It places
elements side by side and when those pieces do not align, the door is open to
alternative explanations. MATCHING fuels theory generation.10
To be clear, in order for MATCHING to work it must apply a logic in this
comparative moment. That is, if I put A beside B, I am using some system of
reasoning to measure them. But, while matching uses logic it is not confined to one
method. It can employ deduction or induction as it moves back and forth between
fields. For example, from FRAMEWORK to EMPIRICAL WORLD we may deduce
relations but if we moved from world to frame we may apply inductive concepts.
And when these logics produce inconsistencies, MATCHING utilizes abductive
reasoning. Abduction, made famous by C.S. Peirce, is a reasoning sequence that
moves “off to the side.”11 Any time the relationship between premises and
conclusions, or rule and result, is problematic abduction steps out of that linear flow
and looks for other explanations. Abduction is also less formal and more flexible

10. Kristian Philipsen, "Theory Building: Using Abductive Search Strategies," in Collaborative Research Design, ed. P. Freytag
and L. Young (Singapore: Singer, 2017), 50.
11. Charles S. Peirce, " On the Logic of Drawing History from Ancient Documents," in Essential Peirce v. 2 (Bloomington:
Indiana UP, 1998), 106.
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than its logical siblings. It almost explicitly consults everyday discourse and
experience to test and measure any logical claim or concept.12
Consider the beginning of the famous idiomatic conditional syllogism: “if it
looks like a duck, and sounds like a duck.” Deduction would compel us to conclude
that it is a duck. Abduction invites us to reconsider. If it does these things like a
duck, but we are aware of another factor that does not seem “duckly,” then it might
be a goose. This is abduction in a nutshell. It probes a given set of relations and,
whilst trying to confirm them, opens the possibility that those relations are not well
suited to one another. It allows another explanation that may provide more
coherence and explanatory power. It performs these operations simultaneously. On
the one hand, it strengthens relations and theories—provided they minimize
internal dissonance. On the other hand, as it aligns and instinctively compares
elements, the relative stability of its coordinating product provokes alternate
possibilities in our imagination. Instead of forestalling those instincts and reducing
them, abduction seizes upon them in full form. Thus, it is ideal for theory-building.
As the engine of SYSTEMATIC COMBINING, it keeps research developmental
and recursive and therefore always capacious for alternate explanations for a
phenomenon. What I must emphasize is that the full force of abduction is always
operative in everything that follows. Abduction will not always be stated directly or
declared outright, but it is always fomenting speculative insights. Namely, because
this is a study in theory building. We are looking to formulate an idea rather than
strictly confirm it. We are always gesturing towards novel understandings whilst

12. Dubois and Gadde, “Systematic Combining,” 555.
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piecing together elements of a phenomenon. This does not mean that abduction is
an open-ended platform for any hair-brained connection. Abduction is still
constrained by its observations and structural commitments. It only means that
abduction has a wide—but focused—lense that is critical for the early stages of a
new paradigm.
As a foretaste of what abduction will produce, SYSTEMATIC COMBINING will
show that when we sample the empirical world, we find that making rests upon a
few key foundational pillars. Those pillars are fortified or weakened by certain
theories of making. SYSTEMATIC COMBINING will show that those very pillars
have cracks in them. This weakening of making corresponds to the prevailing
theories of writing. This comes into clear view as we proceed, but at this point, we
can only say that writing provides a certain conceptual basis for acts of making
(even local ones unrelated to the manual act of writing) and that this basis actually
undermines making. Simultaneously, as SYSTEMATIC COMBINING reveals the
insufficiencies of written theories of making, it also points to the restorative
possibilities of a drawn theory. These possibilities are the purpose of this paper: to
flesh out a theory of making that is grounded in drawing. The remainder of this
first chapter, however, is to establish the apparatus that will provide footing for
these later formulations and insights.
To recap, inadequate models of making highlight the need for an accessible,
fruitful, and robust theory. SYSTEMATIC COMBINING will help me build a theory
of making both because it makes room for theory generation (precisely what we
need) and because it parallels my internal conclusions. This method will allow me
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to look back and chart the elements of those insufficient models and look forward
and coordinate those same elements under a new organizing theory. But that must
come later. At this point, we must turn towards the ground, zoom in on the
empirical world, and gather data on the common perceptions of life and making.

1.3 Out of the Question
In our EMPIRICAL examination, excavation tools arise out of questions. Questions
can till the soil of hardened assumptions and reintroduce disregarded experiences.
But, right here at the outset, I want to do something strategically drastic. I want to
suspend all the questions I have developed here above. They are my questions. Not
ours. Not the world’s, so to speak. Starting with my questions would violate my
core condition to situate making in the lives of common people. It would be like
building a local artifice with foreign and ecologically hazardous materials. More
importantly, letting the investigation arise out of my questions would have a very
practical consequence for this specific set of papers in front of you. They could
make this work irrelevant to the people I am trying to reach. Here at the
culminating end of my conceptual journey, I fear a hard fact: no one will care about
my questions. At least no one except interested parties or friends. And even these
folks will not bring my questions into their own lives. My conjectures will be dead
on arrival if I base my work on private interest, neologisms, or esoteric curiosities.
How valuable can any scholarly contribution be if the assessing conversation
remains behind closed doors or tucked within complex terms where no one can
listen in? If I want the dissertation to make a dent in the world I will need to start
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from scratch. If I want my conclusions to have an impact for those on the ground
then I need to start from the ground up. Therefore, I will turn the dissertation
inside out to establish the “so what” of my study at the very beginning. I will let the
world’s questions be my point of departure. I will begin at the end.
This end cannot be deduced by a logical approach to a problem in the world.
This would already have too much distance. We must follow the path of the
anthropologist and listen for that “end” as it arises in a mythos.13 A mythos is that
undercurrent or thematic that guides a series of behaviors.14 It is akin to a narrative
plot but it exceeds it in intensity and depth. Mythos becomes the psychological
orientation of the actors within its jurisdiction. Mythos is the telos of local
inventions and practice. It sits somewhere between narrative and habitus.15 We
might say it is their bonding agent. We experience mythos in mythemes. To wit,
beginning with mythemes is not unusual in analytical research or theory building.
Jacques Derrida’s famous account of the pharmakon or Bernard Stiegler’s series
Time and Technics both descend from mythemes. But, a mytheme is not restricted
to texts or well-known fables. A mytheme may also be a well-circulated phatic
description like an idiom.
To avoid smuggling my interests back in, I must suspend any mytheme or
“end” that is contained in my conjecture. Fortunately, we do not have to be very
aggressive with our EMPIRICAL sampling to locate our founding mytheme. It

13. Aristotle, Poetics (London: Penguin, 1997), 14-20.
14. Claude Levi-Strauss, "The Structural Study of Myth," The Journal of American Folklore 68, no. 270 (1955): 430,
doi:10.2307/536768.
15. Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 214.
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actually comes to us. The world shows itself on its own terms. Our grounding
concepts arise right out of the world’s questions (the world outside my thesis…the
world this study is built for…the world who will go on living and making). And
those “real world” questions come right at the end—and on the outside of—the
dissertation. I am not being obtuse or indirect. I am referring to that literal and
temporal end when the dissertation is printed, submitted, and defended. Where
privileged study shifts to shared interest. Where the poetic becomes prosaic and
the pedantic stands before the pedestrian. Where I have to face my neighbors,
supporters, and family, and explain to them what I have just done for the last few
years and with my life savings. This is where I encounter the actual “so what”
questions of the world—not just the ones I posed for myself. This is the empirical
soil that I will dig in. This is the soil where I will plant the seeds of my research.
We do not have to dig deep. We do not have to wait long for the world’s
questions. They are actually waiting for us at this end. And, conveniently, they point
us right back to the issue of living and making. When we do encounter someone at
this end, they ask two simple, but loaded, questions. One is explicit and the other is
its implicit corollary. As to the first, someone will ask, or perhaps already has many
times, “what are you going to do with your degree?” This all-too-familiar question
may seem harmless at best and annoying at worst. But our routine consent to this
question conceals what is actually at stake. When someone asks us, “what are you
going to do,” they intend something very simple. What they want to know is: where
are you going to get a job doing this thing you studied? This comes as no surprise.
But it's precisely the fact that this interpretation is so ubiquitous that deserves
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attention. There is a social ontology and behavioral psychology so deeply
embedded in this question that it is hardly ever noticed. Questioners and
responders alike assume that what we “do”—in our case, what we study—is
primarily explicable in economic terms. If this assumption is ever academically
interrogated it usually remains in economic spheres. But what is self-evident,
although enervated, in the question is its focus on human activity and agency.
Action is the most direct aspect of the sentence but it gets buried under the weight
of economic assumption. Thus, the question both conceals and reveals the
primordial purposes of human action. It is simply asking: how will you act?
This explicit question is always accompanied by an implicit corollary. The
second—often silent—question is: will it matter? It is the one that haunts the
respondent. Even if one can articulate what they plan to do, they cannot measure its
effect. That part is up to the rest of the world. Others—other lands, other people,
other animals, etc.——will decide whether that thing we “do” with our degree is
significant. And much like the first question, that significance is measured
economically and semiotically. Even if the question only circulates in the
imagination, both the questioner and the respondent will anticipate "mattering" by
how much money that “doing” will generate. Both imagine significance as gaining
enough semiotic force to effect symbolic change—to buy a company or gain social
status. Once again, though, this abstract economic interpretation obscures the plain
nature of the inquiry. If we took it at face value, to matter would simply be effecting
material change. Or perhaps more appropriately, constructing materiality. It would
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be doing something embodied or sensual. Mattering would be more like making a
quilt, playing with Lego, or baking. It is simply asking: what will you change?
As is natural with EMPIRICAL sampling, these observations help us sketch out
some basic structures for a new theory of making. First, and self-evidently, the two
questions share space and time. They arrive together. The first question leads to
the second. They are mutually informing. Second, and more importantly, they also
share an organizing principle. The force of that organizing principle affirms some
interpretations and repels others. For example, The questions ostensibly ask: what
material reality (matter) will you act on (do)? But, we feel dissonance when we take
these questions in simple and plain ways because they are at odds with the
prevailing motif. We are supposed to know that the questions mean that we should
get a job (do) and earn significant capital (matter). This is the inherited and
approved reading. On our way towards setting down a FRAMEWORK, these
patterns point our EMPIRICAL attention to other samples to see if this governing
motif is bigger than these two questions.
Let us reorient ourselves, then. We are here at the end of the dissertation
mining thoroughly mundane situations for clues about the nature of making. Two
standard questions have set us well on our way. But to probe further, these
questions can give way to a third idiomatic question that is both more synthesized
and more fecund for our purposes. It discloses a more general disposition.
Someone may ask: how do you plan to make a living. The idiom reinforces and
develops the notion of action intimated in the “doing” question above. Here, the
word plan connotes more intent and purpose than simply “doing.” And, in expected
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fashion, this plan is unreflectively treated as an economic strategy to get a job,
secure capital, and so forth. And, in accordance with what we saw with other terms
above, the term plan—when taken directly—does not imply economic strategy but
some kind of interaction on a planar surface. Likewise, making is self-evident and
clearly stands at odds with “getting a job and “living” is irreducible to money. In
addition to these tensions, this idiom also expands and generalizes the prior
questions by recasting doing as making and mattering as living. What was formerly
characterized as a personal obligation to do something and matter is now
connected to the general duty of all to make and to live. These idiomatic questions
codify the basic cultural rationale.16 Before homing in on that rationale, we must
turn our attention towards the FRAMEWORK field and derive the basic structures
of making latent in these observations.
Let me restate what we have in front of us now. We have a clear research
desire: to build a theory of making. We have a clear research agenda: that theory
should be accessible, materially effectual, and conceptually viable. We responded to
that desire and agenda by activating SYSTEMATIC COMBINING. We started by
pointing the EMPIRICAL lens of ` COMBINING at the end of the dissertation to let
the world define making in its basic questions. We observed three questions (What
are you going to do? Will it matter? Plan to make a living?) that cluster around a
basic economic motif. We also sketched out ways that those terms might be
misaligned and therefore could cluster around an alternate motif. Now we must

16. To stave off any potential dismissal, idiomatic phrases are not incidental or irrelevant. They are pristine social samples.
They mobilize ideals and inculcate the uninitiated. They reveal what we bury in them
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investigate those terms more directly to test their flexibility and to anticipate
alternate clusters (which will then lead to a tectonic theory of making centered on
drawing). We turn our attention towards the FRAMEWORK field and try to distill
the basic concepts that structure the terms, questions, and idioms that emerged in
our EMPIRICAL observation.

1.4 The Three Elements
The FRAMEWORK will generalize what we found in the EMPIRICAL stage. It also
isolates corresponding concepts that we can then work with. In the first question,
“doing something” implies agency. Even if the status quo interpretation of the
question is about jobs, the questioner still assumes that the path to power, the
control over one’s future, is wrapped up in the issue of agency—even if that
market-laden agency proves to be exsanguinating. The second question,
“mattering” qualifies the scope and force of that agency. Accordingly, it assumes
that agency is material in two senses. The interrogator thinks that the
consequences of a job will be empirically evident. But this is only the first sense of
“mattering.” This sense is directly physical. The question includes a second sense
wherein mattering pertains to an ability to effect, change, or cause the “matters at
hand.” Put together, material efficacy is those actions that redirect or shape an
event. Importantly, the questioner does not evaluate efficacy—for better or worse.
The questioner also does not isolate efficacy to ecologically, emotionally, or socially
impact. What is important is that effectual agency is a cardinal element of making.
In the third question, the “doing” and “mattering” are configured as a dyad: making
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and living. They go together. To do is to matter. Making is living. Agency is
efficacy. And, of course, any of these can be inverted. Lastly, plan combines both
agency and material efficacy with manual execution. To plan is to spread out,
measure, and scratch the surface. In simplest terms, to plan is to mark that
surface. This is why the term has deep affinities with architecture. We will discuss
this in detail in chapter 5. For now, I simply want to enumerate the elements of the
framework we see. Making is a constellation of agency, marking, and surfaces.
This framing, lets us compare the structural elements of making against my
early desires and research agenda. I wanted a theory of making that is common.
These elements are general and universal and therefore common. But their
universality is nevertheless experienced specifically and particularly. Though we
derived them from the scholar’s dissertation experience, they (agency, marking,
and surfaces) are ubiquitous. They are present in most forms of “making.” And
they are applicable to those who would not consider themselves makers. The
questions that produced these elements are asked of everyone. Whether you quit a
job, acquire a skill, or fall in love, someone is asking you “what are you going to do
now” or “how do you plan to make a living given x situation?” In other words, our
framework is both local and distributable. These elements of making apply to me
and to nearly everyone within their own field-specific situation. They satisfy the
main demands of our study. Namely, to establish an account of making that is both
radically common and theoretically sound. They also correspond to the original
goals, as noted above. That is, to understand making in the everyday world and
energize it. We need not look for analytical logics or quantifiable measurements of
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these terms. We only need to see that they underwrite our daily rituals and shapemaking or unmaking. This is not to say that these elements cannot still be tested
under quantifiable methods or analytical philosophies. So to reiterate and conclude
this section: daily interests in making a living or doing and mattering orbit around
the foundational concepts of agency, marking, and surfaces.

1.5 The Structural Elements of Making
At the risk of redundancy, let us collect what we have developed so far so that we
can map out the obstacles in front of us. I am trying to build a theory of making that
suits everyday life. That issue, as it turns out, is not uniquely my own. By using a
non-hierarchical methodology, we EMPIRICALLY examined everyday questions
that center on doing, mattering, making, and living. We used the FRAMEWORK
aspects of our method to distill three basic elements of making: agency, surfaces,
and markings. At this point, these conclusions reopen a question I posed earlier
we passed over. Namely, why is so damn hard to do this? If we know what making
is made of, then why can we not live this out? To answer, we must use
SYSTEMATIC COMBINING’S fluidity to float back over to the empirical field
where we can observe the obstacles to making in everyday life.
If we return to our original EMPIRICAL sampling of questions, we can see
opposition to making approaching from two fronts. Let us consider our original
mundane questions in reverse. The last question we identified, about making and
living, generalized the issues of doing and mattering. Living is everyone’s purview.
Making at this scale is threatened by the Anthropocene. The Anthropocene is a
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geological term that denotes an epoch of time in which humans have precedence
on the earth.17 This can mean that humans have the greatest efficacy or that the
world is centered around humans. For example, the Holocene precedes the
Anthropocene and was defined by heat. The Pleistocene before that, ice. So, in
simpler terms, humanity defines the earth. But that role might be destructive or
constructive. That is still under debate. In fact, the very nature of the Anthropocene
is always under review.18 But most of those disputes are about when the age begins
not whether it has begun. But this does not yet tell us why the Anthropocene is a
challenge to making. For that, we need to identify the most universally affirmed
aspect of the Anthropocene.
According to the Anthropocene, whatever action the agent of change performs,
they perform that action on a surface. After all, it is a geological term. And geology
concerns itself with surfaces and layers of surfaces.19 Identifying the surface here
does two things. First, it reaffirms our FRAMEWORK. We said earlier that the
surface is a pillar in the structure of making. In direct terms, the Anthropocene
agrees. Second, the surface also maps the battlefield for making. This is where the
danger arises. If humans are the center of the world, and the world is on a dismal
trajectory, that damage is felt at the surface20. In the age of the Anthropocene, the

17. Paul J. Crutzen, "Geology of mankind," Nature 415, no. 6867 (2002): 23, doi:10.1038/415023a.
18. Donna Haraway et al., "Anthropologists Are Talking – About the Anthropocene," Ethnos 81, no. 3 (2015): 45, Bruno
Latour, "Anthropology at the Time of the Anthropocene: A Personal View of What Is to Be Studied," The Anthropology of
Sustainability, 2017, 38, doi:10.1057/978-1-137-56636-2_2.
19. Jan Zalasiewicz et al., "The Anthropocene: Comparing Its Meaning in Geology (Chronostratigraphy) with Conceptual
Approaches Arising in Other Disciplines," Earth's Future 9, no. 3 (2021): 5, doi:10.1029/2020ef001896.
20. Zalasiewicz, “Meaning in Geology,” 10.
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surface is threatened by human construction. Or, making. We dig into mountains,
expunge waste from and into the ground, and we affect the surface temperatures of
oceans. As a result, we are deeply afraid of damaging the world right here at the
surface. And this has direct consequences for collective human making. Ecological
disaster and mass extinction, we fear, are in our future if we keep making things at
this rate and in this way.21 In other words, if we do make our life then we may not
be able to live with the world we have made.
But human making gave us dental care, statuesque art, and conservation. Is it
all bad? Is it humans qua humans that are destroying the earth? Since the arrival of
the Anthropocene, another term has come into the geological lexicon that may
more properly explain the current state of the planet. The Capitalocene affirms the
dangers of human action by aligning them with capital flows.22 That is, it is not
humans qua humans who destroy things but those that hold access to capital in the
greatest quantities. These can be private persons, corporations, or governments.
According to the Capitalocene advocates, digging in the mountain or drilling in the
ocean is a derivative of the desire for capital. And the Capitalocene does not
circulate and influence the world amongst elites, it bears down on the least of these.
Recall that our making a living question opened up the role of the
Anthropocene. Our second question, doing-and-mattering, confirms the role of the
Capitalocene. Most everyday folks do not fret about their actions having planetary

21. Susan A. Crate, "Introduction: Anthropology and Climate Change," in Anthropology and Climate Change: From Encounters
to Actions, ed. Susan A. Crate and Mark Nuttall (London: Routledge, 2016), 24.
22. Jason W. Moore, "The Capitalocene, Part I: on the nature and origins of our ecological crisis," The Journal of Peasant
Studies 44, no. 3 (2017): 597, doi:10.1080/03066150.2016.1235036.
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consequences. They do, however, worry that their actions will—or will not—affect
their relationship to capital. This produces local conflicts and competitions. Social
arrangements, school decisions, city policies, and more are driven by these capital
flows. The Capitalocene arranges which businesses get stitched into local soil,
which skin gets which advantage, or how humans interface with each other. While
the Anthropocene points to the surface of the planet and the Capitalocene points to
the surface of others. The Capitalocene may or may not be the central influence on
climate change, but it is certainly the most dominant force in class dynamics.
These two fronts are always lurking in our sense of making. And, once again,
this is evident in our daily discourse. No, I don’t have the time to build that. Time is
money. That’s an expensive hobby. I don't know if the soil will, will hold. I don't
know if I can plant here. I don't know if I can dig here. I don't know if I have access
to the wood that I need to make this. Or I don't have the financial resources. I'm not
the owner. I'm not big money. I don't have the power to do that.
The Anthropocene and the Capitalocene have led many to believe that making
is dangerous, impossible, or antiquated (let the machines do it). But this is
precisely where EMPIRICAL samples and FRAMEWORKS need help. These two
categories only tell us what the structures of a phenomenon are, not why they
began or continue that way. We must open the need for a THEORY. In the
THEORY field, we have some rationale or explanation for the data we have and the
patterns we see therein. The THEORY explains how the elements of the framework
are held together. What kind of relationship they have. Those connections allow us
to stretch our understanding and imagination. We can use one element of a

30

FRAMEWORK to shed light on another. In so doing, we can draw inferences about
dark elements. We can evaluate the quality of that bond. We can even identify the
elements that are underserved by that bond. We will do all of that in chapter 3. For
now, we only need to be able to say that making, living, surface, agency, materiality,
and so on may not be the problems underlying the Anthropocene and the
Capitalocene. The problem may lie with the way they are arranged. It may be their
priority, their distribution, or their negligence. Below, we will test status quo
theories directly and show that these elements can be invigorated and even
undermine the Anthropocene and capital’s energy.
It is worth noting that the Anthropocene and the Capitalocene are not all bad.
They may reflect a disordered theory but they can also still play a diagnostic and
prescriptive role in this study. As I have already noted, The Anthropocene confirms
the importance of the surface. What we make changes the ground, our skin, and
our sky. Meanwhile, the Capitalocene testifies to the centrality of agency (which
we have observed implies material efficacy). That is, only a few people have the
money to make earthly differences. Put differently, the marks we make on the earth
(Anthropocene) or the marks we are allowed to make on each other (Capitalocene)
underlie the everyday concepts of making a living or doing something that matters.
In other words, these two obstacles still traffic in the same structural elements we
distilled before. They sharpen them even further. These problems focus our
attention as our study approaches the THEORY field. They confirm that any model
of making will need to align surface, agency, and marking in a hospitable way. They
are well suited for the abductive reasoning noted above. They appear with the logic
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of doom but they inadvertently map their corrective. They convert the
FRAMEWORK into the schematic of a new theory of making that restores and
realigns those elements.
Most of our analysis, to this point, has concerned agency and surfaces. These
are nominal in our experience. They are usually accompanied by referential bodies.
We observe them naturally and therefore it is easy to conceive of them as
instrumental in making. Marks are harder to isolate because they are implicitly
processual. They happen. Therefore, we need to briefly touch on them here. Recall
that our making a living question introduced the term plan to describe the human’s
role in that life. When we passed this datum through our FRAMEWORK, we said
that it implies stretching out a surface and marking it. Will these marks be lost in
the new model? Not at all. Quite the opposite. Marking extends the FRAMEWORK
towards a more robust THEORY by offering an instrument that can operationalize
agency and surfaces. It will become the chief instrument of the new model. In
empirical terms, “planning” is the apparatus for living, making, doing, and
mattering. In FRAMEWORK terms, marking performs but agency and surfaces.
But this latter point will only become evident as we test these terms in the
THEORY field.

1.6 On Inscriptions
To really test a theory’s effect on the elements of making, we must establish a
constant. Let me put it conditionally. If we want to build a theory of making that is
accessible, effective, and common, then we need a way to discern when we are
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closer to that goal and when we are further from it. The elements we have
discovered thus far cannot give us that because they are dependent variables. They
always appear (marking, surface, efficacy, agency) but their value varies based on
how they are arranged. The data sampling taken from the EMPIRICAL world
cannot give us that measuring stick because they are also variable. And, as we have
said, both of these are arranged by theories. Is THEORY our answer? Not exactly.
Theories are exceedingly hard to pin down and measure. They are nebular and
amorphous. They cannot be a constant for our study. Theories are the thing being
measured rather than doing the measuring. Therefore, they are our independent
variable. We need something more concrete to tie down the study. For that, we turn
to inscriptions.
My specific conjecture will arise right here at the intersection of EMPIRICAL
observations, FRAMEWORK elements, and THEORETICAL alignments. But I
cannot just state it without risking it to presumptive distortion or the conceptual
prejudice of the reader. Without a constant to hold it still, it is subject to a wayward
academic tendency. I can brace my hypothesis against that drift and establish a
constant in the same stroke. First, the trend. My research tries to address a social
practice and cultural transformation. It is explicitly targeting daily life and changes
in the role of making. It is admittedly large. And, I have tried to narrow that
through method and organization but there is still an academic impulse to go big.
In fact, this is a general scholarly trend. We tend to focus on larger paradigms in
order to account for more phenomena and to increase the applicability of our
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contribution. But, as I noted from the beginning, this may fall flat. Therefore, I want
to consult another scholar who has zeroed in on a way around this compulsion.

1.6.1 Bruno Latour, Maurizio Ferraris, and Jean-Luc Nancy
Bruno Latour is a theorist and historian of science, human culture and thought,
and in some respects, politics. In his essay, Drawing Things Together, he points out
that when the scholar becomes interested in questions of large-scale cultural
formation or transformation, they tend to evaluate them from wide abstract
angles.23 They intuit all sorts of constituent problems like the ones I have laid out
above. Then at the moment of establishing a conjecture, they pull back and try to
provide an abstract rubric that can make sense of them. And this is dangerous
because by providing that abstract hypothesis, the scholar will scissor off or
eliminate phenomena that do not make sense within their broad paradigm. OR, for
the more aware scholar, they have to over-explain and hegemonically assimilate
things. Perhaps, more directly, the scholar does not have a singular datum to study
but a series of data. So they cannot see a phenomenon all under one lens.
Therefore, we conjure one. For example, we explain epochal shifts like “modernity”
with inventions like “rationalism” without ever being able to pinpoint rationalism.
Latour goes on to identify two dominant modes of this wide-angle approach.
The first approach is mentalist and the second is materialist.24 The mentalist
approach tries to explain large-scale cultural orientations or transformations by

23. Bruno Latour, "Visualisation and Cognition: Drawing Things Together," in The Map Reader: Theories of Mapping Practice
and Cartographic Representation, ed. Martin Dodge, Rob Kitchin, and Chris Perkins (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2011), 65.
24. Latour, 66.

34

designating them as the product of a mind or concept. In other words, we changed
the way we think about things and therefore the world looks different. Examples
abound. We stopped seeing the world through a transcendental lens. We stopped
seeing the world through an a priori lens. We used to think of humans as animals.
The problems with the mentalist approach are well documented. They cannot
account for small-scale everyday interactions. And, as we have already intimated,
they neglect unsuitable data. It has to wash over, or under, them. It cannot explain
how things actually change on the ground. It cannot accurately diagnose. It cannot
prescribe. Of course, it will always claim to all of these things. But Latour’s point is
that mentalist approaches are only successful if we accept their large-scale arbitrary
inventions.25
Opposite the mentalist approach is the materialist. It is often more attractive
because it takes up the mentalist’s failures directly. It is hyper-attuned to the way
actual structures, objects, and relations change in reality. Examinations of
capitalism, analyses of a clock or typewriter, and forays into determinate computing
are all examples of this trend. But materialist explanations have their own
problems. Materialist accounts cannot explain the continuity of that phenomenon
over time.26 They struggle to explain how simple modes of production or simple
material goods can necessitate human behaviors, emotions, visions, ambition, and
so on. In some ways, they are anti-material because they press so firmly into
mechanical accounts that they are not able to extrapolate out their findings.27 They

25. Latour, 69.
26. Latour, 69.
27. Latour, 69.
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go silent or they inadvertently become mentalist in trying to subject everything to
their mechanical principle.
As a result, Latour pushes for a synthetic, or perhaps a more originally unified,
option. This third option is not in between, or third at all, but is the shared ground
of both mentalist and materialist tendencies. This third way, then, is what he calls
inscription.28 Latour claims that if we want to understand cultural transformation,
we need to understand those sites where we inscribe things into reality. We need to
be looking at how we actually transmit our ideas from one time to another or from
one location to another.29 If we are interested in knowing why culture in one age
looked at things in a certain way and then looked at them another way in a different
era then we need to home in on how our inscriptions have changed over time and
developed new visions of reality.
His key example is a colonizing one. A Frenchman is charting an area that
includes a Chinese island.30 It would be easy to understand their interaction only as
the result of an imperialism which is then codified in the map. It is just as easy to
understand the map as the progenitor of imperialism. But, as Latour points out, the
Chinese also made maps in the sand. They also projected terrain. It is not a thought
or object that is significant. What is distinct here is that the map is an inscription
that can spread and roam about the world. And wherever the inscription goes,
material and mentalist angles are transformed by it. suddenly optical control

28. Latour, 68.The concept of inscriptions, as applied here, is an extension of the claims he made in Bruno Latour and Steve
Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).
29. Latour, 72-77.
30. Latour, 67.
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becomes a standardized desire. Maps beget more diagrams and more codes and so
on. The original map does not simply impose a conceptual framework nor does it
materialistically breed a concept. Rather, the map is a testimony to how ideas are
born, travel, and grow.
Immediately we can see that in trying to understand making as a cultural
orientation, my study is actually operating in the realm of inscriptions. But the more
critical value here is that the changing expression of inscriptions coincides with the
changing nature of society. In the same way, the elements of making in the
framework and empirical world change as the theory varies. Latour goes on to
illustrate this in more detail. Later in the essay, he tracks the evolution of this
visualization as it morphs into written documents. What started as disparate in the
imagination (the relationship of one big idea to another or one place to another)
was put side by side in a drawing or diagram and became actionable. that action
was maximized and expedited when the drawing became the written record.31
These small blocks of inscriptions are what we now know as bureaucracy. The
conceptual force and material effect of these documents are that the tiny becomes
really large. Little signatures rule giant nations. This pushes against those
tendencies noted above. Whereas we normally want to bypass the red tape and look
for other causal explanations in society, for Latour, this documentation is precisely
where we should look. We will not change government, for example, by citing
Derrida but by creating a form.

31. Latour, 90.
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We must be careful not to take inscriptions as simply the pieces of paper in
front of us or the messages of a communicator. We should consult a few voices who
have carefully rounded out the full nature of inscriptions. Anyone who is familiar
with Latour will recognize in these inscriptions the echoes of actors and networks.
For Latour, if inscriptions are actors in a network then the power of inscriptions is
measured by the size of its constituent network. For example, he says, consider
capitalism. We have been approaching it from the wrong end: looking at capitalism
as though it is a process that gives rise to the narrow inscriptions (paper notes) that
shape our lives. But the opposite holds. Capitalism as a concept is weak without the
entire network of inscriptions and record-keeping that makes it viable and visible.32
This is precisely what grounds blockchains: the ledger. Its novel achievement is
that the computers are doing the record keeping. Marxism, he claims, should not
look to money per se but should fixate on the “centers of calculation” wherein
money papers are shuffled. To reiterate, it is the networks of these transmissible
inscriptions that govern human action and daily life.
Maurizio Ferraris, the new realist philosopher, coined the notion of
documentality that corroborates Latour’s insight.33 Ferraris was not directly
interested in cultural formation as much as establishing the real nature of texts
against a Derridean backdrop. Nevertheless, his conclusions are closely aligned
with Latour. Documentality asserts that speech acts become social objects when
they are registered.34 Ferraris goes so far as to say that all objects are inscribed acts

32. Latour, 93.
33. Maurizio Ferraris, Documentality: Why it is Necessary to Leave Traces (Commonalities, 2013), 247.
34. Ferraris, 120.
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of some sort. And these inscribed acts are etched on the surface of the mind and
evolve into letters and signatures. Once again, for both authors, if we want to make
change in the world we must do so at the level of inscriptions.
A third voice expands even further by drawing us beyond the social
dimensions of inscriptions and into their ontological implications. Jean-Luc Nancy,
the French theorist, moves away from the term inscriptions and embraces a notion
of exscription.35 Writing is an exscription, he says. For Nancy, writing is not an
attempt to approximate a reality around us but rather to found or grounds that
world around by “edging” it. Writing is an exscription that gives outline or form to
things which in turn makes them touchable. That exscribed world and its things
still remains somewhat remote or inaccessible “in themselves,” according to Nancy,
but this is mostly because as you touch each surface there is another waiting
beyond it.36 There is no final center. No full “it” to touch. Just ongoing exscription.
Writing “matters” insofar as it is giving shape and form and sense through a kind of
groping or touching. Nancy’s emphasis on exteriority has its own share of ethical
difficulties and ontological pitfalls but for now, it is sufficient to point out the
repetitive nature of inscriptions/exscriptions.
This notion of inscription not only isolates our constant, but it also aligns with
the expressed purposes of this research. I directly that I want to stay close to the
ground of daily experience and inscriptions do that. I noted that I did not want my
speculations to become unclear or unmoored. Inscriptions give shape to

35. Jean-Luc Nancy and Katherine Lydon, "Exscription," Yale French Studies, no. 78 (1990): 47, doi:10.2307/2930115.
36. Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2000), 92.
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forthcoming examinations and prevent inflated irrelevance. I culled out structural
features of making while considering the framework. One of those elements—
surface—is intimately linked with inscriptions. I highlighted the empirical obstacles
to a theory of making. Namely, the Anthropocene and Capitalocene. Centers of
inscriptions are critical to ratifying or reversing both. Finally, inscriptions are
multifaceted. Not only are they networked but they always have a mentalist and
materialist hue. From the beginning, I have cited my desire to have a theory of
making that can be both concept and mechanism.
Beyond their symmetrical relationship to my purposes, inscriptions open new
dimensions for a novel theory of making. One point I will expand on in chapter 3 is
the nature of habit. Insofar as inscriptions are manual things that are repeated, or
shared, they are entirely habitual. But this does not mean the private habit of a
single person. As Ferraris claimed, inscriptions are not singular art pieces that exist
in the mind of a genius and are heralded by many from afar. They are social objects
which have been registered by subjects.37 As Nancy pointed out, they are things
that we share.38 They are things that make sharing possible. And, as Latour
described it, we circulate inscriptions amongst one another.39 They are part of our
social habits. Habits share another common feature with inscriptions. Being
habitual means more than just being vainly repetitious. Habits, like inscriptions, are
a double-movement. They are both willful and natural. They are purposeful and
conditional. The full value of these parallels will become apparent in chapter 3 but

37. Ferraris, Documentality, 121.
38. Nancy, “Exscription,” 48.
39. Latour, “Drawing,” 91.
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for now, it is enough to say that habits will provide an ontological justification for
drawing as inscription.
Nancy’s approach to inscriptions issues a challenge to our study. But upon
closer examination, it may be ontologically fortuitous. The problem centers around
the prefix: in. In short, does the marking go “in” or go “out?” Jean-Luc Nancy
affirms the latter. His reversal of inscription into exscription suggests when
marking occurs it does externally, even to itself. This has a certain ontological
orientation. It suggests that the world and its inhabitants always remain exterior to
each other. For Nancy exscriptions constantly go out to sense the edge of the
world.40 Nancy cannot use the term inscription to describe markings because it
would insinuate the opposite. An inscription would be going in towards an object
and at some level crossing into it. Nancy is concerned that if an inscription passed
into something else, then we would have to conclude that it flowed out of an
enclosed ego.41 That it flowed from an existential self. For Nancy and many others
—who we will address in chapter 3—enclosed things are estranged and untenable
things. If an inscription can not flow from an enclosed self unto an enclosed object,
then they are both a series of surfaces continuously reaching out and touching each
other. Thus, we arrive at Nancy’s exscription. So does this radically undo the notion
of inscription from the start? In chapter 3 I will expound upon this, but for now, I
can firmly say no. Instead, it only adds dimensionality to inscriptions and opens the
need for more ontological explanation. To affirm inscriptions as the key operator in

40. Nancy, “Exscription,” 57.
41. Nancy, Being Singular Plural, 44.
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making, living, doing, and mattering, we must attend to the way inscriptions cross
the threshold between inside and outside. More on that later.
We should regroup here and look closely at what we now have at our
methodological disposal and address the questions that are emerging. In
SYSTEMATIC COMBINING, the EMPIRICAL WORLD and FRAMEWORK are
dependent variables. The way we live/make and the way we structure that living/
making fluctuates. Inscriptions are a constant to both. In any fluctuation, we see the
steady presence of inscriptions. But the nagging curiosity here is: if they are
constant, and they are so ubiquitous, then where are we getting different results?
What accounts for better moments of making and living or worse ones? The answer
lies in THEORY. THEORY drives the FRAMEWORK and interprets the
EMPIRICAL WORLD whilst pivoting on the constant. In this case, the THEORY
inflects the inscriptions. To be clear, then, the purpose of the study is not to
introduce inscriptions as the constant but to identify the theories that have
deformed the dependent variables through this constant. In other words, to see
which model of making and living has inscribed the Anthropocene and
Capitalocene and then offer an alternative.

1.7 The Conjecture
I submit that the dominant theory of making in our world is best identified with the
inscription of writing. Writing is a way of configuring empirical elements and a way
of structuring our framework. But writing is not coextensive with inscriptions as
such. They are not directly interchangeable. Writing is also not simply the
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alphabetic arrangement in front of your eyes. Writing is a way of acting. Writing
evokes a certain THEORY and its specific theory itself does not have a proper
name. Yes, movements like deconstruction relate to writing but so does actornetwork-theory, affect theory, Marxist analysis, and more. Therefore, we have to
use the word writing flexibly. It is also two-sided. It means both a certain mode of
inscriptions as well as the theory that informs that mode. But this is not new to our
study. We have said from the beginning that a theory of making, now configured as
inscriptions, must always be a concept and mechanism. Writing fits that bill.
Therefore, I take writing as the status quo model and theory of making. But I
introduce writing here not just to satisfy requirements but to recall that a theory
can meet some conditions whilst unsettling others. Recall that I have effectively
claimed that the status quo model of making is destructive. Therefore, writing must
somehow deform the basic elements of making and therefore bear responsibility
for the damage.
We will look more closely at writing through the remainder of the study. But, if
we took a passing glance at it now, and placed it under SYSTEMATIC
COMBINING’s categories, we could roughly sketch its role in the Anthropocene
and Capitalocene. Writing emerges as a preeminent inscription when our empirical
life is configured by the framework of language. So much ink has been spilled to
situate all of life in language.42 And, consequently, more work has been done to

42. Alan D. Schrift and Claire Colbrook, "The Linguistic Turn in Continental Philosophy," in The History of Continental
Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 279.
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argue for writing as a critical operator in language.43 That work, in turn, has tried to
understand how, or whether, every intention should be treated as an authorial act.
The complementary theories have had ontological concerns about violence,
otherness, difference, change, and so on. In large part, as I will exposit later, these
ontologies pivot on notions of incommensurability. Therefore, writing, in its
theoretical hue, trends towards separation or monistic collapse. This monism,
decidedly chic, has deleterious effects on making.
I contend that such a monism cannot grant agency or surfaces and inevitably
undermines writing’s goal as an inscription for life. This is evident in the work of
thinkers like Derrida and Blanchot who expressly focus on writing. Agency gives
way to absence, touch gives way to limitrophy, and life gives way to perpetual
death.44 The consequences of writing are not confined to the abstract either. We
will touch on the way that writing-as-theory underscores industrial concepts like
copyright and Latour’s “paperwork” insight snd how both these inform the theme
of ownership that structures the Capitalocene.45 Finally, as we approach the
ultimate chapter, we will see how writing is the ancestor of code and informs this
historical moment when the digital tries to resolve the problems of the

43. Jacques Derrida’s entire body of work could be listed here but for my purposes, the most significant ones are: Jacques
Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2013), and Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2021). The simple sentence also implies much of the work of Maurice Blanchotas well. The two most important for
my study are Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature: A Translation of "l'Espace Littéraire (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 2015), and Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015). Though not cited
here in this work, we could trace the issues of writing in the work of Roland Barthes, Jacques Ranciere, Helene Cixous, etc.
44. Blanchot, Space of Literature, 95.
45. Moore, Capitalocene, 604-609.
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Anthropocene.46 But all is not lost in writing. It will become increasingly apparent
that writing only falls when it forgets that it is always already drawing.

1.8 The Architectonic
The goal is clear. The conjecture is before us. And we have laid out our blueprint.
Allow me a few sentences to review the basic features of the study. First, I am
driven by a desire to understand and rehabilitate making in local and daily life. This
calls for a new theory of making that is radically common, actual, and academically
robust. A constructive theory demands systematic explication. I use SYSTEMATIC
COMBINING to evaluate the current state of making on the ground and to discover
the seeds of a new theory. I start by focusing empirical attention on the kinds of
questions about jobs and living that circulate in daily life. Those questions yield
patterns and conceptual motifs about making. I then filter those patterns and
establish a basic and more general set of terms that give a framework to these
questions. I point towards the need to test and measure the unified theory that
holds these frameworks together in modern consciousness. Thus far, everything in
this systematically combined layout is variable. Therefore, I establish a constant
that will hold these categories together. Namely, inscriptions are the spot or site
where we will see theory affect the framework or empirical world. In other words,
to understand how much we make or do not make—how much we live or die—we
must locate the conversation in the inscription.

46. Bernard Stiegler, The Neganthropocene, trans. Daniel Ross (London: Open Humanities Press, 2020), 43.
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At this point, I must stake my claim. The groundwork of the study is in place. I
have intimated my theory of making along. So let me put my conjecture out here in
the open: Drawing is a superior model of making and it invigorates that making
specifically through its material, habitual, and tectonic nature. Drawing ascends all
the way up the ladder of prerequisites. It is materially efficacious, provides agency
without violence, and is always double-sided. It is radically accessible and
theoretically sustainable. It is the means by which cultural transformation and
renewal become possible. It grounds an ethics of otherness and is pragmatically
repeatable.
The remainder of the study is dedicated to building, or rebuilding, that drawing
theory of making that can inscribe a full life. remainder proceeds in three steps
that are directly informed by SYSTEMATIC COMBINING. I will revisit the
EMPIRICAL WORLD and FRAMEWORK categories noted above and add a
third—CASE STUDY. Though each step is focused, I remain committed to the
fluidity of SYSTEMATIC COMBINING and will continue to flow back and forth
between logics and fields in each of these steps to establish new elements and
insights. But during this tour, I will apply disciplinary magnification. I will zoom in
on each category using the insights of a specific faculty. In the first step, I will
narrow in on making in the empirical world under the guidance of Anthropology.
There I will examine the ways that making has been critical to human life from the
beginning. This step will yield the first indication that the kind of inscription that
will generate human flourishing is drawing. It will also demonstrate the materiality
of drawing—one of my central parameters. The second step is to revisit
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FRAMEWORK under the guidance of phenomenology. Here, we raise theoretical
questions about the nature of drawing as a phenomenon and establish its unique
and habitual ontology. The third step flows naturally from the questions that
emerge from the first two. If drawing is critical to human making and thriving on
the surface of the earth, and it is ontologically habitual (meaning also inhabitable)
then have we ever seen these pieces come together? I answer with architecture. I
take architecture as a CASE STUDY that has and continues to coordinate drawing,
surface, making, living, habit, matter, agency, and the rest of the litany. there I
identify the key feature of a new theory of making. Namely, to join. Drawing as
habitual, and material is fundamentally tectonic and therefore the critical operator
in the future making and living. In the concluding chapter, I look ahead to that
future and speculate about drawing and tectonics in digital materiality.
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2. AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF DRAWING
2.1 From Mythos to Logos
In the first chapter, I stated my research interests directly: to understand making in
the everyday world. I set forth a research agenda that placed parameters on that
desire: making must be common and effectual. In turn, I initiated a research program
that could discover the structures of making in that everyday world, distill them in
conceptual reflection, and then evaluate their composition theoretically. The main
movements of the research program were established by SYSTEMATIC
COMBINING’S four categories. The first step was to observe the empirical world
and listen for the nuances of making via the questions of the common person. This
proved to be fruitful insofar as it yielded patterns wherein we could derive our three
key concepts. But it also came with a significant weakness that you may have
already recognized. Namely, this empirical moment is anecdotal and scantly
verifiable.
I have to face this vulnerability directly. How can we erect a new theory of
making on a small slice of reality? The answer lies in magnification. Our starting
point, in lay questions, was just that—a starting point. It gave us an empirical
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sample to observe or a place to put our pencils down. It was risky. But, I
intentionally avoided the temptation to stay general and have a hermetically sealed
thesis. We could have very well shut off empirical observation, avoided this
difficulty, and only worked within self-referential premises. Instead, I wanted to
remain consistent with my ambitions to find a theory of making that could survive
and even thrive at the everyday level. But offering an anecdote back to the
layperson—even with conceptual structuring from the framework—is woefully
insufficient. In other words, I cannot just cite the status quo questions, poke around
in them, and then call it a day. I cannot stop short of testing the integrity of our
simple example. We must put it under the microscope and rotate different
magnifications over it to carefully scrutinize it. Presumably, different focal lenses
will not only verify our preliminary observations but should deepen them. We will
apply three said lenses to the sample over the course of the next three chapters.
This chapter circles back to the empirical world category and inspects it under the
lens of anthropology.

2.2 Anthropology is not Ethnography
But why anthropology? Simply put, it is ideally suited and specifically useful for
empirical reexamination. Two of those uses are worth noting here. First, and in
accordance with the magnification metaphor above, anthropology has a very
focused angle but also an exceedingly wide lens. It can be quite narrow or
impossibly broad at the same time. Anthropology zooms in on practical
occurrences whilst also positioning those occurrences within larger social,
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geological, and historical matrices. It takes note and observes minutiae but also
examines those instances for themes. Anthropology allows us to look closely at
anecdotal samples like the one we established in the opening chapter. It also allows
us to witness larger human patterns and test them against anthropological
literature and field data. This thematic and generalizing skill is what separates
anthropology from ethnography.47 Though the two are often treated
interchangeably, ethnography is focused more on the particular and narrow stories
of specific people48. It is attentive to those same stories but takes them to be part of
a more general pattern that exemplifies thematics in the one world that all stories
seem to inhabit. The two are not mutually exclusive or estranged. Rather, we might
say that ethnography informs the larger faculty of anthropology.
But to be balanced, I must note that anthropology is not without its detractors.
Still, those critiques turn out to be serendipitous for my study. The complaint
leveled against anthropology is that it externally imposes order—imperial and
colonial—on worlds and people groups without their consent or even interest. And
while this is true for many historical applications of anthropology, it is not endemic
to it as such. Trauma like this results from a certain angle, theory, or paradigm. It is
only a way—a bad one—of doing anthropology. This model assumes things about
the anthropologist and about the world that run counter to the descriptions above.
It positions the researcher “outside” the event under observation. It also positions

47. Tim Ingold, "Anthropology is Not Ethnography," Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 154, 2007 Lectures, 2008, 73,
48. This deserves qualification. Ethnography is not simply folk-telling or a series of unlinked or privatized stories. It is, in fact,
a kind of construction in its own right. My description here should not be taken as a dismissal or diminution of its force in modern
resistance models. I only single out this feature to elevate the generalizing benefits of anthropology for my specific study,
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the world’s moments “outside” each other.49 Such outsideness produces violence
even when strictly conceptual. This approach, Ingold claims, has an ontology that
treats the world as a set of discrete parts that require networking or organization. In
this vein, the analyst is another separate part itself.50 Naturally, this sort of
anthropologist will arrange discrete and opposable human elements on a page
under an imposed and often unseen rubric. In other words, unity can and does exist
in this model but it does so silently, surreptitiously, or under pressure. It does not
come from the world as recognized by participants.
This distant paradigm is what most commentators are objecting to. The united
and immersed approach, conversely, starts with the continuity, coherence, and
intimacy of the world. An anthropologist with this model in mind will produce
insights that are both determinate and developmental. They observe the world in
its materiality and sense it in its gestures and processes. This sort of anthropologist
does not shy away from the specific and the material nature of observation.51
Neither do they offer passive descriptions. They will give feedback that is pliable,
growable, revisable, and verifiable. They will engage the multidimensional reality of
the one shared world we are living and moving in.
This methodological excursus is not accidental or incidental. I do not lay out
these distinctions to take up room or postpone actual anthropological insights. I
include them to show that anthropology not only gives us a lens by which to closely
inspect the act of making but from a procedural standpoint it coincides with my

49. Ingold, “Ethnography,” 80.
50. Ingold, 87.
51. Tim Ingold, Anthropology and/as Education (London: Routledge, 2017), 22.
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own “matching” methodology. I lean on this brand of anthropology as espoused by
Ingold, his colleagues, and theoretical ancestors.52 For these reasons, you will not
see field notes, qualitative monographs about people groups, or surveyed data in
the following section. These sorts of insights are not inherently destructive but they
are counterproductive with respect to my specific aims.
In addition, and as I have noted many times, I want to maintain a strong parallel
and even intertwining between my form and content. According to the model laid
out by Ingold, anthropology does research and investigation the way I am doing it. I
have already been taking an anthropological approach, as it were. We embedded
this study with the world by observing ourselves at the end of the dissertation and I
am now digging into shared sensations and bearing witness to patterns. The critical
outcome is that these methodological parallels have similar ontological rewards.
The cursory comparison of anthropological models above implied different
ontologies. Seeing the world as particularities or as atomic configured
anthropological concepts and applications in a certain way. But seeing it as
coherent and its elements as mutually informing opens new possible interpretations
of life. The same reality applies to theories of making: specific theories have
conceptual arrangements and those arrangements have material consequences.
Therefore, as we wade into anthropology, the way theorists organize connection
will model and inflect the empirical elements, framework components, and

52. Jerry D. Moore, "Alfred Kroeber: Configurations of Culture," in Visions of Culture: An Introduction to Anthropological
Theories and Theorists (Lanham: Rowman Altamira, 2012), 46-55. For a contemporary see Jerry D. Moore, "Phillippe Descola:
Nature and Culture," in Visions of Culture: An Introduction to Anthropological Theories and Theorists (Lanham: Rowman Altamira,
2004), 326-339.
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theoretical conditions that shape—or fail to shape—making in our contemporary
world.

2.3 On Material Intrageneration
Now, let us turn our attention to anthropology’s content. At its introductory level,
anthropology is interested in human life—its instruments, its operations, its goals.
But, what exactly is living? Generally speaking, anthropology bounces its questions
of human life against two registers: artifacts and landscapes.53 When these poles are
treated separately, the former begets disciplines like archeology, and the latter flirts
with the likes of geology. Either of these subdisciplines can be examined in the lab
or the field. Anthropologists can discern ancient activities from archaeological
strata, pottery striations, or fieldwork observation of dance rituals. But even this
simple example presents two immediate challenges. First, these registers may help
sketch the outline of a human as an inert object. They may even be able to
schematize daily rituals, but they do not tell us what life is. Second, the example
challenges the heuristic limits and demarcations of the given registers. That is,
where does an artifact end and a landscape begin? Archaeological strata are
landscape slices composed of artifactual residue. Pottery is an artifact composed of
landscape matter. Dance rituals are artifacts that are also performative
transformations of the landscape. In short, human life and all of its constituent
elements run together. As a result, contemporary scholars have synthesized these

53. Tim Ingold, "Materials Against Materiality," Archaeological Dialogues 14, no. 1 (2007): 3.

53

two registers under the rubric of “material culture” in hopes of getting a better
grasp on human life.
Right here at the start of our magnifying inspection, anthropology affirms one
of the conceptual pillars we identified in our framework section above. Namely,
materiality. But, despite the synthetic value of this nomenclature, materiality is a
dangerous term. It risks reducing the human interaction to some abstract
substrate. As such, it may not move us any further away from the objectifying
models noted above or any closer to understanding life and making. The scholars
who raise these concerns opt for more enlivened terms like environment or
ecology. In other words, to understand human life, they say, we should understand
the materials of their interactions in an active environment. In so doing, we will
treat those materials themselves as the growing, changing, and interlacing world.
Or in other words, materials have a life of their own.
We should be clear about how we conceive of this term—material—and how far
that conception can go towards our thesis without having to stretch it. In the spirit
of the dissertation, we do not want to import a concept of material that is foreign or
abstractly constructed for convenient conclusions. So, we must let material speak
for itself insofar as it is possible. Material, in its customary and plain usage, relates
to extended matter. It describes things that have heft, weight, shape, etc.54 This
would push against the idea of a “material culture” because that construction risks
evacuating the heft and weight that has long characterized materials in every other
usage. But material can be used adjectivally to describe that brings about a

54. "material, v.,” Oxford English Dictionary Online, accessed May 20, 2022, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/114924.
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difference.55 In law, material evidence is that element that takes the case or the
verdict in a different direction because of its figurative heft or weight. Thus, when
we say material throughout this study, we do mean something with heft. Enough
heft to make a difference in the world. Enough heft to be this thing or that thing
and not just a raw and undefined potency. When we say making must one material
we mean both in terms of tangibility and in terms of efficacious.
To return to the matter at hand, one theorist who has influenced this turn
towards materials as active environment or ecological presence is James Gibson.56
Gibson, a psychologist by training, introduced concepts about perception that have
had a lasting impact on anthropology’s understanding of human life and its
environment. Gibson rejected the notion that the human was a brain moving
through a world matching the world to its preconceived notions. Instead, he
believed that man understood the world as he perceived it in real-time and in real
interaction. He proposed a tripartite model of objects to explain the human’s
interaction with this perceived environment. In his theory, the perceived world and
the lives therein are either substances, media, or surfaces.57 Substances are
resistant and solidified objects. A medium is the “stuff” that the substances pass
through like wind, perhaps fluid, or other intermediate zones. Lastly, and most
importantly, surfaces are the site of contact for substances and media. Wherever
the wind presses against the ground or wherever the human grabs a flower, this is

55. "material, adj., n., and adv.,” Oxford English Dictionary Online, accessed May 20, 2022, https://www.oed.com/view/
Entry/114923.
56. James J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach To Visual Perception (London: Psychology Press, 2013), 16-32.
57. Gibson, 22-30.
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the surface. The surface, for Gibson, is where all the action happens58. So, rather
than human life interacting with landscapes or artifacts, Gibson’s insight suggests
that humans are always perceiving and interacting at surfaces. Their perception is
in the middle of things. Their life is directed by perceptions at the center of these
exchanges. Human history, then, is a record of distributed action on surfaces. Here
again, anthropology has reintroduced a conceptual pillar in addition to materiality—
the surface. But neither material nor surface has enough depth to inform or guide
an understanding of theory yet. This will require the help of the aforementioned
Tim Ingold.
Ingold took up Gibson’s assertion and extrapolated its implications—both good
and bad—for anthropology. Like Gibson, Ingold firmly believes that human life is
perceptive in nature. They both wanted to conceive of the human in a non-essential
way without distancing themselves from that human as such. By attending to the
perceiving relations of the human and to their constructed social world they could
get close to human life in a way the former models had failed. Other nonessentialist models of human understanding have proven to be detached and veer
close to that particulate anthropological model decried earlier.59 For Ingold, a la
Gibson, thinking about life in terms of perception takes us along with the human on
their journey. And, the reward is bountiful. Anthropology, configured by
perception, reveals human life, our life, to be an exercise in way-finding.60
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Wayfinding is not only fundamentally perceptive but it is processual. It is a
discovery of location, meaning, nearness, and a whole host of other terms we use to
narrate our personal histories. The affirmation of perception does not mean that the
human “uses” perception or “uses” their body to move throughout a given world.
Humans are not at a distance from artifacts and landscapes. In Gibsons’s terms,
they are at the surface of all of these things. They live at the surface of the world.
Humans are touching, seeing, tasting, hearing, and smelling. To put it together,
then, for Ingold human life is a movement; movement is perception; perception is a
process; this process is fundamentally a commingling of surfaces. To reclaim a
term from above, human life is bound up in material culture. But more than just
bound up, humans participate in the process which is material culture.61 Materials,
according to Gibson and now Ingold, are themselves surfaces of transformation and
passage. Therefore, the human-material perceptive relationship is generative. New
things are born at the site of this surface interaction.62 These new things are
themselves part and parcel of the moving perception.
Critically, the surface is not a flat canvas. As material, it is not passive either.
Ingold illustrates this in his commentary on the ground. To begin with, humans are
inextricably tied to the ground. The very term, human, connotes earthling.63 Even
without a conclusive etymology, its shape and sound, humus, point to the soil.64 And
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this soil is actively making that human. Ingold overturns the common assumption
that the ground is inert and used only to cover old and shameful misdeeds. Instead,
the ground is voluminous. That is, it rotates. As the weather interacts with the
ground, the top is washed away or dispersed and the oldest memories rise to the
top and become “new.” Inversely, when other elements are added to the top, those
surface elements settle downward and become “old.” The ground is changing and
by virtue of that morphology, it transforms earthlings that move along its surface.65
This surface defines the agent that presumes to act upon it. Likewise, the
perceptive movements of the human are defining it. Ingold calls this interactive
fecundity: intragenetive. The so-called environment is not given or inert. It is being
made. In the same way, the human does not simply exist but is being made.
Intrageneration is a double movement that peels out from the surface of interaction
and perception.
At this point, Ingold has touched on two of our four critical concepts: surface
and material. He has now united them in intergeneration as the act of making.
Making is not the act of a mind on matter any more than living is the brain moving
through space. Making is not hylomorphic. It is not the application of contained
rational agenda “geniusly” applied to a material. Making is intragenerative
perception.66 For example, when a human society utilizes basket weaving or
dancing, they are not applying a concept to a register but rather perceiving at a
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surface, interacting there. Weaving is a perceiving of what that surface might do
and might become. As human hands tweak and turn the reeds, they too are being
transformed. Both are being made and making. All of this is unfolding in order for
human to find their way. Therefore, Ingold holds the highest esteem for craft, arts,
architecture, and the like.67 These are samples of this intragenerative perception.
For our purposes, this account is more than descriptive. By aligning surface and
material in an account of making, they may have prescriptive value in the
contemporary world.
But before I jump ahead and claim victory, important questions arise for Ingold
and Gibson just as they did for artifacts and landscapes. For example, what is the
phenomenological shape of this making? Is it repeatable? Is it purposeful? More
importantly, what is the phenomenological shape of this human that acts at
surfaces? Is anything happening in their mind, will, or intent? Answers to these
questions introduce additional, more complex ontological questions. If two things
interact at surfaces, are the humans or things themselves substances? Are they
surface-substances? Do they arrive at the interaction ready-made? If so, then what
happens to intergeneration? Or, how would we describe their own internal
activities? What happens inside a substance when it morphs and grows? Does it
contain internal surfaces? What happens when the wind moves in a new direction
due to internal temperature variations? Is making a substance? If so, what is made?
Ingold does not broach these theoretical questions and neither shall we in this
section. Admittedly, they can be dizzying. I list them here to keep them ready-to-
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hand as we proceed and compile more data for later theoretical inspection. Though
Ingold does not directly answer, he does at least affirm an unexamined but
ubiquitous ontology. Namely, life and its materials are surfaces all the way down.
After his work on perception, Ingold turned towards an investigation of lines.68
At first glance, this appears to be a departure from the issue of perception and
making. But, as it turns out, it is a refinement. He indirectly addresses one of our
ontological questions about the nature of the substances that are interacting at
surfaces. The inherited assumption, Ingold says, is to think of interactions as
between blobs.69 Therefore, perceptive making would be one blob touching
another. But this raises a slew of concerns and not just curiosities about what is
inside and outside those blobs. He asks: would not the insides be made of more
blobs? And, if so, would we be interacting with the surfaces of those blobs ad
infinitum? And if not, then what exactly is the essence of the blob? Is it undivided?
How does it not swallow up things? Change in scale? And so on? In accordance with
his belief that life is surfaces all the way down, then Ingold argues that the world
would be better understood as being composed of lines instead of blobs.70 Lines can
go all the way down without needing insides. A line is made of more lines and so
on. Not only is this philosophically consistent, but it also matches our experiences
of threads, filaments, ligaments, muscles, and more. These lines are critical for
explaining the perceived interactions noted above. When perceived interaction
occurs—when intragenerative making happens—it is lines or threads intermingling
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and knotting. Blobs are actually knots, in other words. Therefore, the world that
this paradigm yields is a meshwork. Lines are everywhere. Rain, writing, walkways,
buildings, memories, skin, and so on are all conceivable under the rubric of lines.71
It is Ingold’s theory of lines that brings surface and material into proximity
with marks. Ingold presses on and suggests that every life can be read as someone
laying out a line.72 Our personal histories begin with umbilical cords, proceed
through interweaving threads and tense clinging, and end as decomposition into
filaments. Our social histories are comprised of the same. Our texts are lines that
push the eye along a path from left to right or top to bottom. Our letters are
strokes. Our roads are wide lines secured by thinner ones. Our concept of history is
a line. But even beyond the stretched, splayed, or extended lines, for Ingold, our
laws could be conceived as knotted narratives. Our affections can be considered as
tied lines. I could go on. For our purposes, the important insight is that these lines
are the operational element of perception and intrageneration. Life is line-making.
Or in our terms, line-making is mark-making on material surfaces.
Lines reaffirm Ingold’s overall commitment to decentralization and an antiessentialist account of making. In his later work, he polishes this concept of linemaking as intragenerative perception by introducing the term correspondence.73
Lines are not impositions or the product of a mind. Rather, when a human
perceives at a surface, and they mark that surface with a line, then they are
corresponding to the entity which is that surface material itself. This can be
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disorienting. Ingold is trying to describe a reflexive action that occurs in real-time
and without much interval if any at all. The human makes the object as the object
makes the human and both do so at their intragenerative surfaces because they are
both material. The mystification progresses. Furthermore, if life is material and
materials are surfaces all the way down, then each line-making at a surface has
another line and another and another just around the bend. What is more, the
presumed surface is also doing line-making of its own on the reverse surface. The
confounding regression applies in this direction too. Importantly, correspondence
does not try to hold this befuddling expansion still. It simply means that wherever
the human is in this meshwork, life requires a willingness to follow the lines as you
make lines. To live, then, is the perceptive process of intragenerative line making
that is characterized by a humble and attentive mutual following.
As I have noted above, Ingold elevates crafts of all sorts. But at this point, given
that correspondent life is tied to line-making, Ingold narrows in on the role of
writing and drawing. In Latour’s terms, Ingold might say that life is inscriptive. For
Ingold, writing and drawing are both inscriptions that enact the perspectival and
material intragenerative act as outlined above. They are surfacial interactions.
Drawing is, however, more rudimentary insofar as it deals more directly with lines
and line-making. We can draw with threads and with traces. For example, threads
can be “drawn out” and snapped at surfaces to make traces. The thread can also be
extended and in turn, vibrate. These pulling and stitching actions are natively
perceptive and embodied.74 Drawing begins with deistic gestures and performs a
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localized version of them that “corresponds” to that gesture. Meaning, we use an
instrument in our hand to pull across a surface and emulate that material gesture.
In other words, it is an inscription that has both mentalist and materialist
dimensions.
Despite their shared roots, and the assignation of inscription, writing and
drawing are discernibly different. Most common people would sense that difference
without being able to articulate it. Ingold explores the typical reasons given for that
sensation and finds them all wanting.75 Still, he makes a few important observations
along the way. Writing, despite the modern notion of code and semiotic
performance, in its original state was very much still drawing. But writing, being a
form of drawing, depended on a certain relationship between agent and surface—
the inscription relationship. Drawing had consistently brought the agent close to
the surface for the intragenerative event. But, at some point, it shifted away from
drawing’s pulling near and towards a removed notation scheme. That is, when the
line-making could be distanced from the surface each set of its strokes becomes
repeatable and representational.76 This does not happen as the result of a decision.
Once again, it is recursive. Just as the inscription gains distance so does the
concurrent perceiving and conceptual apparatus. Ingold goes on to explore the
evolution of writing according to this increasing distance from the surface. Once
typography and engraving entered into practice, writing as perceptive inscription
gave way to repeatable description. The consequence of this shift towards notation
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is wide-reaching and not exclusive to writing precisely because it is an inscription.
This is the critical point for our purposes. Namely, that the world, its material
nature and perceptive possibilities, change right alongside the human right at the
threshold of inscriptions. And at this point in the survey, the inscription enfolds the
surface, material, and marking in the operations of writing and drawing. We will
explore the distinctions between writing and drawing more fully under the category
that we develop in the next section. Namely, technology. It behooves our study to
draw out this notion as it lurks in the back of Ingold’s analysis.
But before we can register the full value of that investigation, let us recap and
relocate our exploration. Ingold’s tour from perception to writing and drawing
recapitulates the blueprint laid out in Chapter 1. In the first stages of our systematic
combining, we isolated four concepts from an empirical sample. Specifically, that
making is comprised of surfaces, agents, markings, and materials. We bracketed
a full exposition of those concepts in order to investigate empirical life more fully
through the lens of anthropology. In response, they pushed through those
restraints. Ingold expanded on each of those concepts—some directly and others
indirectly. Alongside Gibson, Ingold foregrounded surfaces as the site of human
perception and interaction with the world. What is more, these surfaces indicated a
counter-movement of the world toward the human. Both of them, are treated by
Ingold and Gibson as materials. Materials, according to both, are defined by an
interactive possibility to generate something new. Or, in our terms, materials can
generate something of heft and consequence given that they too are effectual. This
quality is born along the surface of interaction. This is an important point that
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cannot be overstated: the surface begets. The entities do not arrive at the surface
from an inside or as a substance in advance. They become whatever they will be at
that intragenerative event of making at the surface. Therefore, the human, the
doorknob, the neuron, and even the imagination, are materials in the making. As
Ingold continued, the interaction of those materials is laid out in lines. Surfaces are
the active life of materials and those materials are directed and redirected by lines.
Ingold and Gibson give these three—material, markings, and surfaces—
anthropological and perceptive depth. But they also open speculation about the
fourth concept—agency. Throughout both scholars’ work, agency is implicit in linemaking, craft, and even perception. Still, neither ever investigate the concept
directly. Therefore, we will take up both technology and agency in the next section
with the help of Andre-Leroi Gourhan and his mentor, Marcel Mauss.

2.4 On Technicity and Graphism
As we approach a fuller understanding of making, we must confront a nagging
question: how does the human uniquely figure into all of this? So many other
questions are nested within this curiosity. If the world is a perceptive interplay, a
meshwork of lines, then do any of the surfaced materials we call “things” have any
sense of purpose or agency within themselves? Is there any reason to focus on the
human? And if these things can act intentionally, then to what end? If we are all
making lines, if we are threads knotting up, then what are we building? Or are we
building? If things do not have agency then are we just floating along responding to
Lucretian swerves? Can we do any of this making business on purpose? If so how
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do we do it? The roadmap to answering these questions passes through the ideas of
technology and agency.
Despite the fact that Ingold does not map out agency or technology directly, we
can look to one of his inspirations, Andre Leroi-Gourhan, for a fuller understanding
of both. Leroi-Gourhan, the French prehistorian, has been instrumental in more
than one theory of making. Famously, Jacques Derrida derived his own concepts
about writing from Leroi-Gourhan’s insights into human development.77 More
recently, Bernard Stiegler has enlisted Leroi-Gourhan’s thoughts in the service of a
modern account of technics.78 Leroi-Gourhan’s popularity amongst all three
corresponds to the way each centers their work on the notion of techne. For each, it
is in the soil of human meaning-making, world-making, and living. Techne is LeroiGourhan’s forte. For us, not only will Leroi-Gourhan give us insights into the
mechanics of anthropological agency, he will position drawing as its critical
technological instrument.
Andre Leroi-Gourhan was an interdisciplinary anthropologist and contemporary
of well-known figures like Claude Levi-Strauss. But unlike the latter, Leroi-Gourhan
focused his attention on the mechanics of social action rather than their systemic
meanings. His most enduring idea is that man makes himself what he is through
his tools.79 He reverses the inherited assumption that what makes man unique is
his conceptual advantages. This is because these conceptual advantages are not
only found amongst humans. Language, rationality, socialization, or even religion
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can be witnessed in animality. Man’s evolutionary distinction, for Leroi-Gourhan, is
positional and that position is upright.80 By standing up, man began a process of
transformation that would pass through his technical intelligence and lead to
language and rationality. In sum, by standing up, man-made tools, and tools made
man. Refracted through Ingold’s terms, human life is mutually perceptive as it
pivots around the technologies of intrageneration.
Leroi-Gourhan’s notion of technology arises in paleontology and archaeology.
The bones of ancient bodies show us that before being properly “human,” we were
simply an animal that grazed along the ground without the ability to pivot the head.
The hands were preoccupied with locomotion and the head was engrossed in the
function of foraging.81 Adaptation would eventually lead to a revolving head. And, at
some point, this animal would develop hip changes and muscular control and soon
stand up.82 Upon standing, the rotating cranium would expand and realign making
room for brain expansion.83 These changes would shorten the snout, free up the
fingers from clawing and make time for dexterity. The hands and the face would
establish a new perceptive position: front and back. The front would “face” the
world, and the hands would be free from locomotion and empowered to reach
outward towards that world.84 But these developments would not come from some
arbitrary instinct or internal desire. It would come from the mechanics of
perception.
80. Leroi-Gourhan, 116.
81. Leroi-Gourhan, 26-27.
82. Leroi-Gourhan, 63.
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For Leroi-Gourhan, each step in that physiological adaptation sequence above is
the result of the way that organism or animal is “acting” in the world. It is not
because the animal “decided” on it or was led to make a change. Bodily adaptation
is on a feedback loop with bodily techniques in the world. For example, the way
man moves and forages leads to his adaptation from quadruped to biped. LeroiGourhan dedicates his whole first section of Gesture and Speech to this
development and there is no need to repeat it in full here.85 But we need to
emphasize that the act and the tool—conceived together as technicity—precede
bodily changes. These technical acts are what Leroi-Gourhan calls gestures.86
Therefore, technical activity, under the rubric of gestures, is in the generic
proximity of materials (i.e. a pliable and effectual heft). Therefore, these
technological acts are akin to what Ingold has called intragenerative perceptions.
Leroi-Gourhan’s “technicity” is material insofar as change starts at the surface of
something consequential and substantial. Technicity is perceptive insofar as it is a
kind of testing and trying life at that surface. Altogether, this technicity mobilizes
and habituates the creative perceptive act. It just so happens that it generates both
the products of tools and formal changes in the body of the agent wielding the
tools. The productive power of technicity folds over on itself much like meshwork.
Technicity enables new things—speciation, new concepts, new bodies, new
gestures, new techniques. In other words, technicity is part and parcel of life.
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Technicity, in general, shapes the objects and bodies participating in life. But
technicity is not a flat category. It also shapes and orients life in a certain way. We
can see this technical force more fully by narrowing in on one key outcome of the
standing gesture. Namely, the introduction of exteriority.87 As I noted, once the
hominid was standing up, the mouth was free from grazing on the ground, and the
hands were free from locomotion. And being free, the hand then could participate
in bringing food to the mouth. It could reach out toward objects. The technical acts
of the animal clearly wrought bodily changes. But these techniques also generated
certain “thoughts,” orientations, or paradigms as we might call them now. The new
orientation, an anterior and posterior twoness, “constructed” the very notion of the
outside world. That new technical posture allowed the hand to convert its once
internal instincts of consumption into exterior action. Tools like the eating utensil
derived their form and function from formerly interior gestures of bringing food
inward towards the teeth. The sharpened stone could, in effect, operate as a tooth at
a distance. The hand was now the place where tools could develop, be operated, be
extended, and eventually, be separated from the body and automated.88 Tools
exteriorized but remained continuous with the body. There was still a line of
connection but that line now extended between and was configured by two new
endpoints: in and out. Suddenly, there was a relationship between perceptive poles
like here and there. Therefore, the interaction along that line, the technicity, of the
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body would continue to evolve and continue to require the maturation and
development of new tools to negotiate the new perceptive distance.
The face pushed exteriority even further and extended it to the overall
organism. The face would become the seat of language. Once again, pushing back
against the common cerebral explanations, Leroi-Gourhan reads language as a tool
of the face and as a result of the technicity of the body.89 Language is not an act of
the mind but a result of mechanics. Once freed from the ground, the mouth could
make sounds that exteriorized desire. Sound passed from the throat and out into
the world. It could connect the animal with other animals in a way that surpassed
violent competition. It could inscribe desire on the wind as calls coordinated into
signifying phonemes. This naturally lends itself to social organization. The sounds
of the face could produce connectivity and generate a non-physical body—a
collective body. We will look at that more closely in short order. For now, what is
important is that the techniques of the body introduced evolutionary change, and
this change made speech possible. Speech, then, paved the way for the technicity of
symbols beyond the body. Sounds could be divided and reassembled to coordinate
external action. Formerly, action was connected to adaptation and adaptation was
slow. Adaptation was immanent to a body and this body knew no demarcation
between inside and outside. It took many thousands of years for certain bodily
changes to take root. These bodily changes were critical for the organisms to
achieve their desires. But when changes could be inscribed on the outside world
through sounds and symbols, then the demand for bodily development is
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mitigated.90 Why wait on a change in a body’s physiology when the human could
exteriorize their interests in another non-physical social body? The face accelerated
the technical trajectory of exteriorizing all desire into the social body.
To circle back, the hand tried to catch up. In Leroi-Gourhan’s scheme,
everything works in two’s—the world and the human, the biped, the front and the
back, the mouth and the hand. Just as the mouth was exteriorizing in sound, the
hand was beginning to form gestures into markings. This is the birth of what LeroiGourhan calls graphism. In its earliest stages, graphism is neither writing nor
drawing. It is not representational. It is akin to Ingold’s line-making but far more
literal. It is the manual marking of surfaces to orient the body in space and time.91 It
is an extension of the biped’s newfound perceptive condition. Insofar as the biped
now had a front a back, and a rotational head, it was “in the world” and now “faced”
and exterior on all sides. Graphism was exteriorizing this position. It inscribed the
rhythms of life in a series of dots or visual pathways.92 Once again, like most early
stages of technicity, graphism was continuous with the body. Nevertheless, it had
within it the capacity for separable exteriority, though, just like speech and symbol
making. What the face inaugurated, the hand inflamed in graphism. If the face
could project sounds forward and potentially make changes in the exterior world—
in order to meet its needs—then the tools of the hand had the potential to do the
same. Tools of the hand, like the eating utensils we noted, were already connecting
with the exterior world by bringing food closer or grasping at resources formerly
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unavailable. So if the technicity of the hand could go outward to secure their
interest, it may also be able to produce symbols. The human could inscribe their
activity on the surfaces of the world in order to produce action at a distance.93
Graphism is a significant technical achievement—for better or worse. But in its
origin, graphism resisted full exteriority. Leroi-Gourhan locates this resistance in
the operational mechanics of graphism. In short, its original markings were radial.
It marked the world according to that positionality noted above.94 That is, once the
body had front and back, in and out, the grapheme could corroborate a new sense
of centeredness visually. A dot or series of loops could exemplify the perceptive
reality of being in-and-with a world. Graphism was the ground of mythemes.95 It
was the way that oral cultures could depict (exteriorize) their perceptive relation to
their environment. It complemented the sounds and phonetic symbols of faces.
Mythemes and phonemes converged in folk tales. It was, despite Leroi-Gourhan’s
misuse of the term, linear.96 It just was not a set of straight lines. It was concentric
circles. Graphism could comprise radii and vectors which extended from focal
points or loci which provided a sense of place. To boot, it described life on the
surface in miniature by pulling a ling across a surface It was ineluctably perceptive,
surfacial, and material. So how did we get from graphism to code at a distance,
writing and violence, documentation and imperialism?
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The transformative moment—notably one that Leroi-Gourhan sees as naturally
continuous and even necessary—was when graphism was straightened out and
made orthogonal. This is the sine qua non of writing for Leroi-Gourhan. The
technics of writing enable repeatability and rhythm because they deal with discrete
symbols that are lifted or distanced from a body.97 They exteriorize actions that are
quasi-automatic. The signs and symbols of graphism are now constructed in
smaller pictographs that are laid out on a straight line that is to be followed. This
straight line not only coordinates the movement of the internal mind, but also
produces expected results. The rhythm of the follower, the reader, or the walker is
scripted. This linearity became the paradigm of all graphism, including drawing.98
In other words, writing became the grounds for even drawing. Orthogonal and
geometric drawing, the basis of architecture and manufacturing, would also follow
lines, read the symbols, and produce the results. That is, rather than make them. In
effect, the exteriority of mechanization was taking hold. Language, and specifically
external symbols, would make technicity’s exit from the body complete. After all,
how would an external machine perform a human service without the help of coded
information laid out on a line?
These exteriorizing technics needed a way to execute actions that once
occurred internally. Therefore, technicity placed action at a distance by
constructing an external body—the social body. The social body could be a
collectively identifiable agent which could perform techniques for the service of the
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humans therein. Whereas the former animal was integrated into the perceptive
environment, its technicity liberated it, established it as a thing facing the world,
then extended that entity into a symbolic one by creating a collective that spoke in
symbols, sounds, and lines.99 That secondary body, the social one, did the “acting”
in the environment in parallel to the human body whence it came. In the same way
that rhythms of life became the dots and lines of graphism, now the buttons and
written documents would prompt the work of the machine. The technicity of the
animal could be handed over to the social body and concentrated in these
machines. Eventually, these mechanisms of external technicity would be
automated.100 The body will have completed a shift from immanent instinct and
manual engagement to passive reception and visual acquiescence. Once
constrained by the body, the burden (or gift) of active making was now manipulable
by ideas and power relations within that social body. Leroi-Gourhan expected this
exterior evolution to continue.101
Leroi-Gourhan’s significance for my constructive theory of making should be
rather clear. He corroborates what we had already established in Ingold, exceeds
him in precision and detail, and brings the issue of agency to the table along with
the other three structural concepts. Much like Ingold, making is at the center of
what Leroi-Gourhan means by being human and what he means to be alive.
Surfaces are critical to the act, or “interact”, of making, and materials are defined
by possible development. He exceeds Ingold’s somewhat vague notion of
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perceptive intrageneration by calling this technicity. This is a significant moment in
our study. It moves beyond the descriptive to the prescriptive. Techniques can be
repeated. Techniques can be learned. So, rather than just compiling the
fundamental components of a theory of making, Leroi-Gourhan brings us closer to
finding a way to mobilize and operationalize that theory. Leroi-Gourhan introduces
this wrinkle precisely in his consideration of graphism as technicity. He raises our
category of marks directly within his affirmation of graphism as techne. What is
more, he gives us a general sketch of what drawing should look like if it is going to
enable a restored perceptive and common life. His ability to distinguish drawing
from writing without vilifying the latter is critical. It suggests that if we are to place
drawing at the center of a theory of making, if it is a technique that could invigorate
common making, then it will also have redemptive effects on writing. He also points
us to conceptual remedies by identifying the critical points of departure between
writing and drawing Namely, as inscriptions, Leroi-Gourhan shows that their
relationship and their corresponding material efficacy is continually tempered by
certain views of space, time, reality, and so forth. In other words, theories are
keeping them apart or subordinating one to the other. He gives us the tools to ask:
which technicity breeds life? Does one do so more than the other? These lines of
inquiry will push us toward the next section on the phenomenology and ontology of
drawing. Before we leap into those deep waters, there are a few more dimensions to
anthropological making that deserve attention and refinement.
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2.5 Of Kith and Kin
Andre Leroi-Gourhan inherited many of these categories and initiatives from
Marcel Mauss. Mauss was, himself, a student and family member of Emile
Durkheim. The most important thing about this lineage is their well-documented
interest in social life. From Durkheim to Leroi-Gourhan, they shared an expressed
interest in understanding how humans interacted with otherness—whether that be
people or things.102 Whereas Andre Leroi-Gourhan focused in on the narrow
mechanical nature of human development, his mentor, Mauss, extrapolated the
effects of technicity in developing social bonds. Mauss’ insights give further shape
to our budding sense that technicity is influential for comprehending making at a
molecular level. Specifically, Mauss’ work treats technicity always a shared activity.
This was latent in the foregoing insights. Ingold’s surfacial perception always
assumed that at least two things were interacting. Leroi-Gourhan’s twofold
feedback scheme also implies some mode of exchange. Mauss will make that
explicit.
Marcel Mauss is mostly known for his work, The Gift, which describes forms of
exchange that challenge the dominant western modes of trade and competition.103
He claims that gift exchange is a social mechanism that breeds a society of
obligation that is not rooted in debt. His other works include reflections on magic
and its permutations and functions in societies.104 Though we are not directly
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interested in either of these works, they do shed light on his continued interest in
social mechanics. For Mauss, both gift exchange and magic are social
developments that could not begin with rationality. The people did not “make it up”
or “believe in it.” Conversely, even in a Marxian or Durkheimian form, such social
groups were not grown in a Petri dish of symbols or strict means of production. In
other words, the people did not inherit notions through signage or through
organized labor. The only way to account for fantastical or generous societies like
this is to look at the practices of daily life. There, not only do the body and
technique of doing converge, but multiple people and things coordinate in shared
procedures that are the building blocks of social order.105
To establish his claim, Mauss homes in on motion—bodily motion.106 He reads
it fundamentally as a social phenomenon. Whereas contemporaries like Henri
Bergson had taken motion to be an ontological substrate of creativity, Mauss was
interested in the mobilization of practices.107 Mobilization is both spatial and
temporal and thus accounts for the shared norms of social life. Techniques, for
Mauss, are ways of moving through life. Techniques can be distributed to others
nearby and down the historical lineage. This fact helps resituate what others
celebrate in his more famous work. His claims in The Gift can be seen as a technical
exploration rather than an economic one. In the Gift, he articulates the movement of
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goods throughout society in a way that is not based on debt but based on surplus.
Gifts technically spread the wealth of life.108 Now, in Techniques of the Body, he
extends that implication by asserting that daily actions, the literal movements of
the body like walking and talking, are shareable. They are shareable because they
operate like Ingold’s perceptive positionality. That is, my bodily gestures occur
within groups of other people and those people are the surfaces of material
intrageneration. Those surfaces evaluate, confirm, and reconfigure my movements
every bit as much as I do theirs.
This interplay and feedback of various techniques return us to the complexity of
living in a meshwork. Mauss’ emphasis on social bonding and sharing helps us
navigate the confusion, however. When surfaces come together and share
movements, or affirm some techniques above others, they join in crafting a
habitus.109 To lay out the process more directly, social norms are constructed in
techniques of the body. The collective movement of bodies, in their cooperative
sharing, forms the rhythms of a society. This rhythm is inscribed in habits.110 But,
to ward off misunderstandings, habit should not necessitate automation. We will
consider the nature of habit below. The critical point here is the appearance of
inscription in this sequence. It is not convenient or incidental. It is central to
movements as they shift from local to shared and from shared to repeated. For
Mauss, these technical practices are a form of inscribing—in others—the
movements of a body or bodies. We mark on one another sometimes as fashion,
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body art, or even in physiological transformations. Inscriptions are shared
techniques because they join us and pass between us. Mauss’ arrangement adds
two significant aspects to what we have collected thus far. First, in all of this,
technique and sharing can be done consciously. Unlike his contemporaries, who
preferred irrational motion or elevated idealism to account for human decisions,
techniques reproduce social organization according to agency. The second aspect
is that Mauss says the quiet part out loud. In the foregoing scholars, there was a
latent assumption that technicity, inscription, and making were inherently shared
events. The implication is that the lowest common denominator of making,
perceiving, technicity, or even inscriptions is two. These two notions—purposive
agency and twoness—will keep recurring as we progress until we are forced to
address them directly.
Mauss’ emphasis on perception, technique, and social organization raises the
question about what kinds of bonds they will create? If we follow this logic, will we
simply be a productive society making and manufacturing at every turn? Given his
emphasis on gift and loyalty, Mauss’ technicity trajectory points towards something
more like kinship—a major field of study in anthropology. Kinship studies
dominated the anthropological landscape for decades until David Schneider
dropped bombshell critiques that called it all into question.111 The damage was not
all for naught, though. Schneider may have dismantled the inherited notion of
biological kinship but he also opened the door to new forms of kin-making. In fact,
this was his direct claim: that kinship did not exist in any system insofar as kinship
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is understood through blood ties but kin can be found when it is formed
symbolically.112
Marshall Sahlins, a modern anthropologist, took up Schneider’s argument in
his essay: What Kinship is (and is not).113 He also questions the notion that kinship
can be understood as patrilineal or matrilineal. He confirmed what had already
been stated by Schneider: kinship is not a genealogical or biological property. What
actually separated Sahlins’ position from Schneider’s is that he more directly
asserted that technique, or cultural action, actually informed and shaped biological
ties. That is, rather than only saying that kin can be crafted through social bonds,
he goes a step further and says that blood bonds are themselves derivative of
technical ones. He uses the example of birth, the sine qua non of heritage and
kinship. The assumption is that one has children and those children become kin.
The story continues: the kin forms a locus around which social networks and
behaviors begin to form. In due fashion, the child will go on to build a world or
participate in activities and rituals that are derived from that blood-based kinship.
But Sahlins shows that there is no necessary priority in this sequence.114 He turns it
on its head. He argues that the already connected world of people makes that birth
important. To piggyback on Mauss, births find meaning in culture because we keep
reproducing a social order by way of body, movement, and technique. That
biological reproduction is seen as an instance of this shared world—as a movement
or technique rather than a novelty. It's the fact that the parent does X, Y, and Z and
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then has a baby that will also do X, Y, and Z that makes its birth significant and
grants it social significance. The baby arrives in a technical matrix. It is the fact that
the brothers and sisters participate in these acts, rituals, constructions, and so
forth, that makes a blood birth a manifestation of those procedures.115 This may
offend some of our sensibilities and biological impulses, but that does not refute
that those very sensibilities and impulses are not derived or at least interwoven with
our lived techniques. In simplest terms, kin is made. Kinship is built.
The issue of kin now gives our thesis a more robust vision of what a theory of
making requires and what a theory of making can engender. That is,
intragenerative perception, making, technicity—or whatever we may call it—is, as
we have noted, social. It is shared. Making is a twofold moment. Sahlins’ insights
not only confirm this fact but colors it kind, friendly, and familial.116 Though this is
promising, kinship also has a peculiar position with respect to the problematics we
outlined in the first chapter. Recall that both climate crises and class conflict
dampen the human propensity towards making. By virtue of that dampening, they
also threaten any sense of kinship that reaches beyond trade, exchange, or
acquiescence to power structures. I call the issue of kin peculiar because it is both
suppressed in this way but also surreptitiously affords resistance. On the one hand,
it is directly dismissed as an artifact of class conflict. Capitalocenic folks may resist
kinship as means of maintaining hierarchies and power relations between
aristocratic families and the hoi polloi. But this fear is driven by the general
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assumption that kinship is biological. If Sahlins and Schneider are correct, then kin
might also foment resistance to class conflict. We may be able to build a collective
of active making that is more than a hegemonic enabler.
The acclaimed feminist theorist, Donna Haraway, believes just that. Though not
typically associated with anthropology, Haraway has been directly involved in
debates regarding the names of these two problematics.117 She accepts the term
Anthropocene and Capitalocene but introduces her own nomenclature in order to
reimagine our impending doom and sketch exit routes. She describes our age as
the Cthulucene.118 Despite temptations, this is not a reference to H.P. Lovecraft’s
horror monster. It is a reference to the ground—chthonic119. Haraway argues that if
we are going to survive the Anthropocenic and Capitalocenic age, then we need to
return to the perceptive posture outlined by Ingold above. That is, we need to be
aware of the surfaces that comprise our intragenerative environment. And the chief
surface of our dwelling—the ground—is our primary shared surface. It helps us to
see that we belong together. In this way, Haraway synthesizes Sahlins, Ingold, and
even Mauss: we can make kin with one another through shared perception when
we also have kinship at the perceptive surface of the ground. More simply, our
kinship with one another is our kinship with our world. Haraway positions this
hope directly against the traumas of the Anthropocene and Capitalocene in here
work, Staying with Trouble.120 Kinship kills two birds with one stone. By focusing on
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the ground, we can make kin with the earth and maybe mollify ecological damage.
This is the plight of the Anthropocene. In addition, by focusing on the earth, we can
find lines of connection with each other. We can make “ties” of connection that are
of a different sort of bloodline.121 They are of a line drawn in blood, sweat, and tears
—in shared technique and practice.
To summarize these findings, Sahlins’ and Haraway’s arguments stand in line
with the anthropologists we have consulted thus far. For Ingold, man is making his
way in the world with lines and movement. For Leroi-Gourhan, that way and
evolving position in the world is formed by tools and technicity. For Mauss,
technicity is the congealing force of social organization and social continuity. For
Sahlins, a la Schneider, our cultural techniques give rise to the core of that social
organization in kinship. And, all along the way, drawing has been either iterated as
fundamental to (Ingold, Leroi-Gourhan) or implicated in techniques for (Mauss,
Sahlins) human life and making. When all of these thoughts come together, new
channels of understanding making open up. We have glossed over them above.
Now, we turn to commentators who can help us coordinate these new channels and
state them openly so that we can pursue them directly in the next chapter.

2.6 Scratching the Surface
Our foray into anthropology demands careful explication. It is not always
immediately evident as to how these primal human conditions will factor into a
theory of making that in turn pivots around drawing. For that, we must return to

121. Haraway, 13.

83

the fourfold set of concepts that we distilled in the first chapter. We need to
comment on how they have behaved under the magnifying lens of anthropology.
Furthermore, we need to observe the forces and conditions that are maneuvering
these four within these anthropological accounts. Those conditions and forces will
help us more clearly link the structural elements with the specific thesis of drawing.
Only then, can we speculate about how they will serve an overarching theory of
making. The figure of drawing is beginning to emerge against the ground of all
these methodological rehearsals (as anticipated in the introduction). But we are not
there yet. Our concepts will undergo explication here and then are made available
to another layer of magnification that will zoom in even further.
To go back to the beginning, Tim Ingold directly introduced the importance of
surfaces and materials. In many respects, in his model, these are one and the
same. For Ingold, recall that the surface is a site of interaction and what defines
materials is their morphogenetic capacity to adjust and grow along with whatever
other material is at that surface. Ingold insisted that this interaction was always
evolving and could not be scripted in advance. It must be followed as a
correspondence. These concepts of surface and material were corroborated in the
work of Leroi-Gourhan wherein every material gesture had a double-movement. It
shaped the body and the world simultaneously. Furthermore, each time it is
enacted that event of technicity or making is both novel and habitual. LeroiGourhan and Ingold both isolate a third term, marking, as critical to this surface
interaction. In a single sentence, then, we could say that anthropology confirms that
the surfaces, and by implication materials, are themselves sites of creative

84

markings and that this act of marking is making life. And this demands a hearing:
what exactly are these surfaces? Yes, they are interactions, but this does not help
see what they are in real-time and amongst real people. So, what are they?
In an anthropological vein, we are inclined to think of these surfaces only as
extended organisms or constructions. That is, we imagine plants or walls or
perhaps skin as these intragenerative sites. But phenomenologist Ed Casey
expands our narrow assumptions and sheds light on the scope and material nature
of surfaces and materials. What is more, He does this from within the empirical
world and common experience. He just looks more closely. In his book, The World
on Edge, Casey does not use the term surface as his largest category.122 He actually
reduces surfaces as being one instance of his larger genus: the edge. We do not
need to debate Casey here about which category is higher up the ladder of genera.
We can treat surface and edge as interchangeable because our surface is much
more akin to Casey’s edge than his own diminutive definition of surface. We think
we know edges and surfaces but Casey challenges our instinct about their
operation. He pushes past the obvious truism that edges are the terminal outside of
an object. He sees edges as more than stopping points. They are also starting
points. As one thing terminates at the edge another is beginning. For him, an edge
is a site of interaction but it is more importantly a double event of coming and
going.123 It is an arrival and a departure. This capacity allows the edge to gesture
past itself toward other things. Or it that limit or line may gesture back towards the
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thing whence it came. It has, as he says, material intentionality.124 That
intentionality is this two-sided trend. Casey’s book surveys a full range of objects
that have edges and explores the different functions and manifestations of this
double-sided line. His survey confirms what our instincts are telling us right now:
edges must be everywhere.
Casey’s tour de force opens us up to the underlying conditions and forces which
guide the arrangements of our four structural concepts (the surface being one). For
example, Casey’s definition of the edge as having this material intentionality
suggests that every edge, and by virtue of that edge every material, is always “on
the way.” It is always in process. Our empirical instinct is to think of surfaces as
static when we confine our observations to our eyes. But if we look closer at things
or look at other elements like our hopes or cares, we will immediately resonate with
the pliable indeterminacy of the surface. If the surface is endemic to any theory of
making, and a theory of making is to be useful for a common person, then the way
we conceive of a surface as process is critical. Immediately it shows promise. It
means that the surface is not only a site of interaction but is itself an interaction. It
means that a surface is constantly amenable to any other material surface
(including ourselves). Considering “process” will help overturn the restraining
assumption that we cannot make something because we do not have the materials
or that we will be met with stiff opposition—physical surface or abstract surface.
Upon filtering the surface through Casey’s account of the edge, we can have hope
that all making is possible. Coming and going—material intentionality—is
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perpetually possible. But this deep current or condition—process—comes with
pitfalls and questions that Casey does NOT address.
Casey’s account does not give us any ontological insight into this process of
surface-making. We do not know whether the materials we touch are touchable if
they are always on the way. We do not know whether the marks we make endure if
the surface is always “becoming.” Or to put it differently, we do not know whether
we have agency. And without agency, we have a deeply impoverished account of
making. Without penetrating philosophical consideration of the full nature of
markings and agency, making would be left to those who already have powerful
agency and a capacity to mark. To be fair, ontological exploration was not his intent.
Thus far, none of our interlocutors has probed the surface metaphysically. But this
absence actually confirms the importance of understanding surfaces at an
ontological and phenomenological level. For starters, if Ingold is right and surfaces
are marked by lines, and if those lines are also surfaces, then is there any actual
making to line-marking after all? Is there any newness? If it’s all a bunch of lines on
lines then are we adding anything to this? To rephrase Derrida’s question: can the
line be drawn? But this returns us right back to the complicated questions about
surfaces. If surfaces are being made; If surfaces are themselves interactions; if
surfaces are intentional and gestural; if they reach forward into the new, then what
catalyzes this transformation? Is the thing that catalyzes transcendent to the
immanent event of change? If it is immanent, then is the catalyst for change no
different than the thing being changed? Is this a monist account of time and space
where all fluctuations leave us in a place of passivity? In the simplest terms, can we
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ever make something on purpose? Am I thwarted in advance by the very
philosophical nature of “stuff”? These two, surface and agency, seem to share
many of the same ontological questions when we peer into the deep currents and
conditions that they swim in (process, becoming, etc.). The ontological makeup of
one will have an effect on the other. Therefore, as we unfold agency in this and the
next chapter, the act of marking on surfaces will become more ontologically
discernible, pragmatically repeatable, and manifestly related to drawing.

2.7 Homo Superficialis
Agency has developed a bad reputation in philosophical reflection. The general
fear is that any advocacy for agency smuggles in preconceived and erroneous
metaphysical assumptions that ultimately end in ethical violence. From the divine
right of kings to the well-informed western scholar, agency has often been a cover
for “do it my way.” The very notion of intent and purpose has been stripped down to
the bones to the point of vanishing. But, even the most critical voices do not
dispense with agency altogether. One response has been to distribute agency as a
means of recovering it. It aligns violent agency with singular and centered wills.
Therefore the hope is that a more diverse and dispersed body of agents may quell
the forces of that violence.125 In this model, there is no willing center or desiring
subject but rather a melange of forces and ambitions coordinating in a moment of
change or illumination. This approach runs parallel to post-human appeals. It may
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not be enough to have multiple humans expressing a coordinated agency. To avoid
violence we may need to distribute agency across the full network of actors.126
Another strategy is to keep the agency located in this or that person but weaken
it.127 Agency would be more indirect as a participatory affect or involvement in some
type of event. For example, this event of ecological growth attests to “my”
witnessing agency. Each of these strategies has its own merits and applications.
They only become problematic when they substitute for materially efficacious
agency. As I will exposit in the next section, denying humans materially efficacious
agency is to preserve it for a select few. This was the underlying problem of the
Anthropocene and Capitalocene.
But why humans? Why must agency be connected to humans at all? Didn’t you
read the above paragraph? Haven’t they (we) done enough damage? Perhaps. But
the tacit point of this entire anthropological appraisal is that it is not the warp and
weft of humanity to destroy. Rather, the violent trends and imperialist impulses are
decidedly not human. The perceptive and intragenerative descriptions above beget
a world of interdependence. This is Haraway’s point. The anthropologists are all
telling us that human agency’s core competency is constructive beneficence.
Abdicating that function is not “natural.” This fact, amongst others, drives my
advocacy for human agency. But to be persuasive, we must chart a way back to this
human essence and bring surface, material, and marks along with it. A human
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essence that accommodates the pliability of the surface and the intragenerational
energy of materials avoids violent imposition. This brings us to a unique possibility:
what if the core of human agency is precisely its lack of essence?
Over the course of philosophical history, there have been countless efforts to
locate the human essence and discriminate it from other organisms and materials.
At each turn, and depending on the intellectual affinities of the investigating party,
the human incidentally becomes more animal or more angelic. Not uniquely
human. But in the last 15 years, a new trend has emerged alongside neuroscience.
Namely, that the slippery nature of the human is telling us what it is. The human is
plastic.128 Catherine Malabou minted the idea that the human’s distinction is its indistinction and variability. It can, in other words, fold around anything. There is
both promise and peril in this model—especially in light of my opening desires. A
plastic person can become a surface for any object, material, animal, and so forth.
This is the promising part. But what will be left of this person once they do so? If
the other surface writes on them, then what remains of their own shape if their
plasticity makes them utterly deformable? Does the person have any determinate
quality?129 This is perilous for the everyday person already crushed to a pliable and
fungible pulp under the weight of the Capitalocene. So is plasticity enough? Is this
the surface? Is this agency?
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Michel Serres offers a way forward. In Serres’ concept, the greatest distinction
of humans is not language or the like. It is its any-distinction.130 At first glance, this
sounds like an echo of Malabou. But unlike Malabou, Serres’ human has
determinate life. It has colors. The human is so full of white light that it can be
pushed through any prismatic determination. He calls this “incandescence.”131
Those colors are refractions of the determinate worlds in which they dwell and
move. The human has no strict vocation. But it also does not have to revoke one
calling to take up another.132 Rather it is the surface par excellence. It is material
par excellence. It does not just fold around things. It does not just enter into
situations as a vessel. It can become those things, those surfaces, those materials.
And they can become it. It can pass into them and participate in them in a
dispositional way. They can pass into the human and shape its determinate form.
The way Serres describes it: man “has no niche but the world.”133
These last expositions provide a few preliminary conclusions that we should
catalog. 1) If we can conceive of the human surface this way, we can also consider
agency under the same ontological principle. To be an agent of making would
simply amount to being available to mark and to be marked. This resonates with
the account of surfaces and material we have developed up to this point. Agency
could be participatory, perceptive, material, and surfacial. It would be open to all. It
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would be technically determinate at those sites of intrageneration. This has
substantial promise though questions remain. But would it be constructive? Would
it actually make things or is that a line we cannot cross? 2) If we draw some of
anthropology’s earlier premises forward, we can see that this agency and surface
align with the requisite twoness in making. Making something must always be
occurring in cooperation with another surface offering itself. 3) An open agency and
surface, a sharing technicity, is also that process of repetition gleaned from Casey.
The act of intragenerational crossing will continue and never stop lest it achieves an
end. Ends like this are usually only measurable according to a concept that has
been violently imposed from a conceptual beginning. Surface, material, agency—as
making—must always be in situ and always in actu.134 4) These developments open
a need to understand twoness, repetition, habit, and duration.

2.8 Anthropological Findings
As a way of summarizing, let me condense our progress thus far. I set out to
address the needs of common people. I wanted to know how common people,
including myself, could make their world better and more livable. I wanted to
subject this desire to academic scrutiny and precision. I stated, right away, that any
advocacy for—or model of—making would need to be usable for those common
folks whilst remaining intellectually legitimate. Therefore I enlisted systematic
combining as a method of inquiry. Systematic combining took us to the ground at
the end of the dissertation to witness a call to making in real-time. We took the
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questions of our friends as a representative empirical sample. We pressed those
questions for patterns and discovered four pillars of making. They were surfaces,
agency, and marking.
For the purposes of strict study, these four have been treated as dependent
variables. They occur in most accounts of making but their interrelationship and
nature are dependent on other factors. To observe the changes and chart them, we
established a constant for them to pivot around. We proposed the inscription. The
inscription is a Janus-faced entity that has both mentalist and materialist sides. The
inscription serves as a basis for measuring and witnessing the variable elements of
making. At this juncture, we had collected raw data (the questions of doing,
mattering, making, and living), structural concepts (agency, material, marking,
surface), and were ready to see how they responded to an independent variable.
Which, in our case, is the theory category of systematic combining. But before
consulting the theory or paradigm we placed our empirical observations under the
microscope.
We looked through the lens of anthropology to see if these four structural
concepts had validity and value. Tim Ingold reinforced the importance of surface
and materials. He suggested that they are central to humanity across time and
critical for life. Andre Leroi-Gourhan affirmed agency and marking by focusing on
the feedback loop of technicity. Mauss extended technicity to social organization.
Sahlins and Haraway recast that socialization as kin-making. We turned to the work
of Ed Casey to extrapolate the underlying conditions of surfaces and materiality and
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then consulted Michel Serres’ work to plot a forthcoming investigation into agency
and marking.
At present, we can reassess the dissertation’s original claim and improve upon
its nested subtleties and fill in some conceptual gaps. Formerly, I asserted that
drawing is a superior model of making and it invigorates that making specifically
through its material, habitual, and tectonic nature. Now, I can, with confidence say
that drawing is a superior model of making because it connects the surface and
materials of construction with the pliable agency of the human. Because of this
connection and pliability, drawing enriches the lives of humanity and the earth at a
perceptibly material level.
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3. A PHENOMENOLOGY OF DRAWING
3.1 Digging In
Let us keep our findings in front of us. But let us also be brief so that we can get on
to the crux of this study. Anthropology has shown us that materials—and by
implication, the very concept of “the” material—are critical to making a life. More
specifically, materials are defined by mutual generation and transformation—to
both agent and surface. Anthropology confirms that the human, its world, its kin,
and its products are material. It illustrates the way that—as materials—they are
surface, they are interactions, they affect change, and they do all of this in that
double movement noted above. Anthropology also provides the basis for including
drawing in this schema. Anthropology points our attention to the way that change is
operationalized in marking the surface of materials through graphism. Therefore,
the first proposition in a drawn theory of making is that drawing is material.
As anticipated in the previous chapter, the anthropological proposition
introduces difficult philosophical questions. We might know that we interact as
material but not what that material is. We do not yet know what interaction is. What
are agents? Where does the event of drawing start/stop or begin/end? There are
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multiple ways to approach these curiosities. They can induce substantive
exploration, mechanical responses, or outright dismissal. We must avoid the latter
two options lest we leave the daily practices of making unchanged. Mechanical
explanations would also leave hierarchies and current structures in place.
Therefore, we will follow the substantive route. More specifically, we turn to
Phenomenology at Anthropology’s behest. Anthropologists have already situated
making and materials on the horizon of perception. By virtue of that positioning, it
should be supplemented by a science of perception. That is to say, phenomenology.
At this stage of the study, the phenomenological lens of magnification will bring
three “ontological motifs” to light. As we will learn, those motifs are critical in
configuring the structural concepts of making (surface, et al.) that we identified in
previous sections.
Using phenomenology is not without scholarly risk. Several critics (some of
whom we will mention below) have abandoned phenomenology in the last few
decades out of a concern for what they perceive to be a self-involved or narrowly
subjective view of reality.135 Critics fear that phenomenology is too egocentric to
even address the problems of the Anthropocene and the Capitalocene.136 In some
instances, they may even blame phenomenology. While this may be true in certain
applications, it isn’t the case for its roots, derivatives, and core questions. Instead—
as the voices here will confirm—phenomenology tries to understand experiential

135. Silvia Stoller, "Phenomenology and the Poststructural Critique of Experience," International Journal of Philosophical
Studies 17, no. 5 (2009): 712.
136. Travis Holloway, How to Live at the End of the World: Theory, Art, and Politics for the Anthropocene (Redwood City:
Stanford University Press, 2022), 12-14.
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sites where intersecting forces and influences converge but without privileging a
subject. When it does acknowledge a subjective angle, however, it does not do so in
a preferential or violently solipsistic way. It does so by bearing witness to that
subject’s own matrix of perception.137
Beyond its risks, phenomenology has two distinct advantages for this study.
The first comes from its explicit focus. Phenomenology is highly attuned to
everyday life and everyday experience. Despite its various trajectories and legacies,
phenomenological investigation is always asking one question: what is
appearance?138 Or in everyday terms: what is the stuff of life? In light of the
meshwork of “appearing,” laid out by Ingold above, we might describe
phenomenology as a description of the emergence or application of that meshwork
in any given world. Thus, phenomenology is inherently allied to my interests. The
second advantage for this study lies in phenomenology’s accompanying disciplines
and perspectives. Because phenomenology is always looking at local experience
and trying to extrapolate insights, it regularly interacts with other fields. One field
is of particular interest. Given the metaphysical and abstract questions related to
experience, phenomenology routinely engages ontology. Ontology investigates the
nature of a “thing”—be it conceptual, extended, or otherwise. Phenomenology and
ontology are correlatives though they remain conceptually distinct. Together, they

137. Gail Weiss, Gayle Salamon, and Ann V. Murphy, 50 Concepts for a Critical Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 2019), 11-16. See also Michael Marder, Phenomena-Critique-Logos: The Project of Critical Phenomenology (Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield Pub, 2014); Elisa Magri and Paddy McQueen, Critical Phenomenology: An Introduction (Cambridge: Polity,
2022).
138. Weiss et al., 4.
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explicate events at their lowest—albeit abstract—level. In sum, phenomenology
and ontology allow us to peer into the interstices and energies of making, living,
and drawing.
Schematically, this third chapter has four main movements broken up over two
large sections. A1) It sets forth from the anthropological proposition and enters
into phenomenology, A2) proceeds through ontology, B1) undergoes theoretical
experimentation, and then B2) arrives at a pragmatic recommendation for the
future of making. Those movements are then tied together in a final aesthetic
proposition. In the first movement (A1 ), I explore three main threads of historical
phenomenology and engage their chief proponents. In the next movement (A2), I
engage three corresponding reactions to those threads in order to distill key
“ontological motifs.” Though I expand on this further down, for provisional
understanding, “ontological motif” is my term for those energies or currents that
coordinate structural concepts and manifest overarching theories of making.
Therefore, in the third movement (B1), these resultant motifs are coordinated and
synthesized so as to present two main—inscriptive—rubrics for making. I then
abductively experiment with these emergent theories. This theoretical exploration
is the key turning point for the entire study. It highlights a critical assumption that
has a ripple effect on the ontological motifs. In the final movement (B2), I press on
from phenomenology/ontology towards pragmatics. I shift from describing making
to prescribing drawing as a means of rehabilitating making as such. In the end, this
rehabilitation will push towards the following chapter and its lens of Architecture.
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3.2 Phenomenology
Anthropology confirms that human living—past and present at least—is bound up
with making. It also demonstrates that making is deeply rooted in perception.139
This brings making, in its anthropological hue, to the doorstep of phenomenology.
It is hard to describe phenomenology constructively though. Phenomenology
seems only loosely interested in making since it has historically been interested in
reception.140 In the worst cases, it has been reduced to a narrative about human
consciousness. Therefore, if making does play a role it is usually circumscribed by
psychological interests. But at its core, phenomenology is curious about the
appearance of what appears. This is consistent across a variety of disparate
thinkers. What is more, phenomenological investigation is guided by a curiosity
about what constitutes that appearing. This is why we see whole phenomenological
texts or oeuvres dedicated to art. In other words, making is not incidental to
phenomenology. It figures in here as a mode of appearing. In this way, making is
the very bedrock of phenomenology. While no two thinkers have the exact same
questions or treat appearing the same way, we can identify three historical strands
of phenomenology that share an interest in making. Respectively, we will consider
Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and G.W.F. Hegel.

3.2.1 Edmund Husserl

139. Tim Ingold, The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill (London: Psychology Press,
2000), 166-168.
140. Weiss et al., 50 Concepts, 12.
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The most recognizable name in phenomenology, especially to those outside the
philosophical world, is Edmund Husserl, a turn-of-the-century German philosopher.
His diverse interests in psychology, mathematics, and logic have contributed to his
broad renown. Upon closer review, those seemingly varied interests orbit around a
basic and unified concern. Namely, he was intrigued by the human’s perceptive
ability to discriminate objects. His dissertation on number represents an early stage
of that interest.141 Number, specifically geometry, continued to inform his later
work.142 He is most well known for his take on the concept of intentionality. That is,
the perceptive moment wherein a subject’s consciousness is directed towards—or
intends—an object. What we look for in Husserl are the ways in which his account
of the perceptive moment supports or threatens making. More specifically, will
probe whether perceptive agency has the capacity to affect the objects it
encounters. And if so, what is the nature of that efficacy?
Husserl’s teacher, Franz Brentano, had already claimed that consciousness had
corresponding objects.143 In simpler terms, consciousness was never empty.
Intentionality was not new in Husserl. But, Husserl wanted to focus on the
connection itself rather than the object or the consciousness. If he could explain the
nexus, the very event of perception would not depend on the properties of either

141. Edmund Husserl, Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics (Basingstoke: Springer, 2011), 1-6. See also
Edmund Husserl, “On the Concept of Number: Psychological Analysis,” Philosophia Mathematica s1-10, no. 1 (1973),273; Mirja
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142. Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to
Phenomenological Philosophy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 24-27.
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mind or matter. It would have wide explanatory value for both experience and
understanding. It would be repeatable, universal, and shareable. Therefore, for
Husserl, intentionality should be understood on its own terms.144 Not on the
consciousness that intends or the object that is intended but the intending qua
intending. In anthropological terms, Husserl is aiming for a science of interaction
without a focus on the human or the world.
We do not have the space to delineate all of the features of his entire system,
but we should note a few important aspects of intentionality. First, intentionality
does not mean that the world is not real. It means that we bring something to the
world to differentiate it. The blobby experience of phenomena is discriminated
through a conceptual structure he calls the noema.145 This process is ongoing and
is critical in constituting objects as we know them. Second, this noetic act is unified.
We are not piecing things together; the structuring is in real-time. Third, sensation
is critical to consciousness insofar as the objects we perceive can alter which
structure we apply to them. Thus, intentionality is more like the consciousness
providing an expectation for an object but it does not always get it right. Once
again, in intentionality, there is no doubt about the world’s existence. There is only
a desire to understand how we interact with it.
But what happens to intentionality when there are no corresponding objects? At
least when there is no tree, thread, or lake? Husserl offers the notions of intuition
and reduction.146 The former is a familiar term and describes perceptive access to
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essences like those of his aforementioned mathematical objects. Reduction, on the
other hand, is where his pure science of interaction begins to take fuller form.
When we reduce, we reverse the conscious movement. That is, instead of attending
to the object through the application of structures or expectations, we turn back
and attend to our process of perception. We reflect on the structures like the
noema.147 Famously, he calls this a bracketing or an epoche.148 We turn away from
the “standard” way of looking at the world, set it aside, and reflect. When our
reduction homes in on a conscious feature in our perception that is a prerequisite
for it, this reduction is demonstrating a “transcendental.”149 This is a key shift in the
science of perception. It opens up ontological speculation about the nature of these
transcendental structures and how we participate in them. In the spirit of
anthropology, we should be wondering whether this retreat into the recesses of
reflection can be called interaction. These categories may refine, but they may not
bring perception closer to the material surface.
Before we move on from Husserl, there is one more key aspect of his science of
interaction that deserves attention. His systems of perception do not preclude other
consciousnesses doing their own perceiving. The temptation for interpreters of
Husserl is to see the subject as isolated and objects as delimited to that subject’s
world alone. But Husserl claimed that the structures of perception actually exposed
that consciousness to the interplay of other consciousnesses.150 This is because the
147. Husserl, 134.
148. Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology (Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media,
2013), 6-9.
149. Husserl, Ideas, 114.
150. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 207-222.
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actions and movements of the body, as part of the structure of perception, raised
conscious awareness of other bodies and their capacity towards interacting.
Husserl’s famous example of this is the touch.151 When my hand touches a
keyboard or table, the noetic structures can zero in on the hyle of the object. But
the perceptive apparatus can also reflect back on the sense that my body is doing
the touching and therefore is an object amongst objects in this lifeworld. This
realization is heightened even further when one of my hands touches the other.
Since I become aware of myself in the self-touch, I also become intimately attuned
to others’, activity and our joint capacity to act.
Again, though we certainly have not explored the fullness of Husserl’s scheme,
these few notes have a direct relation to our study of making. First, his scheme
attests to the structural categories we have been working with all along. His
meticulous taxonomy of the perceptive act begins and ends at the site of interaction
we have been calling the surface. His descriptions of intentionality and even
sensation do not retreat to either side of the intentional moment.152 The
consciousness bends, revises, and reflects in lockstep with the intention. Likewise,
the objects of experience are on a horizon of indeterminacy without the act of
intention. Intention is a double movement. It is a double effect. As a result, it is
extremely hard to posit either consciousness or object without it. In other words,
this intention is primordial and bi-directional. This resonates with anthropology’s
vision of the material surface and the action of making. Recall that the material
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moment is the ground or surface of intragenerational perception—or technicity. In
the same way that the biped changes and is changed in the encounter with the
world, at the surface of perceptive intention, both agent and object are active and
pliable. But, while Husserl sheds more light on the nature of the surface—as a
fountain of dual effect—his lasting weakness has been his appeal to a
transcendental subject. We do not have the space or time to expound on this
danger but suffice it to say, Husserl posited a subject that dwelt amongst the noetic
transcendentals.153 According to critics, this sort of subject would have full agency
by solipsistically containing the world. Or, it would lend itself to a neutered agency
that receded too far behind the intention. Neither model of agency is sufficient to
account for a life of making. Husserl’s successor, Martin Heidegger, would take up
this issue of the subject and build his own phenomenological scheme around it.

3.2.2 Martin Heidegger
Heidegger is not commonly spoken about as a phenomenologist. His impact
has extended into a variety of disciplines and that is for mostly ontological and
existential reasons. Still, his ongoing fixation with appearing combined with his
tutelage under Husserl places him in a phenomenological lineage.154 He inherited
much of his predecessor’s questions and conditions but ontologically overhauled
them. Specifically, Heidegger thought that we could not begin to understand life,
the world, and our actions from the vantage point of things or the perception

153. Husserl, Crisis, 151.
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thereof. For Heidegger, Husserl’s former aim to explicate the perceptive middle
might have been a noble path but he would need to go further than perception. He
needed to ask about the appearing of appearing. Heidegger would radicalize, or
purify, phenomenology’s focus on appearance and center his attention on being.
Though this may seem only distantly related to making, this issue of first appearing
inflects the process of making at its originary moment. If Heidegger can show that
appearing is only passive or that it is elusive, then agency and marking may vanish
at the surface of Being’s revelation.
To put it directly, Heidegger wants to reach behind any discussion of the
structures of perception. Starting with the perceived would limit our understanding
of appearance only to the ontic. According to Heidegger, things—extended,
palpable, present—are “ontic” and ontic things only appear.155 There is something
more primordial and properly basic that grants such an appearance. Ontic things
may include us, the act of intention, and the objects intended but they do not give
us insights into the source of those things. Therefore, our interests should be in the
very event of that appearing.156 Such an appearing is not reducible to perception. It
is ontological and, for Heidegger, ontology is the disclosure of being. If we want to
know life and live it well, we need to explicate the very disclosure of the being of
life, its materials, and its ideas. So, whereas Husserl structured perception via
noetic categories, Heidegger look for events that gave rise to perception. Put
differently, Heidegger and Husserl can be distinguished by the differences between

155. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Albany: SUNY Press, 2010), 12.
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a preposition and a noun. For Husserl, the “of” in consciousness-of-x was the site of
investigation. For Heidegger, the “is” in the-table-is-hard was the true curiosity of
life.
In short, Heidegger’s chief conception is that being is always in a process of
revealing and simultaneously in the process of hiding. Whenever we say something
“is” this way or that, we encounter the reality of a moment but are also faced with
the immediate vanishing of that moment. This prompts us to wonder about how
and why this event recurs. Heidegger realized that if any human took this issue
seriously—if they asked what is is—it would throw the human into anxiety.157 When
we peer into being and its disclosure we also find it receding behind our
investigations. We cannot tame it or name it. We cannot secure the ground beneath
us. This pres-abs-ence, as Heidegger would think of it, hints at our own nature as
vulnerable to disappearance.158 Just as things are disclosed and retreat, we too
stand at the precipice of our own arriving and concealment. To avoid confusion, this
loss is not something that awaits us at the end of a long life. Our absence is
concomitant with our presence. Because we are, this presabscent reality (and its
accompanying anxiety) has been with us since our appearing. To be clear, that
appearing is happening—and continues to happen—now.
Heidegger does not back away from the anxiety this induces. Rather, he sees
anxiety as the proper response to our place in time and a radical awareness of
where we stand with respect to being’s disclosure. Death is a part of life.159
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Therefore, an authentic life for the human would be being-towards-death. At the
risk of redundancy, once again, this death is not something that is postponed to a
chronological moment. The reality that we might not appear or will not appear later
is a precondition for appearing at all. Ontological investigation begets a radical
awareness of this fragility in the light of being’s revelation. Heidegger calls this
fully human self-awareness: Dasein.160 Humanity is unique as Dasein because it is
the site where being reflects on itself. In a similar way that Husserl’s consciousness
exercises a reduction, Dasein is where being reflects on being. These cosmic
responsibilities should not dismay the human but invigorate it. According to
Heidegger, human life has been shackled to the ontic and forgotten its ontological
posture. This being-towards death is a kind of radical freedom. It gives humans a
life unanchored to things and fallen imaginations.161 In the terms of Andre LeroiGourhan, this awareness of being-towards-death is a kind of standing up. Beyond
standing, this ontological posture could move the human forward into material
exploration and authentic expression. This realization led Heidegger to consider art
and productivity as a means of executing an authentic life.162
There is simply too much in Heidegger to give his scheme a proper hearing.
Unfortunately, our space is limited to those insights that address our interest in
making. First, we note that in Heidegger, surface and marking appear alongside
agency—even in diminished form. I have enough agency to make markings that
testify to being. I appear at the surface of disclosure. But our three concepts all
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remain under limit conditions. As the human peers or reaches towards its
absenting end, it never quite gets there. The same applies to artistic works. Though
they disclose disclosure itself, they do so by admitting their inability to touch the
edge of a thing or arrive at the ground of a surface. In other words, the surface of
agency is constantly retreating, and therefore marking is a kind of perpetual futility.
Our agency is groping. Our markings are hovering over an abyss rather than at a
surface.
In Heidegger’s system, this is not necessarily bad news. It is the font of
authenticity—even if authentic life is somehow configured by real death. Heidegger
finds this authenticity dwellable, buildable, and liveable163. It just needs to keep
happening. To be authentic, and to face the possibility of death, is to keep peering
into this disclosure time and again. Still, despite his novelty and advocacy, such an
exotic account of liberated living may not square with daily life as we know it.
Heidegger had considered this possibility but dismissed it as the result of
inauthentic humans forgetting their calling. Even if this holds, it still distances his
work from applicability. His elevation of Dasein also puts human action in a
somewhat passive light. Art reveals and tools may disclose but he never prescribes
an active mechanics. Humans are simply reacting to the conditions of beingtowards-death and every tool at their disposal vanishes in the translucent light of
being’s disclosure. This fall short of an account of making that is purposeful and
actionable. Shortly, we will consider Jacques Derrida’s phenomenological critique
as a step towards an actionable and material account of agency, marking, and
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surface. Even with this weakness, Heidegger’s keen sensitivity to language and the
mundane, combined with his penetrating abstract analysis, reminds us that an
account of making may include speculative but fecund elements.

3.2.3 G.W.F. Hegel
Whereas Heidegger shifted attention to the grounds behind the perception,
G.W.F. Hegel’s phenomenological approach more or less reversed it. Both Husserl
and Heidegger were interested in the experience of the phenomenological subject
as they beheld objects or being. Hegel was interested in the nature and process of
the objects and being themselves.164 Labeled as an idealist by history, Hegel is not
usually associated with other traditional phenomenologists. But we include him
here because his approach to appearing is not only holistic and novel but it
anticipates some of the analyses we will apply shortly. As noted, Hegel was curious
about the being of things just as Heidegger was. But being, for Hegel, was less
disclosive and more inclusive, developmental, and historical. Being was a
comprehensive term that did not just appear on the horizon of human reflection but
was operative in all things.165 We do not need to start with human perception to find
the nature of phenomenal appearing. We can see consciousness at work in things.
This makes him less concerned about the phenomenon of appearing and more
interested in the appearing of all phenomena.
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His most famous work, Phenomenology of Spirit, tracks the development of
being as a general consciousness that works itself out in things. In Heidegger’s
terms, the ontological is alive in the ontic. This work demonstrates the way that all
of history is a perceptive horizon and mechanism for “Spirit’s” authentic awareness
of itself. Spirit, or being, comes to itself in the material order of the world and its
elements. For Hegel, the phenomenon of life is not the purview of Dasein or the
structure of perception. It is the movement of the living world itself. It is not
immediately self-evident that such a movement has any bearing on a concept of
making. But as we shall see, his ontology of holistic consciousness elevates making
as a critical process in the world’s development while also undermining it in its
practical aspects. Once again, how we conceive of appearing and origination has a
direct impact on a philosophy of making.
Though preceding both Heidegger and Husserl, like them, Hegel also targets
the ground of appearing. Recall that in Husserl, phenomenology could provide a
science of perception. It culled out structures of intentionality. Consider also, in
Heidegger, phenomenology would point consciousness towards the very giveness
of being. In his system, phenomenology could differentiate and organize the
elements of being’s disclosure. Hegel shared their ambition to describe the
mechanism of appearance in rigorous terms. One major distinction, for Hegel, is
that phenomenology is a description of the process, rather than the structure, of
consciousness. The second major distinction is that, in his system, the isolated
consciousness is not a given but arises within a world as it unfolds unto itself.166
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The developing world of things is itself the process of consciousness. But whose?
Which subject is doing the perceiving? Hegel’s answer: all of them.167 Instead of
privileging the subject of consciousness—as Husserl had done implicitly and
Heidegger had explicitly—Hegel looks from the side of the objects. The world and
its objects take part in a universal and determinate consciousness. Objects are in an
ongoing discovery of their shared structure. The internal life of each object is a
slice of a consciousness that comprises all objects, moments in time, and relations
between things. Ultimately, these varied elements will converge into one selfawareness. Critically, for Hegel, this is because they began in one.
Contra Husserl, this broad consciousness is not a simple matter of a subject
sensing or perceiving an object. Moreover, Hegel’s is not a bare reversal of it either
wherein the object is thinking about the human. Contra Heidegger, conscious selfawareness is also not a recognition of one’s place in the matrix of being. For Hegel,
self-consciousness is an ontological condition and reality. It belongs to all things. It
is the engine of matter, space, and time.168 In order for being to be, in order for it to
have extension and duration, it must be moving. That moving is the discovery of
universal self-awareness. The animal, the bottle, and the screen all evolve within the
movement of this engine. The fuel of this engine, the currency of selfconsciousness, is its internal logic of negation. Any positive discriminate thing is
always accompanied by its negation or opposite.169 The interaction of these
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opposites propels awareness forward. This logic works in both immaterial concepts
and extended matter.
For example, at the physical level, when a group of coins is gathered together
(at minimum, two), their relation becomes a grouping—a number. Each coin is the
“same” as the others in one sense and “not like” each other in another. Eventually,
this interplay of opposites will lend itself to a higher conceptual unity of coinage-assuch (i.e. as “money” or “metal circles). That unity can gather with another element
to produce another unity. This may be hard to see in matter or in daily life but both
Darwin and Marx were keenly aware of it. For Hegel, the important thing is that
each stage of unity brings reality closer to its self-understanding.170 It brings Spirit
closer to self-consciousness. This engine operates at the lowest abstract levels of
reality. “Being” is always accompanied by non-being. They are not separate but
pass into each other in sublation.171 That passing is its own “thing” which will in
turn have its own negation. This goes on ad infinitum producing quantity, quality,
extension, measure, shape, and all the way to institutions and disciplines like
religion, philosophy, and art. The process of self-awareness is being coming into its
own by negating everything it entails. At least until the process concludes in a circle
of return and awareness. This is phenomenology for Hegel: phenomena manifest a
process of discovery and return that can be called ideal and universal selfconsciousness.
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This model has a direct impact on his theories of making and creativity. Recall
that the material world does not just demonstrate a movement of negation but is
itself negation and self-consciousness in process. This places material institutions in
a key role. They are steps towards that final horizon when the physical and the
mental mutually participate in one another. When this happens, when the opposites
continue to sublate into one another, self-consciousness is set free. Spirit is free
when history, matter, and sensation are folded into one another.172 Making is
critical to this freedom. For example, tools and construction betoken a freedomcum-unity. They coordinate mind and machine to express the self-consciousness
and coincidence of opposites. Works of art are even a finer testament to Spirit’s
development.173 They are not expressions of a private mind. They are not referential
works. Rather they demonstrate the freedom that arises in the harmony of material
and immaterial in a joint movement.
Hegel falls further behind both Husserl and Heidegger with respect to
prescribing a mechanism of making. Husserl and Heidegger circled issues of
surface and agency but their positions on signs or art still left us wanting for a
practical prescription for markings. Hegel’s model enervates most of the structural
concepts we have been working with thus far. The surface is weakened and
overcome. Agency is displaced to the whole. And artistic markings are only
valuable insofar as they evince a process. This is not the advocacy of Hegel but the
result of his overarching system. Hegel’s great skill is to see everything in reality

172. Hegel, Phenomenology, 479.
173. Hegel., 424.

113

together under one rubric. That skill also compromises the discrete value of any
single thing, act, or element. For example, while he appears to celebrate the
material, things are not really interacting with other things. Rather, they are being
incorporated into ever-increasing unities that will position them according to that
synthesis. In other words, any distinction they may have is proximate. The same
consequences befall the agent, surface, and markings. The only surface that seems
to be of significance is the final shell which encases the grand synthesis of selfconsciousness. The agent finds itself to be interchangeable with any “other” given
in the process of becoming that other. Lastly, the surface seems too permeable to
offer any resistance at the site of passing and sublation between opposites. In the
end, Hegel’s system may not only fail to reach the common person, it may actually
pose a danger by encouraging their acquiescence to a hegemonic status quo.
Despite any drawbacks, these forbears of phenomenology introduce new
complexity and clarity to the discoveries of anthropology. Anthropology had
already positioned making at the core of human life—especially in its punctuated
evolutionary moments. These phenomenological voices further confirmed the
structural elements of surface, agent, and marking that we saw in descriptions of
perceptive making, technicity, and kinship. In the mold of phenomenology, these
structural concepts take on greater significance. Husserl suggests that the surface
is a blooming site that begets an interaction, not the other way around. The
material surface is not waiting on the properties of the agent or object. Instead, the
surface is fecund each time it appears. Heidegger helped us see that the agent does
not “bear down” on that surface but “bears with” it. We could say that the agent
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exists to bear being itself. Heidegger’s agent of revelation and interaction marked
that surface but not as violence. Rather as hospitality and welcoming the world and
earth. Hegel confirmed that making, process, and growth are integral to the whole
world. Negatively (ironically), his system showed that surface, marking, and agent
are threatened by totalities that do not account for “making a difference.’ Still,
important issues remain unresolved. Each of these phenomenological threads
evokes critical and clarifying responses to which we now turn.

3.3 Ontology
Let us be clear, as we move through more phenomenological systems we will
continue to conceptually diverge and lose direct historical continuity. As a
reminder, historical linkage is not our purpose or methodological practice. From
the beginning, I stated that I wanted to explore the deepest recesses of making so
that I might find the resources for a novel theory. Our aim has been abductive from
the start. We have been just off to the side distilling and reassembling elements of
making to construct a systematic account that will be tenable for the everyday
person. This method of locating, cross-applying, sampling, and conjoining is not
incidental or arbitrary. It is systematic combining’s core practice of MATCHING.
To build a theory from the ground up, we flow back and forth inductively and
deductively to sketch out a blueprint. What is more, given the scope of this study,
that blueprint may only found the theory but not finish it. In this way, what we are
doing here in selecting and sampling thinkers, provides a “vigorous” theory that
can be developed further by future humans. It can, and should, grow.
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What we are seeing up to this point is the increasing intricacy of making.
Anthropology started with a clear celebration of human activity in the environment
and then pressed further into the evolutionary effects of technicity. That technicity
opened the question about the nature of perceptive interaction. Phenomenology
probed deeper into the mechanisms of this perception as noetic, disclosive, or
dialectical consciousness. Along the way, as making ripened, the structural
concepts intensified. This process highlights the fact that making and its structures
are ultimately rooted in ontology. Our phenomenologists did make that more
explicit than our anthropologists but still stopped short of providing a theory of
making. This omission is precisely because their ontologies had little room for
humans on the ground making things. Instead, they elevated abstractions like
revelation, transcendence, and totality. In short, making still hangs in the
ontological balance. We can see, by their own abstractions, that there is more to a
theory of making than just its ingredients.
Ontologies of making also reveal motifs that organize and arrange these
ingredients. Ontological motifs render theoretical products and prompt empirical
behavior. Though we are well on our way, we have not fully grasped these motifs.
We know that making should include surface, agent, and markings but we do not
how those pieces are combined or blended. Here below, we make another pass at
phenomenology but this time through the work of these forbears heirs, and critics.
In order, we consider the embodied phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the
written ontology of Jacques Derrida, and the creative philosophy of Gilles Deleuze.
As respondents, their writings already do a lot of the work that we would otherwise
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take on as MATCHING. When we cross-apply these critic’s systems, we will expand
our matching process, develop the mold of these budding ontological motifs, assert
them clearly, and then include them in our foundation for a theory of making. We
will proceed in the order of appearance above.

3.3.1 Maurice Merleau-Ponty
As it concerns aim and basic terms, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology
feels a lot like Husserl’s. He too is interested in the nature of perception at ground
zero. He wants to bracket typical perspectives and start afresh at the surface of
interaction and consciousness. But unlike Husserl, he does not begin structurally.
He is not interested in finding repeatable universals but its opposite. He wants to
discover the sine qua non condition of perceiving. He is looking for that thing that is
unique to perception and life. In a word, this is the body.174 Merleau-Ponty
considers the body to be Husserl’s—and other’s—grand omission. Even if Husserl
had discussed kinetics, Hegel had elevated matter, or Heidegger had positioned
the human as the site of being, none had spotlighted the body as the fundamental
organ of perception. Given that the body is paramount, Merleau-Ponty begins his
examination of perception from the angle of behavioral psychology.
Behavioral psychology was a mixed bag for Merleau-Ponty. On the one hand, it
was mired in the mind-on-matter paradigm. Some unreflective psychologists simply
perpetuated the assumption that humans are a mind who receives or conceives of
intents and then conveys those intents on matter. These sorts of models often died

174. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Psychology Press, 2002), 100.
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out in a debate between idealism and empiricism.175 On the other hand, Gestalt
theory was a branch of behavioral psychology that was rife with perceptive
affordances. In Gestalt theory, humans perceive objects as forms—as wholes.176
This pressed against Husserl’s tendency to break down perception into various
interlocking structures of reception. Gestalt theory would argue that the figures of
perception were irreducible to component parts. For Merleau-Ponty, Gestalt
models described everyday life and experience because daily action is whole. Daily
action is bodily. Therefore, in Merleau-Ponty’s system, the lowest common
denominator of perception was the unified form.177 And, life is comprised of unified
forms confronting each other. This confrontation, once again, foregrounds the
importance of the body.
The body is not just something the mind operates on. It is not something the
consciousness possesses. It is also not merely an object amongst objects. It is, in
our terms, the surface of perception. The body provides a canvas for the
appearance of any object. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, “it is that by which there are
objects.”178 The body is a zone of possibility. And, as a result, it is ambiguous.179 It is
as much defined by the event of perception as the object perceived might be. The
body is growable, adjustable, and changeable. These descriptions of the pliable and
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2007), 141.

118

receptive subject hint at similar thoughts in Heidegger with the critical exception of
the body. In Heidegger’s model, Dasein was the site of being’s disclosure insofar as
Dasein cared or considered this disclosure (perhaps in a theoretical way). For
Merleau-Ponty, the body was the site of perception precisely in its sensations,
reflections, speech, and creativity. To change, it did not refer out to some vanishing
horizon. The body bestows meaning right where it is.
The elevation of the body posed a transcendental risk. Namely, would the body
and its bestowal of meaning and significance count as a transcendental subject in
the spirit of Husserl? Instead of positing a receding entity guiding perception—as
Husserl had—Merleau-Ponty thrusts perception back to the surface. Perception
happens where the body interacts. If perception is transcendental it is not because
it is removed from events of perception but because it is pervasive. Transcendence
here indicates “across” more than “above.”180 The body stretches out across all
perceptive acts. Therefore, it grounds even our ability to talk about it. It foments
speech rather than fields it.181 To call it transcendent would not mean that it is
above or beyond but that it is woven in so deeply that we have to use it to try and
reflect on it. We cannot gain distance in order to describe the thing that founds our
descriptions. Our body, perceiving at this surface of interaction, presents a gap in
the manifold of describable things.182 He fleshes this idea out in his later ontological
writings.

180. "transcendence, n.,” Oxford English Dictionary Online, accessed May 20, 2022, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/
204607.
181. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 179.
182. Merleau-Ponty., 387.

119

At the time of his death, Merleau-Ponty was working out his ontology of
perception in a series of essays that would later be collected as The Visible and the
Invisible.183 He wanted to give more depth and shape to the immanence of
perception and resolve those lingering questions about the nature of this
transcendental gap. In this collection, he introduces the notion that the world, itself,
is flesh.184 This flesh is like a plane of possibility and sensation that folds back on
itself and produces perception at the point of contact. He described the flesh of the
world as both touching and being touched.185 The flesh of the world manifests in a
body that is both object and subject.186 In other words, that body gap noted above is
the result of the world’s flesh opening a site of interaction. That opening is not an
absence as it had been in Heidegger, it is a point of contact, touch, and connection.
To clarify this point, he returns to Husserl and takes up his example of the hand.187
Recall that Husserl had illustrated the notion of reflection and reduction when a
subject becomes keenly aware of their own touch. In the first instance, touching a
cat helps me feel the cat feeling me. But, when a subject’s hand touches their other
hand, their self-awareness is amplified. For Merleau-Ponty, this second instance is
momentous. It suggests that I can perceive on both sides of the perceptive
connection. Self-touch demonstrates a kinship at work in perception. The cat, the
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tree, and the wind are all sensing me. Self-touch implies a reversibility of sensation
and is therefore exemplary for Merleau-Ponty.188
In the same essay, he calls this reversibility a chiasm.189 A chiasm is both a
literary tool wherein action reverses after a nexus and a visual cue in the form of an
X. In the chiasm, Merleau-Ponty is illustrating connection and departure in the
same movement. This is his basic ontological principle. When perception occurs,
the flesh of the world begets bodies that join and separate. At that juncture, one
body senses another body sensing it. This enables a reversibility and expands
perception and life. I can see what you see, if only proximately. I can feel what you
feel, if only proximately. But the chiasm is not reducible to simple sensation.
Chiasms describe all interactions. Two ideas converging and sharing or
SYSTEMATIC COMBINING’S MATCHING could both be called chiastic. What is
more, the chiasm can describe interactions without imposing a totalizing and
absorptive principle. By nature, the chiasm resists any kind of finality,
incorporation, or substantive closure. It is, in that way, an act of making. This
brings Merleau-Ponty into proximity with anthropologists like Tim Ingold and even
Andre-Leroi Gourhan who had described this double-movement of interaction and
growth.
Though this idea would only emerge near the end of his life, the chiasm forms
the basis of his final work on art and making. In his essay on the Eye and Mind,
Merleau-Ponty brings the body to the surface and argues that the painter offers his
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body and the world offers itself back190. The artist arises in this chiastic moment
and his perception reverses positions with the world he paints. The painting itself is
the expression of this reversibility.191 Heidegger had argued elsewhere that art was
a revealing of deeper ontological conditions.192 Thus, like Heidegger, MerleauPonty’s craft of making has something to do with disclosure. But unlike Heidegger,
Merleau-Ponty’s art was tied to the event of the intertwining rather than the result
of an interruptive outside. He went so far as to call these makings: icons.193 The
lines, forms, and methods of the maker did not subtract the material ground of
perception and life. Painters were not trying to represent an object through distance
but to encounter the world. In our terms, to make a living.

3.3.2 Jacques Derrida
Merleau-Ponty would not be the final, or even the most consequential, word on
Husserl’s phenomenology. That title belongs to Jacques Derrida, the French
theorist. Derrida is not strictly a phenomenologist but his work inevitably orbits it.
His oeuvre, from his master’s thesis to Speech and Phenomena, are often responses
to Husserl’s phenomenological system.194 In fact, his earliest published work, in
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1962, was his introduction to Husserl’s Origin of Geometry.195 Husserl had
commented on Geometry in his The Crisis of European Sciences. This introduction
still serves as a reference point for Derrida’s grammatological ontology. In it,
Derrida addresses the structures of perception specifically as they relate to
immaterial concepts like geometric conclusions.
Husserl had introduced the notion of eidetic essences. The eidos refers to the
underlying “shape” of an object of perception beyond the particular moments of
perception. Husserl evenly applied them to phenomena that had no direct material
reference. In light of Husserl’s background in mathematics, geometry served as a
prime example of an immaterial eidos. The geometer engages reality with the same
noetic structures that the child in the field might use. He would use the same
reductions and the same intuition to access the shape of the thing under
observation. But, unlike that child’s grass of flower, the geometer’s object must be
inscribed.196 That is, the geometric object would not be a phenomenon unless it
appeared. As a result, this object appears on the surface of the page.197 These
inscribed objects—or as Husserl called them: buried intentions—are get
reanimated in the event of other perceptions. This happens time and again when
others “read” this object on the page. This is how things like geometric forms
escape simple rationalist enclosure. They do not just exist in the mind but rather
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appear on the surface and for perception. Husserl takes these objects to be
available for universal and immediate reflection.
Derrida’s concern is that there are ontological assumptions in the
aforementioned example that are not only dubious but obscure the process that the
geometric object must undergo. Namely, that this object must pass through the
inscription in order to be present. Derrida objects to the notion that the geometer is
present to things in inscriptions. He rejects the claim that such inscriptions can
semiotically produce absolute presence for its later “readers.” Their reanimating
reading will also pass through a process before they become presently aware of its
eidos.198 He discovers and critiques these assumptions according to Husserl’s own
categories of expression and indication. These are two modalities of putting signs
down on paper.199 For Husserl, expressions are inherently meaningful. They may
not indicate another object. Rather they are their object, so to speak. Like art, they
convey their shape openly. Indications, on the other hand, refer away to an object
not present to the sign. For Husserl, the perception of geometric objects is
expressive. Unlike the writing that may convey it later, the geometric object is
immediate in its perceived moment.
But Derrida questions that expressive assumption. How does an expressive
sign unfold inside perception? For him, it assumes that the subject is present to the
intuited object in an uninterrupted, immediate, and direct way. This, Derrida
claims, depends on the subject also being a pure immediate presence unto itself.200
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The most glaring difficulty is that such an ideal relation could hardly be shared. It
would be like a silent encounter—never referring. Pure expression would be
somewhat inexpressible. With that in mind, Husserl had held that an expression
had the potency for indication in the intersubjective actions of readers. It is
writable, in other words. This allowed the pure expression to be “on its way” to
reference and sharing. Such potency did not depend on indication—geometric
objects had perpetuity—but it did enable it. For Derrida, this is suspect because the
subject’s intuition of the expression only becomes visible in the potency of
inscription. In Derrida’s mind, Husserl has it backwards. The potential of geometric
forms—to be “read,” to be repeated across time and space, and to be vulnerable to
misinterpretation—implies that they are always already indicative because these
are attributes of indication.201 Therefore, Derrida concludes, that all perceptive acts
and intuitions are always already indicative and arise alongside the mediation of
inscription.
Derrida expands on the implications of this primordial mediation in
phenomenology. If all perceptive acts arise in indicative inscription, then all acts
have some potential for being shared but also for being misinterpreted. One
implication is that reality, as we know it, is always underscored by a fundamental
alterity. Everything, not only perceivable events, is situated in alterity, differing, or
othering. That differing is both a generosity and a slippage of control over meaning.
But it is not a moral condition. It is an ontological one. Alterity is ready-to-hand
insofar as it is the very nature of inscription or writing. The inscribed opens room
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for more perception and more differing. The other implication is that this alterity
presumes repeatability. If something can always be something else, then it is never
statically presented. It can reappear in another form. If a phenomenon was selfpresent, it would go silent and cease to signify. The bond between sign and
signified would be absolute. To even utter the statement “this thing is like that
thing,” presumes the space of uncertainty that even makes that claim meaningful.
Therefore, inscriptions, as alterable, are inherently repetitious. Derrida synthesized
these implications in a single term: iterability.202 Inscriptions are iterable insofar as
they alter and repeat. This taxonomy suggests that at its basic level, perception is a
fundamental mediation that is also constructive insofar as it is iterable. Perceiving
means we are altering and repeating and therefore producing something new. In
his critique, Derrida had turned phenomenology upside down and, in so doing,
open the door to mechanical explanations of this constructive differing alive within
perception.
Any Derridean mechanics of construction must pivot around the fact that
mediation is necessarily inscriptive. As we have seen, the writing of geometry
opens perception by opening iterability. This is where Derrida’s connection
between writing and acting, perceiving, and living takes root. He coins the term
différance to describe the internal differing of perception that we have been calling
iterability.203 différance is a deferral of time and difference of place. When
something is written, given that it is never fully self-present, it is always elsewhere
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and else-when. So, what is posed directly in the text can be even read as its inverse.
Writing is the inscription of here that always leans on an absenting there. Writing is
that inscription whose now is also then. This, for Derrida, is the structure of
perceptive indication as laid out by Husserl. The indices of perception are
coextensive with a primordial “writing” that founds events.204 What is critical here is
that Derrida is shifting phenomenological speculation away from biological or
philosophical accounts of lived phenomena and positioning them within the
exceedingly familiar practice and event of writing. Therefore, he can ontologically
assert that writing makes perception possible by instituting différance. Derrida did
not back into writing by happenstance but derived it from Andre Leroi-Gourhan’s
claims about the hand, the mouth, and technicity. Leroi-Gourhan had shown that
man’s technical development of speech and tools exteriorized his life and desire. In
other words, writing was instrumental for human’s ongoing perception and life.
Derrida reads this as confirmation of writing’s role in establishing and exteriorizing
all perceptive encounters in différance.
Significantly, writing is not left bare as an abstract force of differing and
repeating. This represents a substantial advancement towards a theory of making.
Namely, Derrida operationalizes his unique take on perception. This way of living
could be shared, taught, or practiced on purpose. Writing is not simply a concept or
a medium. It is both. What is more, now with différance and iterability in hand,
writing and its mediating structuration can be dissected. Since writing is iterability
par excellence. The lowest form of alterity and repetition can be found amongst
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phonemes or graphemes. We can engage these elements and observe their
differing and iteration. What Derrida finds there, amongst the differing, is the fact
that writing’s iterability depends on basic binaries.205 We have already noted how
saying one thing implies another. But this implication can open a chain of reference
that can stretch all the way to the opposite end of meaning. In other words, a term
seems to imply its opposite. For example, each time we say light, dark is always
luring. A binary is shorthand for that chain or reference. Deconstruction was
Derrida’s method of exposing these embedded binaries.206 But becoming aware of
binaries was only the first step. The reader can invert the binary to explore and play
with the consequences. If we wrote about dark instead of light, for example, we
could see ripple effects in textual meaning and force. Deconstructing the binary is a
process that reveals the way a writer, institution, or culture has privileged one
aspect of a differing world and heralded that aspect as metaphysically given. We
can ask why light over dark? Why now as opposed to then? What we cannot do is
rid ourselves of these binaries. They are basic to writing and writing is basic to
perceiving, living, and moving. What we have here in deconstruction, iteration, and
différance is an inscriptive model for making a life. We will discuss the merits of this
model in detail below. For now, it is only important to see the subtle coordination of
phenomenological concepts with mechanical practices.
Thus far, written mediation has only affected our certainty and clarity regarding
the objects of understanding. But writing’s exteriority, iterability, and
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deconstruction also alter our orientation towards an assumed subject—towards
ourselves. In indication—in inscriptive perception—self-presence assumes nonpresence. This means that our concepts of our own life are themselves never selfidentical. According to Derrida, then, our “life” implies not-life. To put it
anthropologically, as alive and perceiving, our perceptions are configured by
death.207 This fact resonates with, but also nuances, Heidegger’s advocacy for
Dasein to acknowledge its own death.
Back in the geometric example, Derrida had shown that if expression were
possible then both the geometric object and the self would need to be fully present.
Objecting to that demand, he demonstrated that the object is always already
mediated despite Husserl’s contortions. The same applies to the subjective
perceiver. In the same way that geometric expressions are always already
indicative, the self is always already indicative. As such, both subject and objects
arrive through references, signs, and language. In simplest terms, since language
always accompanies perception, I am a function of the written. This conclusion has
direct impact on the lived present. If the subject of perception is never immediate,
then every now of perception is tied to a past and future. Every here of perception is
tied to a there. There is no moment where our experience of something is utterly
direct and utterly present without indication. But there is also no clear moment
wherein we set our pencil page, hammer to anvil, or eyes to screen. So, in one
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sense we are instructed to write but in another sense, we may never be able to.208
Despite Derrida’s developments, this raises problems for making that we will
examine below.
In his later work, Derrida would explore the full ontological implications of this
iterable life cum death phenomenology. He takes cues from Heidegger’s resistance
to metaphysics. Heidegger had objected to the notion that we could begin our
understanding in the perceivable things of the world. That approach would assume
a kind of stability that never went behind the curtain to consider the appearance of
appearing. Derrida accepts that critique and calls it the privileging of presence or
logocentrism.209 This would influence Derrida’s more formal ontological
articulation. Derrida used Heidegger’s concepts of disclosure and concealment
alongside difference to claim that life was imbued with a hauntology.210 Beyond the
moment of perception and the process of writing, the nature and being of things,
like différance, is the lurking and nearness of what is not “present.” Life is not
logocentric and to make it that way messes things up. Hauntology presents and
delays just like writing but with a critical nuance. Writing, in the binary,
foregrounds one thing while downplaying another. Therefore, hauntology is not
just the double movement of revelation. Revealing and concealing are not
concurrent and equally active. We are highly involved in what is put forward and
what is hidden. And our decisions are haunted. There are always the specters of
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another thing meandering around every element of our active experience. The
undecidable is nested in our decisions. This led Derrida to further explore the role
of death in all of reality. Much like Heidegger, everywhere there is life, there is also
death.211 Life is not only self-present, it is also deadly absent. And, the two are never
resolvable but always remain undeniable and possible. In the end, even while
writing is proposed as a way of differing and creating the new, even as it is
expounded as a way of life, it is also perpetually dying.212
As we have already said, Derrida’s work advances our understanding of making
exponentially. He not only reinforces our structural concepts but gives further
shape to the ontological motifs that order and develop those concepts. Three
contributions are of note. First, iterability is intimately bound up in altering
binaries. Binaries implicate reversibility, dialectical strategies, double-movements,
and other phenomenological categories outlined above. But most importantly, they
give our theory a way to conceive of the surface of interaction: as double-sided. In
other words, the binaries may not be so bad. They may actually be a key staple in
the process of making given that they implicate a surface—a key structural element
of making. Second, iterability is repetitious. We had already seen, in anthropology,
that the process of living and making was ongoing. Technicity and kinship never
cease. While this moving repetition is suggested in Hegel or is tacit in Merleau-

211. It is also worth noting that Hegel’s totalising phenomenology also runs in the background of hauntology. Derrida had
studied Hegel with his teacher, Jean Hyppolite. His hauntology pushes back agains the vitality and closure of spirit’s selfconsciousness
212. See Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature: A Translation of "l'Espace Littéraire" (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 2015), 95.

131

Ponty’s flesh, in Derrida it is explicit. Thus, making can take up repetition as a
critical aspect of its ontology. Making may not be so violent or impositional if it is a
perpetual process. Third, and finally, Derrida brings the buried and abstract
reflection of phenomenology back to the surface of daily action. All of the prior
explorations lent themselves to wayward speculations about making. They
struggled to apply their concepts (flesh, noema, dialectics, being-towards-death) to
instruments which could underwrite a livable theory of making. Ultimately, the
value of Derrida’s work is in the fact that it states and operationalizes a specific—
inscribed—theory of making. Namely, writing. The question of whether this is the
most suitable theory remains open.

3.3.3 Gilles Deleuze
Most of the foregoing phenomenologies, and their derivatives, pivot around
humanity. Their conclusions may wander from the human but they are guided by
that latent interest. Of course, with the exception of Hegel. There is no doubt that
Hegel has a critical role for the human but it is also evident that he expands the
notion of phenomenology beyond it. All things are Spirit’s movement of selfconsciousness. Therefore, things, in their own way, perceive, make, and live. The
ongoing criticisms of Hegel often return to this issue of humanity.213 On the one
hand, Hegel makes humanity too small. Human decisions are virtually ineffectual in
the grand synthesis of Spirit. This is Kierkegaard’s critique (which we will return to
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in the second part). On the other hand, the self-conscious Spirit appears to be a
human writ large. The critique is that Hegel’s system privileges the human so
much that consciousness becomes the pure form of all reality. In both senses,
Hegel represents an enormous achievement in phenomenological speculation
insofar as he relocates it in the wide array of “things.” He also represents an
enormous problem in that the way he conceives of things is covertly rational and
anthropocentric. His work opens the question: can there even be a phenomenology
of “stuff”? Is there a phenomenology of things in their own right?
Such a question prompts and drives the work of Gilles Deleuze. Deleuze would
never count himself amongst the phenomenologists, but in some respect, his
rethinking of all of life could be read as a new phenomenological beginning.214
Deleuze shares the aim as those who have gone before—to understand and
experience life—but he abandons all of their starting points in order to be a radical
empiricist in the vein of David Hume.215 His aggressive reconsideration of all things
even applies to his own catalog of inspirational theorists (including Hume). He
reads his sources against and apart from their inherited interpretations. Regarding
Hume, most interpreters take his work as a description of the shortcomings of
rationalism. Hume’s writings, at least in this paradigm, are a declaration about the
passive habits of the mind as they correspond to unpredictable reality. But Deleuze
reads Hume differently. Hume is not a diagnostician. He is not shrinking the
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human capacity by way of restrained empiricism. Instead, Deleuze sees Hume as an
advocate for the powers of creative synthesis.216 Instead of seeing Hume as simply
indicting ideas like causality, Deleuze sees him highlighting the promise and
creativity of association that manifests itself in human mental habits. Through
Hume, Deleuze suggests that what the world shows us—including the human part
of the world—is that we assemble things.217 If we want to frame this in terms of
perception or anthropology, life is an intragenerative joining. This joining is not
reducible to the human though we have started here. Deleuze takes Hume’s insight
and distributes it beyond the human scope. All things join and those joinings are
every bit as viable as the things joined.
Thus, for Deleuze, there is no need to retreat behind the observable
phenomena of the world. We only need to observe life on its own terms. And its
terms are constantly being assembled into new things. This “ideal” event of
perception occurs all over, all around, and all of the time. It does not require any
kind of concept that could come from anywhere else. We can observe—with some
creativity—that everything is associative. Our bodies themselves, our families, our
memories, the plants around us, the weather, and so on are all networks of
associated nodes. Brain activity is a coordination of electrical impulses.218 Baskets
are woven threads. Screens are interacting light particles. This coordinating is a
fundamental idea for Deleuze and for those who would enlist his work in their own.
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For our purposes, assembly and association raise some new ontological questions.
To our advantage, though, Deleuze addresses them openly.
First, we may be inclined to see the vestiges of Hegel in this associative
principle. If association is the underlying principle of reality then do things all
converge into one? For Deleuze, it is the opposite. Things emerge from a “one” and
diverge into an ever-expanding plurality. Deleuze will call this “one” a plane of
immanence or the virtual.219 This plane is pure possibility that needs no outside to
dictate its permutations and iterations. As is well-documented, he draws this idea
from Baruch Spinoza.220 Spinoza is the first philosopher, for Deleuze, to offer an
account of pure immanence. In Hegel, there is a transcendent process that brings
different things into a unity under that principle. In Spinoza, there is a reversal and
a rejection of that idea. There is no transcendental. Whatever life is, it does not
come from above. By implication, there is no “two.” There is not “this life” and
some organizing other. There is only life here below and its internal animating
creativity. Hence, “one.” Therefore, consciousness—the gold standard of
phenomenology—is not transcendentally substantive. Morality and theism are not
transcendentally substantive. In Spinoza, there is only the world. There are only
finite modes enacting the life of the world. Consciousness and morality are
immanent modalities of this world. What is more, living this one life is associative
but not synthetic. Therefore, the act of living is monistic but differentiating and
pluralizing. It is not closure and sameness. For Deleuze, this immanent life is the
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world making new things through permutations, associations, and combinatorics.
This raises a second ontological issue. Namely, how does action in a monistic world
beget difference? What animates this action?
To explicate this associative and differentiating action, Deleuze employs a
notion of force and repetition that he derives from Friedrich Nietzsche. He reads
Nietzsche as a supplement to Spinoza’s account of singular substance.221
Nietzsche’s concepts of affirmation and return help filter Spinoza’s emphasis on
ethical postures within the monistic life. Spinoza had held that in a monism of plural
possibilities, we have no need for sad passions. Sadness or disappointment would
violate the central concept of having everything at our disposal. They would imply a
loss or unmet goal. But if life were one and its models were plural, then nothing can
ultimately fall short. This is made explicit in Nietzsche, who rejects any sense of the
transcendental in favor of the immanent power of affirmation.222 We do not need to
measure our action against a beyond. A life well-lived is one that affirms. In that
affirmation, one participates in the creativity of the world. According to Deleuze,
that affirmation is differentiating association. We are saying “yes” to possible
connections, as it were. This posture can exist in perpetuity precisely because it
spawns newness. Deleuze leverages one of Nietzsche’s most famous concepts to
augment this perpetuity: eternal recurrence.223 Eternal recurrence is never a
recurrence of the same things that had gone before. It is a renewing force of
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change. It is a recurrence of an affirmation—an affirmation that life is
differentiating and possible. For Deleuze, both the monism of Spinoza and the force
of recurrent affirmation in Nietzsche pivoted around the issue of repetition. As has
been the case above, we are faced with a new ontological question. How would one
world, and its recurring movement, beget change, newness, and difference if it is
repeating?
Deleuze’s most systematic work, Difference and Repetition lays this ontological
question out in detail.224 It is clear by now that, for Deleuze, newness is sedimented
in the ontological bedrock of life. The world is constantly crafting new species, new
relations, and new possibilities. But we have failed to think newness because we
have always tried to conceive of it from the vantage point of the “the same.” Our
typical reasoning goes: this thing is new because it is “not” like that thing. Thinking
from sameness gives rise to philosophy’s most notorious problems. It is hard to
think movement and growth through the repetition of the same. If we start with
what is the same, then what remains as we progress in time? Am I still me when my
cells change? What is the me that endures when I experience trauma? What
remains, we wonder, as change occurs. Our questions only exist because they are
grounded in sameness. Deleuze inverts the priority.225 He argues that if we are
going to engage life and its fecundity, we must embrace the repetition of its
creativity. After all, we are alive and are therefore repetitiously becoming
something new. It behooves us, then, to rethink the repetition that is life from the
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starting point of difference itself. For Deleuze, difference is somewhat self-evident.
For most of philosophical history, it has been hard to access.
Hegel operates as a prime example of our failure to theorize difference. His
dialectical account of life ostensibly celebrates it. As noted above, for Hegel, in any
circumstance when this thing (a) is not that thing (b), we observe the difference.
This difference opens a passage of the a into b—or b into a—by way of sublation.
This sublation overcomes or undermines their difference by begetting another
moment. For Deleuze, it is not this second moment of sublation that ignores
difference.226 Difference is subordinated already in the first moment wherein the
second thing (b) is defined as different from the original (a). That primary moment
is already a departure from the sameness of the (a). Its sameness unto itself. What
is worse, Hegel’s ostensible differences are only a caricature. In the end, each
variation is folded back into a cyclical whole.227
According to Deleuze, this trend has been around since Plato.228 In Plato’s
hierarchy, there are three constitutive moments in being as well. There is an
original form that subsists in perpetuity. This is the domain of the “same.” This
form is unchanging and persists in itself as itself. There are copies of that form that
circulate amongst the world. They vary. They have accidental properties and
undergo decay, growth, and movement. Beyond them, there are copies of those
copies that he calls simulacra. This third level, the simulated one, has no direct link
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to the original.229 They are unmoored from representation. They are not really even
trying to refer to the other two layers above them. Deleuze sees the potential to
think difference in this lowest tier. For Plato and most of western philosophy, the
same was idealized and therefore this simulation has constantly been discarded as
an unwanted distraction. But Deleuze sees the promise of the simulation in its
freedom. It does not have to correspond to the original. When it comes into being,
it is growing, moving, and developing without respect to the seed of the same.
Simulacra have their own internal ontology. Their nature and existence do not
depend on anything else and therefore it is fundamentally new.230 Therefore, to
think difference first—as something irrespective of sameness—would be to start
with this third layer.
Deleuze recognizes that his account of difference, here, must reconcile with the
concomitant issue of repetition. If the world is continuing this process of making
and it makes according to simulated difference, then are any of these things made
more than once? In a word, no. He had already invoked Nietzsche’s eternal
recurrence to explain how the world (including us) acted out its creativity in the
force of affirmation. Now, here, in Difference and Repetition, he returns to this force
to explain repetition in time.231 Deleuze tries to show that the simulacra of
difference do not arrive in the eternal recurrence of time but rather coincide with
it.232 Simulacra are the manifestation of perpetually affirming change and growth.
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This seems counter-intuitive only because our concepts of time start from notions
of the same just as our ideas of difference do. To be clear from the outset, having
this “sameness” paradigm for time does not necessarily mean that we think every
successive moment is the same as the one that preceded it. It usually means the
opposite: this moment is different than that one because it is not the same moment.
Nevertheless, this understanding starts from sameness.
Deleuze demonstrates this point by configuring our standard views of time as
lines. The first one, circular time, is a succession of the same moments. Each
moment may not be exactly like the one before. That would be better represented
by a point or dot. Circular time, rather, holds that moments move forward but do so
in an arc of repetition. Moments will eventually revolve back on themselves. In daily
practice, this kind of time is religious or habitual.233 We repeat in hopes of
reproducing the same thing that had come before. Perhaps, such a circle could be
understood as a large dot of immobility when we scale back in perspective. Either
way, the critical insight is that this circle is defined by sameness. Another form of
time is the vectored line. This line goes on without any reproduction of its first
moments. It celebrates novelty and difference. This moment on the line is not the
one that we started with. But while it appears to avoid the same, vectored time just
relocates that sameness. According to Deleuze, this version of time is rooted in the
self, the consciousness, that lays out the world in front of itself and synthesizes its
perceptions as a chronological path ahead. He associates memory with this
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model.234 The unity of time is held together in the self—in the consciousness of
one’s own temporal continuity. True time, time that honors the differentiating
affirmation of life, is one that recurs precisely in newness. It is neither habit nor
memory. This kind of repetition is more like a selective growth pattern with no
geometric destiny like the circle or the vector.235
Deleuze applies this ontological insight to making more directly in his
discussion of art, literature, and cinema.236 This is critical for our investigation.
According to his model of difference, an artist is never representing an idea or
experience. This would be vectored time organized in the synthesis of the artistic
genius. Rather, the artist is participating and affirming that repetition which is
recurrence and variation. Their work is an affirmation of those forces. Every art
piece is distinct because every artwork combines, associates, and participates in the
forces it tries to signify. These forces fold, network, amplify, intensify, mitigate, and
ameliorate. The artists employ all of these to connect nodes, dots, surfaces, and so
on as a testament to the associative movement of life. That life billows out of this
single substance of differentiating repetition. The artist leaves behind a semiology
of forces.237 New signs and indications emerge in each artistic production. Art
begets local reflection rather than constructing suppressed syntheses or totalizing
universals. Therefore, the artist is judged according to their ability to affirm the
forces of association and change. This is the way Spinoza had suggested that ethics
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are measured.238 We cannot judge an immanent ontology from a transcendental
height. Ontologies are measured by ethics and immanent practices. In the same
way, art is not measured with a respect to a transcendental—object or subject. The
only way we can discriminate one mode of finite action—or making—from another
is whether it affirms the ethics of difference and repetition. The ethics of difference
and repetition are joining, growing, breathing, and begetting the full freedom of life.
They enable a freedom that allows them to fully realize a relational ontology that
will circle back and make more.
At this point, Deleuze’s radical rethinking of life, experience, and phenomena
strengthens the issue of making even further. Ostensibly, it would seem that we
have all of the elements and forces necessary to mold a theory of making. But
problems and questions persist. The first question is about exteriority. Up to this
point, several thinkers’ phenomenological speculations have pointed toward the
“outside” whether in alterity, technicity, other bodies, or transcendental selfhood.
Deleuze, despite his immanence and monism, maintains a critical role for
exteriority. The plane of immanence that begets all of these changes and variations
never coincides with the objects it produces.239 It is virtual. It is possibility par
excellence. But where is it? How is this plane not an elsewhere that verges on the
transcendent? The second difficulty in Deleuze is more practical. It is the problem
of common craft. Deleuze’s descriptions are penetrating but remain unfamiliar to
everyday people. Making has become force. Life has become differentiating. Art is

238. Deleuze, Spinoza, 110.
239. Peter Hallward, Out of this World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation (Brooklyn: Verso, 2006), 79. See also Alain
Badiou, Deleuze: the Clamor of Being (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 67.

142

a semiosis of affirmation. Time is a recurrence. The world is monistically singular.
The difficulty in applying these formulations to our neighbors and friends lies in
their ability to actuate them. Unlike Derrida’s writing, Deleuze does not offer a
mechanism of making that is ubiquitous and familiar. Even while he spends time
expositing the affirming ontologies of cinema, very few readers take up these works
as field manuals. In terms of the structures of making listed above, there is an
absence of agency in his system.
Deleuze would never concede that this vital life is inactive. There is agency, his
acolytes would claim. The difference is that Deleuzean agency is distributed and
lies along the network. Multiple agents beget multiple differences. But his critics
wonder whether such a monistically networked ontology can ever describe
purposive and active difference without enervating it. In other words, if the world is
the unfolding of a plane of immanence, and action is distributed to a network, then
are the changes I make just an illusion? Are they merely an instance of intensifying
virtuality? will any of my discrete actions matter? This was the original question that
prompted the entire study. Not only is it difficult to answer this question in a vitally
monistic universe, but it is equally as hard to encourage his kind of creativity with
any kind of purpose. We should not dismiss Deleuze’s profound revolution but we
must also position them against the Capitolocene and Anthropocene. We are
inclined to wonder that without a discrete formulation of agency, does this model of
making institute a kind of quietism. Is it as if to say: yes, you make when you work,
when eating, when you pay because you are still associating and differentiating?
This would prove disastrous for everyday people and the world as they both suffer
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under the weight of climate crises and class conflict. In Deleuze’s terms, is the
monistic and virtual plane of creativity liberating the ethical orientation of the earth
and its inhabitants? If not, we need to explore why and find an immanent response
that maximizes life and making.

3.4 Three Motifs
Our exploration of phenomenology and its ontological derivatives can feel
bewildering. Therefore, before we draw any conclusions about them, it is
appropriate once again to step back and gather our investigative bearings. The first
chapter established our intent and methodology. I wanted to understand making
and living in a way that could invigorate common people. We saw that current
models of making are beset by the problems of the Anthropocene and
Capitalocene. Therefore, I set out to build a theory from the ground up. My
constructive plan was laid out in SYSTEMATIC COMBINING and ABDUCTION. to find a
new theory would test an EMPIRICAL sample of a current one, observe its
FRAMEWORK,

analyze its controlling THEORIES, and then test it in a CASE STUDY. Each

of those processes would expose elements of a paradigm of making that were
being underserved in the current models but that could also be reimagined for a
novel theory. In addition, at each stage of the study, we could begin to sketch out
our new theory making by stating conclusive propositions.
Thus far, we have collected three structural elements that comprise theories of
making. We have stated one anthropological proposition and We are on the cusp of
a second. Now, with this phenomenological review at our disposal, we can
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introduce a set of ontological motifs that are operative in theories of making.
Ontological motifs, as I noted in the introduction, are not reducible to structural
concepts. Instead of being ingredients, these motifs are more like movements that
arrange and organize those ingredients. Above, we saw each of the structural
elements at work in the different phenomenological systems. But those structural
elements served different purposes, were emphasized differently or retooled to look
like something else. This means that structural elements may appear in all models
of making but they may not be familiar or operate the same between models. The
question is, what accounts for that variation? In a word, those differences are based
on the way each system handles three ontological motifs. Ontological motifs
operate as a coordinating field. They position the structural elements but
themselves can morph in size, density, texture, and so forth.
The first ontological motif is touch. Each thinker’s model of phenomenal
experience raises the issue of whether things touch in perception or in making. For
Merleau-Ponty and Husserl, this was foregrounded. Touch was not only conceived
as tactile but as a description of other senses like vision. In Derrida’s work, we are
invited to ask whether binaries merely warp around each other like these magnetic
poles or whether they actually touch. Deleuze’s monistic universe leaves us
wondering if touch is possible if it is a folding of a singular substance with no other
reality to grant it space. Or conversely, if there actually is an “other” in that virtual
plane that grants space then does it ever touch the actual? Elsewhere, Heidegger’s
concept of unconcealment hints at the intangible. In all, touch is a way of organizing
contact, interaction, and connectedness within making.
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The second motif is repetition. Derrida and Deleuze explicitly see repetition as
critical to organizing making and living. But the others’ work also hinges on how
they handle repetition. As Derrida pointed out, Husserl’s assumed that the concepts
of intuition, reduction, and eidos could be shared universally. And, sharing is
repeating. Hegel’s dialectical process was a repetition of the same—as pointed out
by Deleuze. Heidegger subjugates repetition to the novelty of disclosure but retains
some concept of recurring poetics in his later advocacy of dwelling. MerleauPonty’s account of the chiasm resonated with Deleuze’s repetition insofar as each
perceptive meeting, no matter how many times it happens, always has the shape of
differing and joining. Altogether, if perceiving lies at the basis of making, and
perceiving assumes confidence and reliability in its apparatus, then any formulation
of making must oblige repetition.
The last motif is number. In Derrida, there was a clear reference to twoness in
his discussion of binaries. More importantly, he made it clear that this twoness
contributed to undecidability. Likewise, in Merleau-Ponty, the self-touching hand
and the flesh of the world affirms a basic twoness in perception. This twofold is
visualized in the chiasm. Hegel’s system operated on a cyclical triad of negation.
Heidegger allowed for the plurality of beings, but his concept of being and its
disclosure is ineluctably singular. Deleuze’s universe is avowedly and
unapologetically monistic in terms of the plane of immanence. Husserl began with
an explicit interest in the discriminating power of number but his late turn towards
the transcendental associates him with a remote one (or zero?). In all, number has
an unexpected but significant function in theories of making. As our construction
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moves forward, we will need to be clear about how touch, repetition, and number
organize surface, agent, and marking.
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4. THE LIFE OF DRAWING
4.1 All the Pieces
In this chapter, I take my cue from Karl Marx who once famously noted that “the
philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the c it.”240 Thus far, I
have “interpreted” the creative deficiencies in everyday life. We have “interpreted”
generation and perception in anthropological life. We have “interpreted” the role of
construction in phenomenologies of life. The “point,” now, is to make something
that enables life. I am happy to oblige.
We should not need another paragraph to rehearse our findings. We have what
we need. Everything heretofore has been to provide the basic tools to build a
theory. So, let us gather these provisions, enumerate them, and use them.

1) We have a fundamental premise: making is manifestly common.
2) We have a fundamental task: build a common theory of making.
3) We have a strategic method: systematic combining and abduction.
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4) We discovered two threats to making: Anthropocene and Capitalocene.
5) We isolated three structural pillars within making: surface, agent, and
marking.
6) We narrowed our testable focus: inscriptions.
7) We discovered three ontological motifs at work in unified theories of making:
touch, repetition, and number.

In all, there will be ten steps to our discovery and construction. Here below, we will
establish both the eighth and ninth steps. Number ten, which states three
conclusive propositions about drawing, will materialize at the end of the next
chapter. Now, let us take up step 8: identify the key theoretical assumptions that
currently arrange the pieces in 5-7. More specifically, we will observe how critical
premises in current approaches to making inflect ontological motifs which, in turn,
shape making’s structural elements. Afterward, we will move to Step 9: abductively
prescribe an alternative theory.
In the previous section, despite phenomenological nuances or outright
rejections of the phenomenal question, each philosophy shared a fundamental
premise that was foreshadowed in Andre Leroi-Gourhan. Namely, exteriority. LeroiGourhan claimed that technicity allowed the human to exteriorize what was
formerly interior and even unknown.241 When we crawled on the ground we did not
imagine, see, or execute our desires the same we do in the aforementioned
phenomenological accounts. We were fully involved, so to speak. Our mouth was
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down on the ground near our hands, our sense of space was structured by
locomotion, and bodily senses were attuned to food or threat. When we stood up,
coincidentally both hand and mouth could project these behaviors. A fork could
bring me food. A phoneme could establish inclusive packs. Our standing enabled
our technical abilities. The key, though, is that this technicity is indissolubly linked
with posture. Technicity is a function of spatiotemporal and geopositional
perception. Standing introduces front-and-back and before-and-after. In other
words, our bodily posture produced a perceptive posture.242 I am here and the
world is there. The future is in front and the past is behind. In a word, LeroiGourhan called this shift: exteriorizing. It has left an indelible mark on the entire
disciplines of phenomenology and ontology.
Many of the categories of phenomenology—thingness, subjectivity, objects, etc
—are inflected by exteriorizing assumptions. The fundamental daily experiences of
humans are almost universally exterior. There is a banana. I am not her. We are
friends. That is a memory. These are manifestations of our exteriorizing technicity
which affixes our sense of place in the world. Exteriority, largely associated with
objects or “thingness,” provoked phenomenological reflection for our
aforementioned philosophers. If a thing is not me, per se, or if the world and I are
different, then how do I understand my interaction with it? What is my perception
thereof? Critically, the assumptions of exteriority that guide the questions also
guide the solutions. Exteriority remains embedded in these inquiries—no matter
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how formal and novel the formulations. But is this so problematic? How does
exteriority bear on life? Specifically, the everyday life I celebrate so much?
The problem is remarkably simple: if exteriority is the ground of action, how do
I do something if I am disconnected from that something? If I do not have access? If
I do not have the power? Or, the right? Or, in our terms, how do I make something
that I cannot touch? We do not normally ask questions with this level of abstraction.
But, if these same questions are recast as issues of material power or financial
access, then we do ask them—constantly. For example, how do I make a living?
The exteriority of wealth or material goods and services circles us back to
philosophical renderings. These daily concerns and their philosophical
counterparts both pivot around the issue of exteriority. Together, they corroborate
a philosophical conundrum that has puzzled all of western philosophy. When there
is distance between one thing and another, when they are mutually exterior, then
do they ever touch? Can one “move” towards another? This is no place to revisit the
whole of philosophical history and its disputations about motion and change. I only
cite this problem to show that phenomenologies that rely on some notion of
exteriority inherit this problem. A synthetic review of the philosophical systems
above will show that this is true even when those phenomenologies labor in vain
against such an indictment.

4.2 Exteriority as Phenomenologically Basic
Recall that Husserl wanted to get close to the moment of perception—to get inside
it. He wanted to establish a universally particular account that needed no direct

151

help from either object or agent. But to get inside, he had to erect an outside. He
ended up with a receding transcendental subject of phenomenology that was,
paradoxically, non-phenomenological and un-experienceable. By trying to contain
phenomenological structures within themselves, Husserl concluded that something
was outside that event containing it.243 This prompts important questions about the
thing doing the containing. Is it also phenomenological? Is it subject to the same
perceptive structures that it uses? How does it influence its containing? That second
thing—what I will call that “exterior” thing—becomes subject to its own exterior
containment and subsequent questions. To stop the regress, there is some
backstop that lies behind or of the contiguity. In other words, there is something
outside or exterior. Something no exterior of its own. But that transcendent thing,
or no-thing, is hardly actionable, livable, or present. Exterior begets exterior whilst
diminishing experience, knowledge, and action.
Heidegger and Hegel shared Husserl’s instincts to exteriorize. Heidegger’s
Being, in its disclosure and concealment, simply never arrives but is always
arriving. The site of its reception, Dasein, is fraught with anxiety about this arrival.
Dasein might be shrouded in light, but at that moment of unveiling, the actual life of
the human becomes peculiar to itself.244 The light that exposes Dasein’s fragility is
never beheld and never passes into it. In other words, the life lived finds its shape
from the outside. Being remains exterior lest it ever be conflated with the ontic. In
Heidegger’s exterior model, Art, architecture, and technology are only known in
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their proximity to Being but never as a process of making something in its own
right. Being remained exterior, even to making. These conclusions could also be
applied to Hegel. Despite including every material element in ideal reality—and in
lieu of his internal dialectical engine of being and becoming—Being was never
present to any of these things. Being began in its own exteriority insofar as it
distanced itself by a necessary relationship to Non-Being.245 By virtue of that
ontologic, the perceived stuff of the world is also exterior to Being and even
exterior within. The stuff of the world departed from itself and headed towards the
outside of Being. Upon arrival, they would be folded up in Being’s sphere—whose
true nature appears as statically dense. Everything would finally be in its
harmonious place. The parts of Being that brought it to that historical zenith would
no longer be mobile in that ultimate enclosure. Like Heidegger, Hegel took art,
architecture, and craft as a passing moment that would hasten Being’s final exterior
synthesis. The point, in both thinkers, is that a strictly ontological approach—
whose aim was to see into the depths of actual experience—brought us no closer to
actionable life. Rather, both systems constructed vast exterior explanations for the
prosaic.
Merleau-Ponty took up the mantle and tried to elude these same pitfalls. He
mitigated the issue of the outside by repositioning it as a touchpoint. In many ways,
he succeeded. At least, in his model, the outside would be between—or centered
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within—every moment of experience.246 As a point of commendation, there is a
philosophical purchase in connecting the here and there, the inside and outside, in
the chiasm. That is until Merleau-Ponty was faced with the potential dangers of the
Husserlian subject. After all, what was this subject, this body, that came to the
encounter of the chiasm? Did it exceed or precede the chiasm? Merleau-Ponty did
not want the body to be just another undefinable precondition of the encounter—
like the transcendental subject. So, he posited the flesh of the world as an
ontological basis for reversibility and touch. But this opened the system back
towards the outside as “flesh.” The flesh is the supra and infra condition whence
this body and others arrive. The self, that appeared in the gap of this flesh’s turning,
only appears as an “outside.” After all, in this description, the body is a gap that is
outside both here and there. The between of the flesh and the chiasm introduced
new ideas but left too much exteriority in play to be immanently effective.
Derrida and Deleuze, rather than retreat from, hide, or smuggle in exteriority,
embrace it as the only corrective to all phenomenological futility. For Derrida, there
may be nothing outside the text but that nothing is precisely what motivates it. The
text manifests and perpetuates the binaries of life as we know it. The generative
force of those binaries is a trace that arises as they multiply towards an
undeconstructable horizon. The outsideness of différance is always manifestly near
and enables writing to continue. It is the ground of perception. The outside is a
Khora that begets. We cannot touch the limit, befriend the beyond, or even fully

246. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible: Followed by Working Notes (Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1968), 133.
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join it in death. Deleuze also centers his system on exteriority despite his immanent
aspirations. In fact, Deleuze is more explicit in claiming that the outside is the
inside. Much like Merleau-Ponty’s flesh, objects in space and time are invaginated.
They are folds upon folds of a pure outside.247 In Deleuze, the virtual, the pure
memory, or the molecular are constant forces that are available for any actuality.
But, much like Hegel, they never coincide with actuality. They sit in potential
towards all manifestation. But, once again, as an outside potential are active within
things without ever being there inside. Deleuze wants to avoid a substantive base
for anything. The only solution, for him, is to turn actual things inside-out. The
molar thing, the actual thing, is larval and composite but it is without an inside. It is
a machine or body without organs.248 It is an intensity of creases. It folds in the one
“outside” that animates it. It is a Möbius strip all crumpled up. As we have noted,
even aggressive and elegant exteriorities like these struggle to create, make, or
unite. Despite Deleuzean advocacies of assembly, the ontology of exteriority always
calls assemblage into question. Making a living still seems out of reach—outside.

4.3 Exteriority, Elements, and Motifs
Each of these thinkers has incorporated making into their schematics. What we are
seeing is the way these systems and their governing ontologies give making a
certain form. Namely, as exteriority. Altogether, these exteriorizing models evince
a budding theory of making. With this in view, it is incumbent upon us to do two

247. Gilles Deleuze, Foucault (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 94.
248. Gilles Deleuze, Logic of Sense (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2004), 280.
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things. 1) We should name this theory—at least for heuristic purposes. 2) We must
show how this exteriority leverages our ontological motifs and organizes the
structural elements of making. This second step is an extended exposition of the
first. Therefore, I can state the first one briefly.
1) WRITING VS WRIGHTING. I call this exteriorizing model of making:
“writing.” This is not a pejorative. I do not intend to debase what I am actually
doing. Instead, I use the banner of writing in the same way that Leroi-Gourhan does
in his original distinction between graphism and writing. Writing exteriorizes. It
converts the radial perception of standing technicity into repeatable action at a
distance. The affordance of Derrida is to see writing as a way of moving and
perceiving. It is not reducible to a technique. Therefore, I will describe Deleuze or
Hegel, for example, under the rubric of writing without them having a large literary
sample dedicated to it. Certainly, those thinkers that do not write about writing
instead focus on some other specific media (e.g. Deleuze and cinema). Still,
hereafter I will be treating “writing” as the primary classification for said media. I
do this because—as I will argue—moving images, industrial labor, or. even code
are heirs to what begins in writing. Namely, exteriority.
To be fair, we cannot emphasize the theoretical shape of writing at the expense
of its implementation. Admittedly, there is a symmetry between writing-as-exteriortheory and writing-as-practice. But, we can hold that link loosely. Their connection
can be weakened or broken. When they are broken, writing is renovated and
restored. Writing-as-practice does not have to begin or terminate in exteriority.
Writing can be recovered in a reversal of that exterior trajectory. We will attempt
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this below. For now, a new lexicon is necessary. In contradistinction to “writing,” I
introduce the term “wrighting” to describe the craft that re-emerges in that
reversal. This offers us a conceptual and visual distinction between two trajectories.
As I proceed, when I mention writing I am referring to that exteriorizing trend that
synthesizes the phenomenologies above. When I mention wrighting, I am still
referring to a manual practice of mark-making but with a theoretical paradigm that
is local, efficacious, and interior. This alternate term is critical. By the end of this
study, I will have offered sharp assessments of writing as exteriority and made
claims about its potential damage to our ability to make a living. But, I would not
want anyone to conclude that therefore writing is anathema. Rather, I simply want
to expunge writing’s exterior trajectory from wrighting’s locality and efficacy.
Wrighting bears witness to making because this latter term means “working.”249
The term connotes someone who works with wood as a joiner, fastener, or in
carpentry in general. It still circulates in contemporary discourse (e.g. playwright)
but its sense of using marks (letters) as means of joining and making is largely
obscured. By rethinking contemporary writing under the auspices of joining,
suggests that it does not have to rely on exteriority as the basis of its craft.
2) MATCHING AND MIXING. My critiques may be pointed, but there is no
doubt that some form of making happens in exteriority. Our question is what kind
of making? There are other implied questions: how long do made things endure?
Can everyone do it? Does writing deserve credit for accomplishing making? Is
there a better way? To answer, we have to shed light on how exteriority leverages

249. "wright, n.1,” Oxford English Dictionary Online, accessed May 20, 2022, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/230697.
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our ontological motifs and organizes the structural elements of making. First, we
should be clear about exteriority as a fundamental presupposition. In the above
systems, exteriority is a broad ontological category that secures local actions. The
“outside,” in whatever form, maintains the space for things to come into being. It is
the ground of becoming. The typical assumption about exteriority—and a common
critique—is that exterior systems constitute transcendence. Our writers were all
well aware of this and hoped to avoid it. Insofar as any of them pursued exteriority,
it was to home in on the differences between specific objects, events, or moments.
That is, theirs was not an exteriority of divine transcendence but an exteriority of
alterity and otherness. This does not necessarily mean that they succeeded in
eluding the grasp of holistic transcendence. But for the purposes of evaluating
them, we need to start from where they started—the mutual exteriority of things
like the body and world.
Nevertheless, we should resist the temptation to reduce their exterior
ambitions to simple dualism. They were, after all, trying to posit outsides or
exteriors that could negotiate the relation between things rather than hold them in
unwieldy independence. So, while the critiques of grand exteriority have been
useful or may become consequential here below, our critical appraisal should focus
on the local relation. Only then can we extrapolate exteriority as basic ontology. At
this point in the study, we are working backward with respect to SYSTEMATIC
COMBINING. We moved from EMPIRICAL SAMPLING to FRAMEWORK and
then repeated that process with two disciplinary magnifications. That process
revealed exteriority to be a fundamental presupposition for a theory of making we
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call writing. Now, we take that presupposition, walk it back, and apply it to the
ontological motifs and structural concepts of making. This should produce an
EMPIRICAL picture of the writing theory of making. In the spirit of reversal, we
will survey writing as a theory by starting with the motifs, then considering the
elements, and ultimately arriving at writing inscriptions.
TOUCH. For writing, nothing is in a state of being. Everything is always
becoming. It is always in a state of change. From fleshly fluctuations to rhizomatic
entities, things are unfurling from an outside to an outside. No inside essence is
permissible. But, if exteriority is the font of becoming, then touch is severely
compromised. Consider this from two angles. If an object is blooming outward and
its edges are multiplying, it is unfolding towards a plane (whatever the direction)
without touching that plane. Likewise, the object is blooming from a plane. Neither
plane has any substance. It is only virtual conditions. Likewise, if a word or text
billows out in the same manner, it is secured from the outside—before or after.
That outside, again, is only a condition of possibility and therefore remains
unavowable, nameless, and untouchable.250 And if that exteriority is pure and
(ab)grounding, then is it real? Primary? First? Last? And does this condition apply
“between” objects? If either of those objects given above move towards another of
like kind, and their growth is given by exterior virtuality, then they perpetually
approach but do not touch. After all, what would they touch if the destination has no

250. This is actually Nancy’s explicit claim in Jean-Luc Nancy, Noli Me Tangere: On the Raising of the Body (New York City:
Fordham University Press, 2009), 20. For a discussion of namelessness see Jacques Derrida, On the Name (Redwood City:
Stanford University Press, 1995), 68. For a discussion of proclamations see Maurice Blanchot, The Unavowable Community
(Barrytown/ Station Hill Press, 2006), 5.

159

bottom nor base? In all, without touch, how would we make? Even if we imagine
machines, electrical currents, and light pulses as the apparatus of making, with
exteriority, we have to ask: is nothing touching?
NUMBER. Just as exteriority compromises touch, it also undermines number.
If things do not touch, then how many things are we talking about when we discuss
making, moving, or perceiving? A world of exteriority can be both multiple or
singular. In a monistic system, where things are the result of a singular substance
folding in on itself, we have to wonder about the space and nature of that fold. Is
there a second, non-thing, allowing for the movement of the singularity? If we
suspended our physical imagination and posited that the folds are like crystalline
internal movements, then we would wonder whether any of those folds were things
at all. Especially if they are strictly modes. But, as we noted, there might be a pure
multiple—not a monad. That is, there may be innumerable things in this nontouching world. But does the number grow? Is it infinitely static? Does making
“add” to infinity? If we cannot touch things how do we count them? Does our sight
touch them? Exteriority problematizes number and touch and therefore largely
dispenses with them.
REPETITION. The consequences for repetition are not immediately selfevident. Especially if things have no number or if they do not touch. A world of
multiplicity or singularity could repeat endlessly or not at all. This world could be
on a perpetual collision course of forces (whilst never touching). It could be an
illusory motion of only futile changes; merely apparent motion ultimately remaining
the same. But a pure exteriority could not repeat in the manner that Deleuze’s
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fecund differentiation does. This is because pure exteriority would threaten to
flatten every difference. Each simulation would just vanish into simulation-as-such.
Or, they would become indistinguishable in the plane of virtuality.251 Just as things
emerged in granular variation they would dissipate into the ether. How would one
repeat what was not? From the Deleuzean angle, how would one repeat what could
never be?
STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS. We can speculate about the consequences of
exteriority as applied to the ontological motifs, but they are more acutely felt at the
level of the structural elements. The surface is compromised first. When a person
grabs a tool, strikes a keyboard, or gazes at a screen they interact at a surface. The
surface is the primordial site of all interacting, perceiving, and making. But if the
surface only expresses the ever-receding outside that grounds reality then all of my
interactions there will have little to no duration. If I grant them any substantive
value, I commit violence. This corrodes agency at the same time. If the surface is a
translucent mirage then so is any sense of the subject as a surfaced body. Will must
be multiplied into the innumerable agencies that I cannot touch. And given that we
cannot actually touch, I will never mark anything. I will only gesture towards a
mark but just as all of my agency and all surfaces remain outside, the pencil does
not reach the paper.
EMPIRICAL PICTURE: LIFE DEATH. Exteriority shapes making and its
elements, no doubt. But it also frames its corollary, life. Each of these
phenomenological models above aimed at understanding life. In some cases, they

251. Peter Hallward, Out of this World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation (Brooklyn: Verso, 2006), 79.
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wanted to embellish and intensify life. Ironically, though, these models
problematize the life they celebrate. Because, as they see it, life has suffered from a
kind of violence of imposition. They are all reacting, at some level, to the brutish
confidence of religion, rationalism, and scientific quantification. Exteriority, alterity,
and otherness provide a way out of enforced metaphysics. Therefore, exteriority
has continually relied on the concept of death to situate life. Death is a liberating
finality that no metaphysics can account for. This is made explicit in Heidegger’s
model. Death is the outer edge of living. It was Dasein’s own sense of selfawareness. The surface of the painter, the tool of the handyman, and the markings
of any agent would only be authentic insofar as they disclosed this fragility. It would
not be a stretch to see death in Hegel’s sublation and final synthesis or Husserl’s
transcendentals. In fact, this is why Derrida also made death central to his system.
He saw it at work in the prior phenomenologists. Différance was death ensconced in
the text. It had always been there in experience but now we saw it coming through
our fingers. Still, while these formulations may tidy up abstract problems, they
make actual life hard to live. They make us great at destruktion but not so good at
construction.252 Thus, on this side of exteriority’s tour through the elements, we are
seeing that a writing theory of making renders life as a kind of death. Touching
might not heal. The two of friendship is proximate but may not be real. And,
repetition could become vain.
But on balance, we do not find these kinds of extrapolations completely
consistent with lived experience. Our college classes in writing did not “kill” us—at

252. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Albany: SUNY Press, 2010), 43-44.
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least in the sense I mean here. But this dissonance is exactly the purpose of our
thought experiment. This is what systematic combining does. Tension is not a flaw
in the system it is its virtue. We wanted to match a theoretical arrangement (in this
instance, writing) with the motifs and structural elements to see how they line
with EMPIRICAL experience. This is why we set up the constant of inscriptions.
They give our test finer precision. Inscriptions allow us to see these theories at
work in all of the structural elements and motifs as they cycle through cultural
materials. Inscriptions give us a way to heed Spinoza’s admonition. Namely, that we
should measure an ontological theory by juxtaposing its ethical consequences
against its claims. This brings us back to the Anthropocene and Capitalocene.
INSCRIPTIONS. We cannot provide an exhaustive list of writing’s inscriptions
but we can circle back to a few ideas we visited before for help. Latour, Ferraris,
and Nancy help flesh out the haunting shape of exteriority and writing. Latour
points us towards inscriptions because they coordinate cultural thinking and
cultural mechanics. In his example, inscriptions like scientific illustrations, lab
records, and mathematics formulae all demonstrated the development of optics as a
rational assumption about clarity as well as a prescription for how a reputable
institution should codify its insights. Ferraris pointed out the social matrices that
found and congeal around these inscriptions. In his terms, when the social circle
affirms inscriptions those inscriptions become documents that have duration.
Nancy went one step further and saw this documenting, inscribing, and social
forming as a way of world-making. But in his terms, inscription becomes
exscription wherein writing or mark-making etches the edges of things and the
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world as a kind of touching. But even Nancy’s touch is plagued by exteriority. That
which is touchable is untouched253. And the teachability of that untouched is a kind
of remote death raised to life.254
In these three, we can see how well they resonate with what we have
discovered in our study. In Latour, we can see that the Capitalocene and
Anthropocene are secured by inscriptions. Bureaucracy, red tape, and law codes
entrench systems of making (or unmaking). A recent example is too suitable to
overlook. In the summer of 2022, the US Supreme Court ruled that the
Environmental Protection Agency does not have broad authority to regulate the
carbon emissions of fossil fuel companies. Their ruling derived from a narrow
fidelity to a text. The documentality around this inscription, then, permitted those
companies to continue anthropocenic damages in the name of their capitalocentric
interests. Ferraris’ insights on documentality show that a certain group—or in
anthropological terms, a certain kinship—forms around that document and holds it
up to clarify boundaries between friend and foe. Nancy would not celebrate the
ruling as an example of description but instead, as a kind of subjective overtouching that lays claim to a world it does not know it is making. In other words, to
exscribe—to raise life—you need to not touch it or get your hands off of it.255
What intrigues us about this example, is not that it fosters fear or raises
concern. What is curious is whether these dangers are the consequences of a
certain kind of inscription. What is more, can those same inscriptions reverse these
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dangers? Can writings inscriptions, guided by exteriority, rescue us from the death
of the Anthropocene or Capitalocene? If our current written inscriptions gather
certain kin around documents, and those documents seal industry’s control over
the earth or reinforce information agencies’ control over digital storytelling, then is
exteriority working? Has death done its job of deconstructing? Are we not still
privileging certain kin over others? Exteriority and death feel far from liberation.
We are very familiar with death in our submission and our sense of helplessness.
As it concerns the Capitalocene, is exteriority performing any better? Do we
intensify life in the inscribed money we “make”? Is its vast exterior life-giving? Does
the outside give the poor inside accessibility? We are all too familiar with exteriority
in networks of digital information where agency belongs to all and none. Where
autoethnographies remain estranged and fly past one another like arrows. Is the
exteriority of a digital surface ensuring life for personal narrative? In sum, it feels
like we know death and exteriority as a means of dismantling or unmaking. But,
building anything back up seems to require more ontological elbow grease.
These are not trite questions or over-simplified applications. They are not
unwarranted leaps. They are the very kinds of questions corroborated by some of
exteriority’s contemporary proponents. The late Bernard Stiegler updated the ideas
of Andre-Leroi Gourhan, Heidegger, and Derrida in order to grapple with these
very comparisons. For Stiegler, more of Andre Leroi-Gourhan’s technicity and
perhaps greater exteriority can usher in change and hope. Stiegler saw technicity at
the center of the human’s experience of individuation and collectivity as well as
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their sense of time.256 His work affirms that without asking these very direct lived
questions, our efforts at theory remain mere chatter.257 Though Stiegler engages
cybernetic thinkers, he is heavily influenced by Jacques Derrida and Martin
Heidegger. As a student of Derrida, Stiegler saw a general principle of life in
différance wherein the human supplemented its textual—ever-changing form—with
technical prostheses. In our terms, he inherits exteriority, still believes it has
promise, and applies it as a function of digital technicity. But Stiegler, unlike some
of his predecessors, realizes that the future cannot be salvaged by exteriority alone.
Exterior inscriptions would only ensure our demise.
Following Leroi-Gourhan, he held that humans were constantly reforming
according to a noetic cycle of exteriorization and interiorization. In one of his last
works, Stiegler juxtaposed this technical exchange to the issue of entropy in the
Anthropocene.258 In the Anthropocene, entropy simplifies life and reduces
complexity to sameness. Stiegler reads technics, or the noetic interplay of human
prosthetic growth, as a way to reverse entropy and reintroduce complexity. Once
again, he inserts Derrida’s textual idea of différance as a way to generate this
reversal. But the exteriorizing force of différance must be interiorized later lest
humans abdicate their complexifying gift permanently. In other words, as the
human surrenders their thought to the outside—in texts and tools, that outside

256. Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time: The fault of Epimetheus (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 1998), 212. An
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257. Bernard Stiegler, Acting Out (Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics, 2009), 9.
258. Bernard Stiegler, The Neganthropocene, trans. Daniel Ross (London: Open Humanities Press, 2020), 240-248.
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must return a new form to the human as interior. Losing this feedback ushers us
further into the simplicity and homogeny of the Anthropocene and Capitalocene. In
our terms, the inscriptions that will save us must be a double-movement. The
inscriptions that will change us will have a surface that marks agent and material.
Those inscriptions must be twofold. Thus, what is most notable about proposals
like Stiegler is that despite never fully theorizing the inside, he obliquely
recognizes the importance of twoness and interiority. His shift on the ontological
motif of number gestures toward a turn in theories of making. And ultimately, he
realizes that this is what it will take to change the actual political and cultural life of
the human: a rehabilitated ontology.
This was already prefigured in our section on anthropology. Anthropologists
were telling us that from the beginning humans have been intragenerative.
Moreover, they explicitly stated that those primeval intragenerative acts are
thoroughly material, thoroughly connected, and thoroughly graphic. Anthropology
anticipates Stiegler’s signaling for a refreshed ontology and his recognition of
collectivity and individuation. Ingold and Haraway assert that any restoration of the
earth in the Anthropocene requires a perception of the ground. Specifically, it
requires the human to recognize its kinship with the soil around, the animals
nearby, and the sky that directs its movements. For Mauss and Sahlins, to develop
a social support system amidst the Capitalocene’s inequalities, we must literally
“make” kin. We must enact social techniques that align us as friends. Anthropology
also fears that a purely exteriorized writing-making may only entrench the
Capitolocene and Anthropocene. If we cannot touch the earth we should caress
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then we command it with a fist. If we cannot befriend the enemy or hospitably
welcome their gift then we will make ownership claims the status quo. In this
world, we would proliferate difference but struggle to maintain unity. We might
share space in a social text as magnetic poles or binaries, but we cannot cross into
each other and empathize. We can file a copyright claim and differentiate unities in
non-fungible tokens but we struggle to joint-author a public building. We know how
to multiply money, set down property boundaries, or split an atom, but joining
eludes us. But even stating these problems feels dissonant. We know very well that
we do all of these things. We do have friends, share life, and empathize. We have
already stated that there is tension between the consequences o this writing theory
o making and our actual life. Therefore, my point, once again is that we do not
make our lives according to the written theory of making or an exteriorized
ontology. We do these things out of a drawn theory of making and through a vital
and interiorizing ontology.

4.4 The Abductive Turn
These foregoing reflections lay out the abductive path very clearly. If the ruling
theory is exteriority cum writing, and the case for testing that is inscriptions, but it
is not yielding the results we want, then we need a new rule. Our new rule will take
an abductive turn. That is, we will consider interiority cum drawing as a rule that
can generate better results for empirically lived life. This is our Kierkegaardian
moment. I certainly do not mean to inflate the importance of our study or claim to
be the reincarnated form of the great Danish anti-philosopher. But my brash

168

comparison serves a heuristic purpose. In effect, our turn positions a new theory of
making in response to exteriority as a totality. I am positioning drawing against
writing as a monism. To repeat, what I mean to do is look upon the exteriorizing
ontology of writing in the same way that Kierkegaard saw Hegel’s totalizing
systematicity. To be clear, since Hegel figures into my own work above, I am not
turning the whole dissertation towards him or his detractors. I am not delimiting
myself to Kierkegaard’s lexicon, system, or writings. I am using Kierkegaard
strictly as an exemplar of the kind of shift I want to propose here. In short, the time
for turning ontology outside-in has come.
Kierkegaard’s main concern with Hegel and his like-minded contemporaries
was their tendency to subjugate all particularity in life.259 The grand synthesis of the
dialectic made each concrete instance or decision not only undecidable but
irrelevant. Kierkegaard wanted to remind Hegel that he too was human—all too
human. To be perched atop the world seeing the world from Being’s godlike
heights did not befit his place in time, space, and with others. The world is not a
testing ground to be swallowed up in logic. The world is lived. Furthermore, it is
lived at the threshold of this/that, here/ there, either/or, and you/me.260 For
Kierkegaard (and me), the most important part of those pairs is the backslash.
These binaries cannot be washed away in a principle of fungibility. They require us
to “make” decisions. Decisions are cuts. Or, in Ingold’s terms, decisions are lines.
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Exteriorizing ontology and its correlative inscription—writing—verge on a
similar totality and transcendence. But this is not a final indictment. Writing only
trends towards this totality as a point of emphasis. Make no mistake, there are deep
verities in all of the ontologies above. Exteriority is not germane to writing as such.
Writing, as an inscribed theory of making, has only emphasized exteriority to its
own detriment. Writing, as Leroi-Gourhan and Derrida both confirm, was always
already graphism and drawing.261 Writing is graphism gone linear which terminates
in the exteriority of code. Wrighting is that discipline that can make. And, as such,
writing can make through touch, repetition, and twoness without vanishing or
without violently substantiating presence. It can twist and bend the line of text to
radiate poetically, move backward, welcome novelty, and beget friendship. When
writing recalls its deep relation with drawing, then it reverts to wrighting.
Wrighting is work. Wrighting is joining. Whereas writing is deadly, wrighting is an
exertion of life. As we shall see below, the immanence of this exertion has vital
affective consequences.
To summarize, the problem facing making cum writing is exteriority—but only
exteriority in vacuo. A new theory of making will need to be keenly aware of the
inside, discern how to cross between the inside and outside, as well as how to
operationalize both of these concepts for everyday people. Therefore, my critical
conjecture is that drawing can achieve all three. What is more, drawing can salvage
writing/wrighting in its erection of the exterior. The rest of this section explicates
this claim. Importantly, as you can tell already, my claim pivots around
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170

paradigmatic shifts that lie deep in the concepts of making. Excavating them may
not signal the consequences of a drawn ontology right away. They require
excavation, clarification, and interpretation. I utilize the insights of Michel Henry,
Felix Ravaisson, Charles Sanders Peirce, and several supplemental voices to draw
out the abstract distinctions that inform making at its lowest levels. As a result, we
will not necessarily mention drawing at every turn as we probe the distinctions
between interiority and exteriority. Drawing will appear later as a synthetic figure
emerging against this ontologically shifting ground.

4.5 Life on the Inside
Michel Henry has been emerging from the phenomenological margin over the last
few decades as more of his work is translated into English and as more scholars
publish reflections on his insights. He remains suspect to many—as Derrida and
Heidegger might have in their first few decades—because he overturns the central
pieces of phenomenology in such a radical way that his concepts are confoundingly
simple. Henry’s philosophical system starts with a very plain question: why is
everything about the outside? Henry focuses this broad question by claiming that
all philosophical conundrums can find their way back to this central problem.262
Because all philosophy, at some level, concerns itself with “stuff” and the
appearance of that “stuff.” Therefore, philosophy has phenomenological roots. In
those roots, is a central assumption that must be addressed: knowledge/stuff/
experience is external.
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Henry sees this as the fundamental reason that phenomenology cannot account
for appearing as such. It has been proficient at describing the way something
appears or disappears (as we saw in the case of Heidegger or Derrida). Still, he
says, there must be a condition for appearance’s appearing.263 Without it, “stuff”
crumbles. Husserl sensed the same problem. This opened a deeper philosophical
trap. Namely, that to establish appearances’ appearing invokes an infinite regress
that always raises a prior thing that begets those conditions of appearing. In more
direct terms, to solve the question of base appearing, Husserl applied that external
assumption above. Whatever was granting appearing was before, beyond, or
outside of appearing. In Henry’s view, Derrida, Heidegger, Deleuze, Hegel, and
even Merleau-Ponty do the same. The undeconstructable, Being, Virtual, Spirit, and
even flesh are all backstops outside of the thing they grant. Henry sees this
persistent externality as the result of an ontological monism whose basic
assumption is that everything lies outside of everything else (down to an
infinitesimal scale). Ontological monism inevitably produces ek-static philosophical
schemes that in turn create their own problems and aporias.264 For us, one of those
problems is making insofar as it relies on ekstatic accounts.
Henry’s response is a bold but basic reversal. Henry counters ekstasy and
monism by simply claiming that appearing comes from the inside. The inside of
what? This is an instinctive response. But it is the wrong question. It evinces
external biases. It starts from the outside. It defines the inside in relation-to
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something other—something transcendent. Henry’s reversal echos the Deleuzean
attempt to overhaul difference and sameness. We can no more think difference
from same than think inside from outside. Pure interiority is not inside-of at all. It is
simply unto-itself. The appearing of appearing, the foundational moment of all
experience, is internal. It is self-appearing.265 The act of seeing itself is not seen.
Therefore, phenomenology’s basis is not intentional. It is life itself in its purity. This
basis is a pure subjectivity that takes its own self as its “object.”266
Once again, as noted above, these terms can be misleading if filtered through
our own ekstatic tendencies. For example, this interiority may come across as a
simple Cartesian relativism. We are tempted to read Henry as an advocate for some
sort of reductive existentialism. But this would be to repeat the same mistake
Henry is trying to undo. The “interior” is not the inside of a shell. It is pure
immanence.267 It is self-appearing with no distance between giving and receiving. It
is not the Cartesian ego inside a body. That kind of “interior” would only refer to an
encasing of the mind within some sort of chaotic, albeit critically necessary,
outside. Seeing this inside in a Cartesian would require standing on the outside.
The interior Henry refers to is not seen, known, or even described. To say it even
has an object is inapplicable. There is no gap or between in this self-manifesting
interiority. So, how is it experienced? It can only be felt.268 The interiority of
experience is affective. Affect is immediate. Affectivity is a reality without exterior
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remove. This is the interiority that begets all phenomena. Thus, as Henry himself
notes, had Descartes said “I feel therefore I am,” he would have been much closer
to the reality of things.269
The interior is hard to grasp as an ontological or phenomenological condition of
lived experience because we are mired in generations of exteriority. Still, this
deceptively simple thesis is observable in our local experience of suffering or joy.
When we hurt, we often designate some exterior object as a cause. But when we
suffer, we often continue in this condition without objects.270 Suffering can intensify
and mollify without external change. For those who know suffering, the experience
continues and even deepens irrespective of any outside circumstances. Phobias are
similar. In fact, psychoanalytical responses roam the exterior of the unconscious to
find some cause. But the phobia is felt, and often evolves, without any external
cause satiating it. The point is that affects like suffering and joy have no distance,
delay, or deferral within them. They need no outside explanation. But, we must be
reminded that though these affects are felt in immediacy, they are not “mine.” This
would be to revert to the “outside.” I would be thinking of affects as external things
to be had, observed, or endured. This would require me to think of myself outside
myself as the subject who has them. I would miss the fact that they are themselves
my immediate access to any “thing.” They foment any awareness I have of a “me.”
Self-affectivity, then, is not a private or possessed feature but a shared ontological
one. Affects like suffering and joy open a relation without transcendence,
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difference, or any outside. They confirm a self-relating or self-affectivity. Affects
proceed in me and things without exceeding or preceding either. It is the basis of
appearing because it attests to a primordial ground of all experience. Namely, life.
Life is this immanent self-appearing in its immanent self-affectivity.271
Immanence is a difficult road to travel. Henry is not the first to take it. Deleuze,
and perhaps to some extent Heidegger and Derrida, walked a similar path. What
immanentists want to do is expunge any reference to the transcendent. They want
to account for reality from within reality. And, according to our aims—to construct
a theory of making accessible on the ground—immanentism is a laudable goal. But
Heidegger and Derrida fell short in establishing Being’s transcendent concealment
or language’s haunting erasure. Deleuze compromises his own immanent system
by keeping a pure memory, pure potency, or pure virtual alongside every
actuality.272 Henry reverses these trends with simple and radical immanent
consistency. The life we experience we feel. The things we feel are actual. They are
not given from elsewhere. They are not going elsewhere. They are not hovering
liminally above a khora, virtual, or disclosive horizon. They are life’s very own
manifestation given to life itself. Life is both cause and effect. It does not pop out of
its immanent self-appearing. There is no “out.” What it does is always actual—not
potential.273 We feel this thing. Life never wants to “become” anything other than
what it is. Life simply lives and that life is an actuality that is rooted in affectivity.
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With this in view, we start to see a path towards making and inscribing that is
shared, present, and accessible to all. Henry’s interiority approaches our categories
by raising the question of discrete and particular lives under the motif of number.
In this interiority of life can there be lives? His answer in short: there must be.
Immanent life is, by definition, superfluity and multiplicity. Immanent affectivity
cannot stop lest it be guided or curtailed by an exterior telos, encasing, or death.274
Every instance of self-feeling in this life is an incarnating actuality. To localize this
difficult concept: when I feel myself suffering that feeling is a moment/space/
thing/state, and is grounded in self-affectivity that arises as a me here and now.
This man, this woman, or this element is an instance of affects upon affects.275
Actualities are not congealed pasts but rather present and unique things afforded
by affective interplay and self-revelation in Life. Lived lives “are” because of the selfaffectivity of life. The gift of a general Life is that this life, the one I live, is actual.
This life is not enfolded back into being, undermine by potentiality, or death.
To fully appreciate Henry’s contribution, we have to think of affective selfrelating as a concrete moment and a concrete thing. Life is not folding on itself.
There is no distance or transcendent nothing for it to fold in. It is an act of joining
without outsides. It is not describable in the terms of things because our knowledge
of things is biased towards externality. It is pure affect. Life begets life and affects
beget affects. Both are always actual because whatever moments may feel like they
are what they are in their self-relation. These concepts directly apply to material
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objects. The inherited hylomorphic model assumes that matter comes to an
external subject as an externality itself. Beginning with this exteriority demands an
exterior condition like Khora or the virtual to account for interaction and
morphology. But for Henry, the hyle of the world is an affective impression all its
own.276 It is already a morphe. When matter touches another thing, that touch is
itself a self-relating of life. It is a new actual. We could read this as a full,
comprehensive, and ontological application of the feedback idea Andre LeroiGourhan sketched as technicity. The self-affectivity of materiality does not subdue
that touch or evacuate it into general “life.” As a moment of self-affectivity, the
connection is self-appearing and that self-appearing is actual. Another actuality—
concrete and material thing—will arise as another affective revelation later. The
meaning of life (even when that term is considered mathematically) is to live at the
junctures of affective actuality.
To reiterate, this life is not passive. It is pure action rather than a pure
possibility. If life feels itself and that feeling is not a potency towards anything other
than what it is, then life always accomplishes what it does. Its being is its act of
manifestation. We even “feel” this actuality in our effort. Maine de Biran had
addressed this issue when responding to Hume’s critique of cause.277 He notes that
when we lift a stick and we subsequently articulate our body as a cause, we are not
“intentionally” projecting a concept. We are actually responding to the pressure and
force of our own endeavors. This is not external in the first instance. We know our
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effort effectively. Our muscles tighten internally. That force and the corresponding
resistance introduce a new layer of our self-experience and are translated as
understanding. Resistance to internal affect is a material actualization of sorts.
Henry forwards this same notion in his account of affectivity, interiority, and life.
Any actual effort and movement of lives are generated by Life’s self-affection. That
effort endows another actuality at the surface of any resistance. The broad
subjective self-affectivity of Life is conveyed to narrow subjective lives. Movement
and resistance bestow a sense of localized selfhood. With all of the energy of Life at
large, then, the concrete subject experiences their life as an “I can” rather than an I
know or I think.278 The “can” arises from the fact of pure actuality. I can because I
do.
The subject “can,” and perhaps must interact. Henry’s world is a myriad of
actualities. It is a plurality of concrete events that are birthing new ones. Still,
Henry’s descriptions of intersubjectivity remain too vague to be systematized in a
local pedagogy. In other words, he cannot quite prescribe how to affectively interact
with each other. He can, however, be supplemented by two other critical voices.
First, Luce Irigaray helps us articulate intersubjective birthing.279 Luce’s interests
are commensurate with Henery’s focus on life. She is interested in conscious
connectivity and its expressions in culture and thought. What is more, her own
perspective is driven by one of our ontological motifs above: number. Irigaray
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began her career critiquing the notion of singularity with respect to cultural
consciousness and sexual identity.280 The world was not only one and therefore not
only man. As her work progressed, she expanded her notion of otherness explicitly
in the number two. To be anyone at all is to be two at minimum. Two precedes
anything that resembles identity. You give me my me. There are touches replete
through personhood such that, ontologically speaking, life is touch and twoness all
the way down. In addition to Irigaray, one of Husserl’s students, Edith Stein, had a
more explicitly phenomenological claim about connection. For our purposes, her
claims were explicitly affective. Stein held that we can cross over into others
through empathy.281 We can feel what they feel. We can enter and pass their edge.
In consonance with Henry, affective actualities are the ground of life. But beyond
Henry, affective actualities can be exteriorized as entities and those actualities can
interact through the self-same affectivity that bore them. While we cannot plumb all
of their insights, Stein and Irigaray show us is Henry’s affective life should be a
shared affectivity. The world may be immanently one, but its tonality is twofold.
That twofold nature is not reducible to the connection of people but applies to
the touchpoint of any actuality. This is expressed in Henry’s reading of material
craft. In his work on Kandinsky, he focuses on the way that Wassily Kandinsky
probed the world and felt its revealing in color.282 Color, unlike other graphic
elements, is self-referential. It is akin to life’s own energy. Color gives us immediate
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affective access to the actual world as opposed to the kinds of markings that
exteriorize it. In the terms of Leroi-Gourhan, color is like graphism. It places us in
the world, with the world, and of the world. Writing aligns with perspectival art or
even fanciful self-indulgent sculptures. In a similar vein to Deleuze and MerleauPonty, Kandinsky’s work testifies to life. But unlike them, that life is not elsewhere.
It is the actuality of that color, that hyle, and that affect. What is important here is
that deep into ontological interiority, this life can be inscribed. It can be made.
Therefore, as we continue through Henrian implications, we must keep track of the
way these insights inflect a theory of making on the ground.
For Henry, mark-making does not begin or end with art. Henry was also a
critical Marxist who had a novel way of understanding Marx’s system. Rather than
read him as an economist, Henry treats Marx as a social phenomenologist.283 For
Henry, Marx express in labor what Henry sees in Kandinsky’s color. That is, the “I
can” actuates life in labor. Work is living labor. When that labor, however, becomes
ekstatic or exteriorized in price, it dies. It is occultized and the energy of life is
traded for the sarcophagi of reification. Contra Deleuze, work and labor are not
about originality. They are not beset by copies. Life has no copy. Therefore, the
subsequent solution to the problem of repetition cannot be simulation. Labor is
actuality begetting actuality. Difference is simply a function of being alive, active,
and working. Labor and its actual produce are only “original” when they are taken
from life and viewed from the outside. Whereas simulation is pure outsideness,
labor is deep interiority. When that interior work is lost, culture has reached a state
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of barbarism.284 Barbarism, according to Henry, is not primitivism. It is the very
opposite. It is hyper technicity wherein exteriority reigns. It produces a world of
outsides that become the only measure of a life lived.

4.5.1 Out into Life
Henry’s insight profoundly resynthesizes everything we have seen up to this
point. What is striking, is that we require less space to affirm his synthesis because
it is self-evident in the life we live. Above, we pointed out the way exteriority
compromised life when placed under theoretical scrutiny. We admitted, however,
that those hazards are not always felt on the ground. They make sense
theoretically but we may not see them in daily life. Exteriority and writing do not
kill me, for example. We have to account for the dissonance between described
dangers and lived experience. With respect to exteriority, the dangers are not felt
because they recede in the centers of calculation and their written inscriptions are
codified into daily practice. Therefore, it requires extra effort to unravel those
assumptions because of the resistance of these networks of inscription. Once we do
this, though, advocating for interiority runs smoothly because it aligns with life as
we know it. Thus, the categorical consequences of Henry seem to flow naturally.
We know we do “stuff.” We feel our actions. We make things. Henry’s model is
in keeping with this immanent sensation. The interior life of all things is fraught
with agency. In fact, this is a cornerstone of his entire system. The subjective
energy of life is “I can.” I can because all is actual. As an agent, I can mark
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anything. Every interaction is itself an actuality that is novel and concrete. I can act
because the energy of motion is interior to life. I can also touch. I can touch
wherever that effort meets resistance. If we augment Henry with Stein, I can
interact within the depths of another’s life as affectivity carries me into their
concrete place in the myriad of moments we share. We repeat this over and over
because life is a process with no outside. Our repetition sidesteps a sameness
because life is an intricate history of actual affects. Despite this seamless
application, when it comes to surface and twoness, though, Henry’s account is
wanting. Stein and Irigaray affirmed intersubjectivity in Henry’s model but we still
do not have an inscriptive prescription. We need a method that honors the interior
life but also enacts the multiplicity it promises. We need to know how we encounter
others? And how does this refract an ontology of interiority? Are others me? Is
there a line between us where these actualities touch? If there is no distance in life,
then is there ever an outside at all that I can call someone or something “else”? Can
we be two? A la Irigaray, can I be two? Is there a moment in my past that is outside
of me now? Is there a future? I submit that upon further examination, making
directly addresses these potential problems in Henry.
For Henry, where life self-reveals, it opens concrete actualities and their
interaction forms another affective entity or moment. But this universe is
dangerously static despite Henry’s claim that life is in process. Without any outside,
here and there become indiscernible as just life’s self-revelation. Henry avoids all
outsides because he fears smuggling in transcendence. We are heading back to
square one. Without any exteriority then our experience of things would feel
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illusory—even if actualities exist ontologically. It seems that we need exteriority in
some sense. We need that backslash of Kierkegaard above. If there is going to be
any exteriority in Henry’s life, that exteriority would need to cycle and repeat. It
would need to rise and fall constantly. But it could not disclose and conceal. That
exteriority could not be a precondition of pure outsidedness. It could not be a
potentiality in that way. Exteriority would need to be actual. So, what if the outside
were made? That is, what if the process of life was about making outsides in the
interiority of affect? If making happened over and over, then each marked moment,
each surface, would beget a new moment or actual instance in life. In simple terms,
what if life was about “making” outsides—notably, from the inside and toward the
inside. Surface would be that event of exterior formation within life. This life of
making would beget more of itself internally but do so through actuality agency
rather than against it. Surfaces would manifest a life comprised of exscription and
inscription. Repetition would be key to this surface. Repetition prevents it from
becoming a shell for essence. Repetition allows making to make an exterior time
and again. In other words, repetition would be resurfacing. Life never dies because
in making it is pure resurrection. Resurrection precedes both incarnation and
termination—both life and death.
Where do agency and marking fit into this making? How are they necessary to
making rather than incidental and dispensable? Before Henry, phenomenological
agency was intentionality. That intentionality is transcendent and so Henry
dispenses with it. But he also dispensed with all outsidedness. Just above, we
argued that we could recover outsidedness if we could keep making it. Therefore,

183

we can couple Henry’s “I can” with inscribed exteriority in the repetition of making.
In other words, agency’s “I can” gives rise and room to others by inscribing them. It
is, ironically, indifferent to otherness or Other. Otherness or the “Other” is a
transcendent that remains exterior and dead. Agency, by inscribing exteriors,
makes otherS. Others are concrete and actual and therefore plural. They are
someones or somethings. Agency would be instrumental in keeping outsidedness
from becoming a stagnant and onerous transcendent presence. Namely, by
exteriorizing from within. It would be instrumental in keeping life doing what life
does: actuate. We would always have the opportunity to keep making outsidedness
—even our own.
In this arrangement, agency becomes purposive rather than intentional. But
purposive cannot mean a simple imposition. We can call it purposive in the sense
that the term means to “put there.”285 In that sense, the term is best treated as purpose. It is not reducible to forcing a preconceived agenda. Pur-pose would be a kind
of touch or marking that seeks the multiplicity of actual outsides. In other words, as
it makes it “puts there.” What is central to the pur-posive making is that it is always
two at bottom. Two is the smallest molecule of reality in this sense. When making
happens, at minimum, this thing puts that thing there. This kind of making enables a
shared Life. If nothing else, this site of twoness in making is a small social
arrangement we call friendship. Marking begets the outside and that outside then
multiplies as others are made. The way that pur-posive making does this is critical.
As an offering of others, then pro-plosive making is also a kind of contraction. It is a
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pulling back so that this exterior and its distance are born. This hospitable posture
is repeatable. Repetition, on its face, is to re-ask.286 It is to invite. Repetitious
purposive making is consonant with a life of opening and disponibilité.287 And when
there is no one then this asking is a summons. It is a question that invites exterior
to interior. It is ontology’s fundamental friendship. It cannot die.
Finally, this reconfigured ontology calls for an operation. We cannot simply
leave these insights to abstract confirmation and betray our original interests in the
common world. Fortunately, Andre Leroi-Grouhan’s work affords a technicity and
inscription that can operationalize this ontology. As anticipated, this is drawing.
Drawing can be an inscription that reaches the ontological and phenomenological
ground below writing. Not only can it go to those dimensions, but it can also stay at
the surface as a method or practice. Jean-Luc Nancy, mentioned earlier in
conjunction with writing, anticipates and epitomizes our use of drawing in his work
The Pleasure in Drawing.288 Nancy says that drawing the line allows us to see into
the connective construction of the world. Nancy, in his own right, is very interested
in exteriors touching. But in this case, what is important is that Nancy describes
that when we pull a line across a page what was once zero immediately becomes
two. Here is touching there. That side is contiguous with this side. Like Pyramus
and Thisbe’s wall, this line is both meeting and departure.289 Without it, “we—nor
just me or you either—would not be. Therefore, drawing has the capacity to
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exteriorize, affectively self-relate, maximize contractive agency, enable twoness,
touch, repeat, mark a surface, and do it all on purpose. Below, I will lay out some of
drawing’s instrumental mechanics with respect to Henry’s ontology.

4.5.2 Felix Raviasson: The Flexuous Line
To operationalize Henry’s interiority, we revisit the Maine De Brian philosophy
tree in the work of one of his pupils: Felix Ravaisson. Felix Ravaisson studied
under Maine De Biran and taught Henri Bergson. He is heralded as a titan of the
French Spiritualist tradition but has been relatively underserved in much of the
continental conversation. His landmark works concern Aristotle and habit.290 Given
his position and his scholarly focus, his work is highly instructive for a theory of
making. We will address habit momentarily, but for now, it is his lesser-known
writings about drawing that are of interest.291
According to assorted writings, Ravaisson takes drawing to be a modality of
interaction.292 He thinks of it as a way of beholding or perceiving reality. It is not a
referential practice. It is not even a pictorial practice. It is not, as Derrida would
purport, a blind exploration.293 It was a means of accessing the substantive world
around. It is a way of touching them. In Merleau-Ponty’s words, it touches them
from a distance. In our words, drawing makes this distance—purposively. These
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convictions are coordinated in Ravaisson’s description of the “flexuous line.”294 This
is the backbone of drawing. Flexuous drawing enacts a certain kind of line that is
neither geometric nor simply curved. As flexuous, this line inscribes movement. As
a student of Aristotle, movement and continuity are principal features of life. As a
student of Maine de Biran, force and effort are critical elements of life as well. The
flexuous line combines them. It is a serpentine line that evokes the movement and
force of the world around. Even when the flexuous line evinces a known body or
seemingly refers to an object, that line is touching that body and moving with that
object.
This line unites many of our aforementioned thinkers in an operative
instrument for making a living. In the terms of Ingold, the flexuous line is
intragenerative interweaving. In the terms of Henry, it participates in a shared
subjectivity of affective life. In the terms of Andre Leroi-Gourhan, this flexuous line
is graphic, not linear. In the terms of Stein, this flexuous line, just as it founds
another, enters in and dwells with that other. For Ravaisson, the flexuous line is the
oikonomia of the life it touches. It inscribes that life in its repetitious (“perpetual
asking”) turns and transgressions. The turns of the line are not folds but the very
making of quadrants, sections, and entities. The turns of the flexuous line are akin
to what Rabbi Ben Bag Bag said of sacred writings: turn it turn it for everything is
in it.295
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This serpentine line is not necessarily visible.296 Like life, which does not give
itself to knowledge or sight, the flexuous line is drawn by and with but never
depicted. It is that interior that is always exteriorized. Bergson called Ravaisson’s
flexuous line a “figurative metaphysics.”297 Its bends and straightaways testify to the
polarity and intensity of a thing’s way of being. Or as we said above, the flexuous
line tells us what it is like to be this thing—without referring or transcending.
Drawing’s flexuous line maintains instants, cuts, and dots. It breaks and rejoins. It
crosses over itself. It draws on its own marked pathways and thickens the entities
as they are revealed in this flexuous figuration.
As invisible, the flexuous line is the rhythm of life.298 Or better, for Ravaisson, is
eurythmic. It is beautiful or good precisely in its capacity to foment actual newness
and difference. It is rhythmic in the sense that it is ongoing and undulating. As it
turns corners, rises and falls, or thickens and fades it is making. It is the touchstone
for the inner and outer—interiority and exteriority. Just as our concept of making
above inscribes exteriority on the inside, the flexuous line can be the means of that
inscribing. It does both things because, as line, it is ineluctably two-sided. And the
two that it gives continue as the line is pulled. In other words, as drawn. It also is
rhythmic in the sense that it is a testament to instants. It is not an unceasing flow
nor an uninterrupted monism. There are no rhythms where there is pure potency
or virtuality without starts and stops. The flexuous line makes different actual
things surface as instants come into view. Eurythm testifies to the fits and starts of

296. Catherine Malabou, "Addiction and Grace," in On Habit ed. Claire Carlisle (London: Routledge, 2014), xix.
297. Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics (North Chelmsford: Courier Corporation, 2012), 262.
298. Ravaisson, On the Teaching of Drawing, 183-187.

188

a life feeling itself. It is never a pure symmetry, a pure void, or a virtual. Lastly, it is
rhythmic in the sense that it is purposive. It puts. As the flexuous line repeats, it
puts this there and that here by calling them forward and touching them.
Ravaisson, as we noted, was not only an advocate for drawing but published a
major work on habit.299 The flexuous line and habit are co-constitutive. This is
critical for our theory of making. In his book, Ravaisson dispels the notion that
habits are routines or rote mechanical movements. Rather, habits negotiate the
polarity of will and nature. Habits are also twofold. He points out that when
something is repeated in habit, it crosses between exterior nature and interior
will.300 In the terms of drawing, this is like a twofold interacting and intersecting
like a flexuous line crisscrossing and pulling. But just as drawing helps us see habit,
a habit can help us see what is happening in the flexuous line. Habit is
transformative and constructive. A repetitious conscious act of the interior will
become more inscribed in nature. It will float “outside” of the self in that sense, as
second nature. It will occur more spontaneously as a result of natural prompting.301
It is the will exscribed. In our terms, habit is the very process of the interior being
inscribed into another. The inverse also happens. As natural, it will become more
precise. As the act is performed on the outside, the inside will become less resistant
to its enactment. Habit is purposive in this way. Nature and will (purposively) put
each other into view and then cross into each other without synthesis or dialectic.
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They befriend one another. Ultimately, according to our theory of making, a habit is
the kind of repetition that engenders living. It makes, crosses, and dwells.302
If we were to scale back from our study, we would see that we are continuing to
work backward. We moved further into abstraction from an EMPIRICAL sample,
into a FRAMEWORK of elements and motifs, and have now considered theoretical
distinctions. My proposal, to take up drawing as an interior theory of making,
redeploys motifs and reconfigures elements. The flexuous line, at least as I have
theorized here, is not yet fully EMPIRICAL. It is still rather vague to the common
person, who is the target audience. Therefore, we need one more step. We need to
address whether this flexuous line, described as invisible, can actually be drawn.
We need to establish the kind of drawing that comes closest to the constructive
rhythms of the flexuous line. For that, we turn to the American Pragmatist Charles
Sanders Peirce to solidify our drawn theory of making.

4.5.3 Charles Sanders Peirce: Diagrammatics
Peirce lies well outside of our stream of thinkers above but he is no stranger to
phenomenology. He was a rigorous scientist that spent a lifetime trying to
categorize and systematize his field’s methods and practices. As a result, his
writings are fraught with hierarchies, information architecture, and novel titles. For
example, he substituted the term phaneroscopy for phenomenology.303 But what is
important about Peirce is not his peculiarity but his sense of connectedness and
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303. Charles S. Peirce, “On Phenomenology,” in The Essential Peirce, 2 vols: Selected Philosophical Writings. (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1992, 1998), 145.
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interplay. What is more, we need to see how his affinity for connection informed his
phenomenology, shaped his idea about drawing, and endorsed communities of
interpretation.
One of Peirce’s lasting insights in phenomenology is that every experience is
contoured by the ontological motif of number. He claimed that every observation
and actual entity has firstness, secondness, and thirdness.304 Firstness is a kind of
feeling or sensation in any encounter. Though he most likely meant something
external and substantive, this correlates to Henry’s immediate affectivity.
Secondness is discerned in resistance or otherness. Once again, Peirce is more
directly empirical than we have been but secondness, here, corresponds to the
drawn line. Peirce’s thirdness, finally, is a reflection on the relation between
firstness and secondness. That relation is akin to a law or even a habit. Critically,
thirdness is not subsequent. In some cases it is primary. His own simple example
can help us clarify. When a dot is placed on a page, it is always first, second, and
third all at once. The paper is firstness, the dot is twoness, and their interaction is
thirdness. We can see that none of these trumps the other. Though, thirdness—our
“habit” of the flexuous line—holds their mutual reality together. Furthermore, that
thirdness is not static but is actively present as it is the ground of continued
reaction or interaction. Namely, someone can draw lines of dots extending from the
dot and paper. This model is in lockstep with our foregoing arrangement. In effect,
he is confirming that a proper phenomenology of life must account for interiority,

304. Charles S. Peirce, “Categories Defended,” in The Essential Peirce, 2 vols: Selected Philosophical Writings. (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1992, 1998), 60.
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exteriority, and their mutual enactment. Peirce goes on to coordinate this
numerical ontology in his own form of graphism.
We can see his ontology at work in drawing but it will be helpful to take an
intermediate step before getting there. For Peirce, markings on a page are signs.
Therefore, to fully comprehend his model of drawing, we should understand how
the numerical ontology above informs signs. Peirce is well known for his semiotics.
His most accessible triad of signs is his hierarchy of indexes, icons, and symbols.305
Indexes have a strong relation to the object they signify. For example, smoke is to
fire. Icons “resemble” the things they signify. For example, a photo or digital
graphic. Symbols are remotely related to the things they signify. For example, a
flag as a symbol of freedom. In lieu of this hierarchy, Frederic Stjernfelt has pointed
out that indexes and symbols are actually limit cases of the icon.306 Icons have that
“resemblance” that makes them the central element of signification. The semblance
of the icon is latent in the index and symbol without which they would no longer
signify. A straight index would be the same as the object it signifies. The symbol
would be utterly unrelated to its so as to be irrelevant and unreadable. This latter
insight has unexpected fruit. Above, we saw that pure exteriority requires
assemblage of the unlinked simulacra. This is akin to the pure symbol of Peirce.
Pure interiority needs disassembly for its undistanced actualities. This is akin to the
pure index of Peirce. The icon coincides with habit and the flexuous line as re-
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semblance. The icon, and by implication drawing, is once again the thirdness that
repeats a relation. Fortunately, in Peirce, this thirdness can be signified in certain
kin of graphic icon.
Peirce’s graphical icon of choice is the diagram.307 The diagram has a unique
position in this signifying chain since it has a semblance but is also internally
revisable. For Peirce, a diagram relates to its reference by graphically illustrating
the internal relations within that thing.308 Those parts, mereologically splayed in the
diagram are akin to the touching we affirmed in the flexuous inscriptions. The
diagram is an actualization of what is felt in another actuality, so to speak. But this
diagram, and all of its lines, can be reassembled and rearranged. This is so that we
might draw closer to the actuality it diagrams. That redrawing, according to Henry,
affects that actuality too. Therefore, diagrams are the kind of flexuous drawing that
lies at the surface. As the means of a drawn making, diagrams do more than just
actuate the flexuous line, though. They also craft the kind of community that Peirce
expected to gather around signs.309
While diagrams resonate with the technicity and line-making interweaving of
anthropology, they also serve kin-making. When we refract Peircean diagrams
through Henry and shine them onto human life through anthropology, then
diagrams become a technicity that summons others into life. Peirce was adamant
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(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992, 1998), 116.

193

that a larger network of human lives was critical to affirming scientific concepts.
Truth belonged to all because truth is not a property but a kind of alignment.310
Thus, when life is shared, kin is made. Diagrams materialize these generalities by
being 1) a drawn actuality that inaugurates exteriority (or two) 2) flexuously purposeful and 3) a reconfiguration that multiplies otherness and makes kin by feeling
the lives of those around it. Given this formulation, diagrams cannot be those
technical drawings tucked away in plans and encyclopedias only to be deciphered
by experts. That would be exteriority and occulted life. The diagrams we have in
mind are those sketches that two people share at a dinner table when they want
someone to observe what they see in a project, a relationship, or a game. These
diagrams are the sketches that doodle out a love note or that a child draws to
illustrate a school procedure. Diagrams can certainly rise to the level of full-blown
construction but at their ontological core, they sprout life at the smallest levels.

4.6 Diagramming Conclusions
We can summarize our entire exposition in a simple motto: drawing invigorates
making. This sort of affirmation might seem too succinct to feel viable. But brevity
is indicative of our sustained effort heretofore. What we have done is finally make
our way to the tip of an iceberg. We have dug into the ground of life enough to
come back to the top and make simple claims. Now, rather than rehash all of the
elements of the chapter, in the spirit of its findings, I want to circle back to the
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diagrammatic enumeration at the beginning and redraw it. This time, I want to
eliminate the meta-discursive research elements and focus on the relationship
between the two theories of making. I want to weave drawing and writing together
under the rubrics of making we have developed. Then I will make a final
propositional statement. The table is organized according to the structures of
making we have developed, how writing addresses and coordinates each, and how
drawing offers a different arrangement.

findings
RESEARCH ELEMENTS

STRUCTURE

WRITING

DRAWING

Identify Obstacles

Anthropocene and Capitalocene

Alterity saves through death

We make life together

Identify Variables

Surface, Agent, Marking

Exterior potentiality

Interior actuality

Establish Constant

Inscriptions

What is literature?

Flexuous diagrams

Observe Variations

touch/repetition/number

non-touch/simulation/one

crossing-into/asking/two

At this point of the study, every piece of the theory is in full view. We have migrated
around the SYSTEMATIC COMBINING categories and solidified a drawn theory
of making that carefully considers both anthropological and phenomenological
subtleties. What is more, we have an operational instrument to actualize that
theory. But, since our goal is to transmit this theory on the ground, that instrument
should be accompanied by our findings. Regrettably, our findings are too
cumbersome for everyday use. To take them along with us, we can pare down the
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insights of these two lenses—anthropology and phenomenology—into two formal
propositions. 1) Anthropology taught us that Drawing is Material. 2) Now,
phenomenology has shown that Drawing is Habitual. In the final section, we turn
to Architecture where we will see all of these aforementioned elements at work in
one discipline. Architecture will verify the importance of a drawn theory of making
as well as provide our third and final proposition. 3) Namely, Drawing is tectonic.
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5. THE ARCHITECTURE OF DRAWING
5.1 Case Study
First, let us be clear, it would be impossible to cover the entirety of architectural
history in an effort to observe drawing as a phenomenological condition of making.
architecture is a vast and sweeping discipline that has covered far too many corners
of the human experience. To be succinct, but direct, that is not what we are trying
to do. It is not just a matter of whether we can do it. We do not want to do it. In
SYSTEMATIC COMBINING, CASE STUDIES are not used for surveying or
refining area expertise. They are not simply additional empirical samples either.
The CASE STUDY serves as a threshold of understanding for any phenomenon—
or theory—and its context.311 The case study integrates. As noted in the
introduction and first chapter, I launched this study under the guidance of a
mytheme. Here in these latter parts, the investigation has evolved into a general and
abstract theoretical construct. This transformation can complicate and obfuscate
understanding. The mytheme is often too small for general comprehension and the

311. Anna Dubois and Lars-Erik Gadde, "Systematic combining: an abductive approach to case research," Journal of Business
Research 55, no. 7 (2002): 554,
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theory is too large for specific insight. The CASE STUDY helps us negotiate these
two extremes.
The CASE STUDY, then, serves as both a tool and a product of all that has gone
before. As a tool, it concretely coordinates all of the elements, motifs, and
theoretical reflections we have developed along the way. At the same time, it is a
product of those same pieces. In other words, architecture is not just the means of
showing the pieces. It is also—in its very disciplinary form—the natural end of
these pieces. What we want, is to see how these pieces configure both ends and
means. In the terms of SYSTEMATIC COMBINING, we want to see how the pieces
match, clash, or exclude one another. For example, to see how surface begets
drawing. Or, to see how drawing materializes in building. Therefore, we do not
necessarily need a genealogy of architectural influences or methods. Our purpose
is not chronological (though it is always historical in a material sense). Neither do
we require an archaeology that highlights specific architectural components. We
only need a series of specimens that can capture and convey architecture’s
prevailing logic and mythos. These will allow us to observe the ways our elements
contribute to its historical self-expression and self-understanding.
Most importantly, a case study gives us an interlocutor. It gives us someone to
whom we can pose our questions. What is more, we can ask with specific reference
to the elements we have developed heretofore. For example, “How does
architecture deal with the anthropological issues of perception? How does
architecture handle its ontological development? What is its relationship to writing?
Did the architect die alongside the author? Is architecture distinctive because of
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drawing? Will drawing survive the digital turn? Is architecture a harbinger of a life
to come? For everyone? These questions circulate in the background of our case
study and will help us confirm our suspicion that drawing, and its constituent parts,
is integral to architecture. But beyond that, the case study documents the
indispensable role that architecture and drawing will play for any possible life
beyond the Anthropocene and Capitalocene.312

5.2 First Joining
In that spirit of questioning, architecture’s various threads can be largely
distinguished by which sorts of questions they ask. Before those questions
diverged, there was rough unity. In the beginning, architecture was interested in
dwelling. Despite any later disputes about the nature of that dwelling, it is
incontrovertible that the earliest stages of constructed environments concerned
liveable spaces. Whether for gods, people, or animals, humans built for
habitation.313 This reality is confirmed by anthropology. In many respects,
anthropology and architecture are so intertwined that in their primeval form, they
are difficult to distinguish. Humans culled out caves or erected huts right alongside
their physiological metamorphosis.314 The shape of the body and the shape of the
building go hand in hand.

312. The following architects were chosen in accordance with the principles discovered up to this point. These by no means
are the exemplary figures of architectural drawing. Their emphases correspond to concepts heretofore established.
313. Ray Lucas, Anthropology for Architects: Social Relations and the Built Environment (London: Bloomsbury Publishing,
2020), 45.
314. André Leroi-Gourhan, Gesture and Speech (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 4.
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5.2.1 Vitruvius
One of the standard backdrops that reinforce this general unity is the work of
the Roman architectural theorist, Vitruvius.315 Vitruvius offered an anthropological
rationale for the emergence of architecture. When humans foraged in the woods, a
storm bestowed fire upon them by putting trees, wind, and other elements on a
collision course. Their convergence produced a conflagration that intimidated the
wood dwellers. The blaze subdued and the accessible fire provided a central
meeting hub for the onlookers. They sustained the fire and, by repetition (or
“habit”), they formed assemblies and shared language. Since the assembly pivoted
on the fire, they needed to maintain it. This prompted the building process.
Namely, they constructed a roof and walls to shelter the fire. Eventually, what they
learned in this shared technicity would endow them with the skill to return to their
own sleeping quarters and erect similar protections. The story provided an
ecological and anthropological context for Virtuvius’ eventual architectural
principles. He delineated three essential features for any construction—firmitas,
utilitas, venustas.316 These features—integrity, utility, and beauty—were derived
from the natural properties that gave rise to architecture in the first place. In other
words, as it is in nature so should it be in the building process.
Most, if not all, serious architectural minds dismiss this story as fanciful.
Nevertheless, those same minds often revisit it as instructive. It remains so for us

315. Vitruvius, Ten Books on Architecture, ed. Thomas N. Howe and Ingrid Rowland (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001), 38-41.
316. Vitruvius, 17.

200

now. Vitruvius’ account is a mytheme that lies deep in the bosom of architecture
regardless of how it is received. Importantly, that mytheme aligns humans and the
world in a way that resonates with Andre Leroi-Gourhan’s technicity, Marcel
Mauss’s social technics, and Tim Ingold’s account of intragenerative perception.317
In addition, the story’s account of subsequent construction outlines a responsive
agency that cannot be reduced to vaulted modern agendas. Humans were not
imposing concepts on surfaces but were letting surfaces shape their own action. In
Serres’ terms, there was a pliability or openness to their agency. Admittedly, my
affirmations must be held loosely. It is certainly possible that the behaviors that lie
within the text may not be consistent with the actions of those using that text. But
that is not what is important here. What is critical is that in the mind of early
thinkers, materiality and agency work in consonance—however concocted. And, as
the Vitruvian epic continued, human technicity would advance to the degree that
they could “correspond” to the interior life of the materials through mimicry— (the
triad). What is more, the ontological motif of repetition is directly operative in all of
these elements. The agency, surfaces, and markings manifested the Vitruvian
humans’ shared habit of coming together.
Thus, in its earliest manifestos, a nascent theory of architecture was underway.
Fortuitously, that theory was a constellation comprised of all of the elements we
have distilled in the foregoing chapters. This affords us a constructive reversal.
Whereas we are looking at architecture with an eye toward making, architecture is
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pointing us back. Vitruvius’ story directly integrates joining and making. To build
coincides with commonality. This feedback provides a way to retain a simple
definition of architecture as it undergoes multiple historical revisions and
theoretical mutations. I submit, that even here at the beginning and unto the last,
we should understand architecture as “first joining.” This is not a cheap exit from
hard theoretical conflict and conversation. I am not trying to sidestep the experts
and their necessary wrangling. First of all, I pose this definition as a prolepsis of the
kind of tectonism that will return below after a few cursory detours. Second, it is a
testament to the prima facie nature of the term. Third, I should note that this
definition is only provisional. It cannot possibly account for all historical nuance.
Despite being confident in its long-term stability, I only offer it experimentally
feature of our theory-building until is bolstered.
Vitruvius’ treatise would remain intact for several centuries or at least as long as
classical thought reigned throughout the world. It would even be reinforced by
Leon Battista Alberti’s own manifesto in the 15th century.318 It was not until the
Enlightenment and its subsequent corollary, the industrial revolution, that
Vitruvius’ ideas would fade to the background. Even still, the centerpiece of his
scheme—human and material relations—persisted. In fact, it grounded 19thcentury debates about the origins of culture.319 What makes art art? Disciplines
were open to new theories about the origins of craft given the Greek and Roman
heritage had been thrown into relief by rationalist and empirical transformations. In
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architecture, the debate was unique. Unlike some other disciplines which relied
wholly on abstract argumentation, architecture had archaeological evidence of built
structures that either verified or refuted a claim about origins. This is the seedbed
of our next archaeological specimen: the work of Gottfried Semper.

5.2.2 Gottfried Semper
In the 19th century, there was an ongoing debate about the whiteness of Greek
monuments and buildings. The prevailing—classical—assumption was that these
structures were singularly white. This seemingly insignificant issue was central
because it spoke to the purity and supremacy of the Greek ideal in comparison to
Roman admixtures. If the structures were white, then their philosophies of form
and political life also had an advantage over Rome. But if they were not white, then
what could that mean? What was at stake? In a word, the underlying concern was:
what are the basic building blocks of culture?320 Is it Rome? Is it Greece? Gottfried
Semper, a German architect, would address the core questions which subtended
these controversies. He first entered into these debates in favor of polychromy—
the view that Greek whiteness was actually an agglomeration of layered colors.321
Semper saw this as a virtue and not a vice. Polychromy meant that the Greeks were
sensitive to their ecosystem’s light conditions and correspond to their surrounding
environment. Above all though, this multi-colored approach evinced an ancient
interest in ornament, dressing, and aesthetic construction. In Semper’s estimation,
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Greek influence on culture should not derive from their distinctive purity but rather
from their ability to combine, transform, build, and flourish (in every sense of the
term).
Semper’s affirmation of integration led to propositions about the basic purposes
of architecture as well as to certain assumptions about its fundamental elements. To
begin with, Semper would emphasize a return to the materials of the world which
surrounded any construction. The materials of the world had, in their own actuality,
propensities or motives. Semper does not offer a specific ontology of matter but he
does offer an account of human interactions with matter that is strikingly
intragenerative. In sum, life is defined by a transformation of material elements.322
In many cases, those material elements were already transformations. They were
often constructs of other things. They were tectonic or woven things. Therefore,
building—architecture—inherits and forwards this combining and transforming
practice. It is an interaction at this material surface. This awareness required a
delicate and faithful understanding of the basic elements that comprised each
constructive interaction. That is, to be a proper “first joiner” we should know
materials at the earliest state of combinatoric—or tectonic—development. Much
like Vitruvius, Semper had a sequential model. He held that there were four key
“elements” in architecture. Namely, architectural junctures stemmed from hearth,
mound, roof, and wall.323
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These elements were more like organizing motifs that had corresponding
tectonic skills. The term tectonic will become central for us as we proceed and we
will define it in more detail later. For now, and for Semper, tectonic skill describes
the ability to grasp the elemental motive (hearth, etc.) of materials and to employ
the technical capacity to bring that material to a cultural expression.324 This makes
more sense if we consider them in turn. The hearth describes a movement of
assemblage around a fire. For a society, the hearth becomes an altar. The hearth
coincides with the skill of ceramics. Presumably, the elements of sharing in the
assembly—dinnerware or religious artifacts—were constructed by joining the
earthen elements with that fire. When that fire is lifted up off the ground, then this
is the movement of mounding. Mounding begets masonry and terracing. The roof
comes next insofar as it is placed over the flame to shelter it. Carpentry, as another
tectonic skill, joins together raw elements to thatch a covering. Finally, and most
importantly for Semper, a wall is constructed by weaving. Semper spends a good
deal of time discussing weaving given that it is the moment of the architectural
enclosure.325 When the wall is added—which would have been a tapestry at first—
suddenly a new cultural moment occurs. Here, at the emergence of the wall,
Semper’s former debates about polychromy resonate. Polychrome monuments and
walls were the heirs of early woven tapestries and therefore naturally would bear
multiple layers of coloring.
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The wall was more than a convenient conclusion, though. It was, for Semper,
the essence of architecture. The wall was the site of cultural dressing. Dressing was
not a banal ornamentation but the very feedback of tectonic advancement.326 We
see life in it. For Semper, as humans tectonically interacted with materials, they
changed them. Those transformations advanced and multiplied. They built on
themselves much like Leroi-Gourhan’s technicity. For Semper, even if
industrialization‘s methods were derivative of this process, it is not necessarily
counterproductive. It can provide new tectonic opportunities for architecture. This
tectonism also had an exteriorizing effect. Whereas former woven walls had color
and cultural expression embedded in them, later they would be spiritualized in
paint. Once, again, this is not necessarily evaluative. It is descriptive. Semper goes
further by cross-applying the built transformations of tapestry and painted walls to
the decorative “scene” of Greek drama.327 That is, the tapestry became wall and the
wall wore a mask in the same way that actors and settings would. In all, Semper’s
tectonism had an evolutionary impulse without determinate or positivist
conclusions.
Semper’s thesis narrows our focus to the issue of tectonics. His original
definition, given above, can be expanded to shed light on the role of our elements
and motifs of making within architecture. Tectonic skill is a grasp of material
inclination and the capacity to bring, or transform, that material into a new
manifestation. But, even our cursory review suggests that tectonics is even more
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simple—more elemental—than that. For Semper, the basic process of all making is
the act of joining. This corroborates the ostensible meaning of the term tectonics
itself. Tekton, taken literally, is a “joining by weaving.” Recall that he emphasized
the weaving of textiles and their critical role in architectural development. He also,
implicitly or explicitly, distributes this process of weaving across all of the tectonic
arts. As we noted above, ceramics bring earth and fire together. Mounding layers
dirt upon dirt. The roof is a matrix of touching pieces. The tapestry that creates the
inside and outside is the full embodiment and expressive pinnacle of an ongoing
joining process. This wall is not only a cultural marvel but it is a reflexive testimony.
It articulates the interactions that have brought the building to life. It is important to
note that this kind of joining is not mereological. We are not simply joining given
parts. Rather, this joining is itself the begetting and birthing of parts. They are not
brought together subsequent to their existence. The joining is their origination.
This model substantiates our simple definition of architecture as first joining. It
also deepens this claim by putting touch and surface at the center of building and
making. The connection of materials is an originary moment but it is not a violent,
impositional, or external moment. Semper’s joining is germane and internal to the
material process itself. Of which, agents are a part. The surface is where the
growth, transformation, and parturition are actual and occurrent. The agent’s
unique offering lies in their receptivity. Or, in our terms, it lies in their ability to
become whatever they need to make room for the forthcoming otherness of the
object. This process is lived. It is actual. The agent does not survey the ground as a
site probing pure potentiality. Rather, they touch the surface and tectonic life moves
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along. And, what is more, this touching is not unilateral. It is shared. Agents are
touching the surface but in so doing they are coming together with one another. In
the terms of Sahlins, Mauss, and Haraway, tectonics is always already kinmaking.328 It is a kinship with the earth and its inhabitants simultaneously. Given
Semper’s indeterminate sense of fecund making, some scholars have filtered his
through a Deleuze, digitality, or externality. They read his openness to
transformation as a prefiguration of code and algorithmic variation.329 But as we see
here, Semper is thoroughly affective and interior with respect to material motifs.
We feel life in materiality. We learn “what it is like to be” this thing or that thing by
touching it. We also learn what is like to be us in this twofold moment.
The 19th-century questions of origins that prompted Semper’s system
circulated in other parts of Europe as well. Other responses also focused on
materials as the ground and origin of cultural formation. Some of which, are
favorable to our theory of making. The English art critic John Ruskin, for example,
elevated material craft and situated the tectonic practices of architecture alongside
drawing.330 For Ruskin, bringing things together, joining them, was epitomized in
the flexuous line. Despite these 19th-century material advocates, tectonic issues
would give way to new questions at the turn of the century and in the face of
modernization. The industrial arts continued to throw questions of making into
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disarray. The issue of culture would continue to expand and the assumption that
humans could articulate and guide it—whether in its origins or toward its end—
grew increasingly suspicious. After the world wars of the first half of the 20th
century, architects began to wonder about their purpose.331 The material and
anthropological ideas bequeathed to them by Vitruvius, Semper, Ruskin, and others
seemed insufficient in the face of machines, concrete, and steel.

5.3 Uninhabitable
Up into the 20th century, there was a prevailing assumption that since architecture
was coincident with human development and human civilization that it should
continue to participate in their evolutionary advancement. The belief was that
architecture could enhance historical maturity on two levels.332 One, it could seek
and sketch out built systems that would promote human flourishing. Two, it
employed novel technologies to execute those systematic visions. The first level
gave rise to planned communities and architectural aspirations for broad and
universal structuration. As noted, this ambition was reconfigured in the wake of the
wars. Universal systems were suddenly volatile, dangerous, and inhumane. The
second level, that of technological progress, rose to prominence in this post-war
period and in lieu of its conditions. In some sense, the idea of planning would
slowly be subsumed by technological novelty. This would not mean that architects
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would wholly abandon social interests but rather they would approach those aims
from the standpoint of technology.
Harry Mallgrave, the esteemed architectural historian, cites Buckminster Fuller
as an inflection point in the disciplinary transformation of architecture.333 Fuller, an
American architect, began to turn his attention toward the ecological role of
architecture during this time. That is, instead of starting from its social role. His
interests in energy distribution, consumption, and their consequences prompted
his development of a “world game.” In his 1967 networked game, computers and
users from all over the world would help calculate and discern the proper
distribution of energy and resources through their cross-comparison and
information sharing.334 This seemingly altruistic agenda was not only putting
architecture on the technological track, it was introducing computation and code
into the design process. The information gleaned from the world game would
inform construction sites and formal design decisions.
Mallgrave highlights one other architectural impulse of the post-war area that
would redefine the questions of the discipline. The world was reorganizing after
geopolitical strife. There were new methods, new cultural affinities, and new
ecological demands. Whereas Fuller would make a coded game of the situation,
architects like Christopher Alexander put themselves to the task of discerning
patterns in all of this variation.335 This paralleled the structuralist approaches that
were appearing in anthropology and linguistics. He also leveraged computation in
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an attempt to locate and apply these architectural patterns. Even so, as Alexander’s
work progressed, the old anthropological interests in human well-being and lived
life returned.336 But they would have little purchase across the architectural
landscape. There were other currents emerging in the 60s and 70s that would
continue the computational and exploratory trends that were guiding architecture’s
identity crisis. The important point here is that architecture was groping for some
sort of defining principle in the wake of anthropological fallout. architecture could
no longer be defined by what it had immediately “done.” Its buildings, materials,
and plans had run aground. The architectural condition was primed for some
external, outside, pure ideality that could give it enclosure and meaning. The code
and semiotic patterns that would inform later architectural philosophies were in
their embryonic form.
There were two other threads that would shape the fabric of architectural selfunderstanding in the middle to latter part of the 20th century. Both touched on
architecture’s growing guilt and sense of communicative failure. Starting from the
latter, the emerging question was whether architectural projects had gone awry—
like large planned communities now empty—due to poor description, expression,
and delivery rather than any inherent weakness in the discipline. This opened
architecture to the growing academic field of semiotics. architecture looked to the
study of signs and symbols as a way to recast building and making.337 This move to
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semiosis and words also brought architecture into proximity with structuralism.338
As mentioned above, structuralism culled out universal patterns within phenomena
that accounted for local and concrete manifestations and organization of elements.
Structural language could have value for a communicatively deficient discipline. For
heuristic purposes, we might call this architecture’s own linguistic turn. Ongoing
interactions between architectural minds and structuralists during this era paved
the way for a pivotal post-structuralist moment.
In addition to its communicative problems, another discipline would address
and validate architecture’s latent sense of guilt. As descendants of Marx, at some
level, German-based critical theory was calling all systems of planning and
organization into question around the themes of violence, expropriation, or
hegemonic imposition.339 In combination with the linguistic turn, the general
critical concern with overbearing and totalizing systems aggravated architecture’s
identity crisis and search for definition and purpose. Therefore, architecture was
searching for some code, sign-system, and linguistic structure that could give
meaning without any positivist claim. It seemed serendipitous, then, that one
discipline could address the demands of the other. Namely, a sign-based
philosophy or a post-structural linguistic theory could provide meaning to
architecture without sliding into the hegemony identified by critical theory. Like
Fuller and Alexander’s altruistic impulses above, this would have significant and
even deleterious consequences. It would lead some architectural theorists away
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from lived experience and the building process altogether in search of more plastic
and universally bland structures.

5.3.1 Peter Eisenman
One such theorist is Peter Eisenman. A titanic figure in modern architecture,
Eisenman plays a significant role in this linguistic turn. Under the influence of Colin
Rowe’s notions of transparency in architecture, Eisenman’s dissertation was an
early search for a pure architectural form that preceded and exceeded all
functionality.340 A basic and denuded form would avoid the problems of positivism.
Though not yet exposed to the work of post-structuralists like Jacques Derrida,
Eisenman was, in effect, looking for that geometric solid that sat on the event
horizon of the khora. He was in search of the seeds of shape that could take root as
any structural manifestation. His ensuing work would continue to explore this
theme and would employ linguistic notions like syntax and grammar as ways to
describe the growth of a form.341 It would not be a stretch to say that he was trying
to understand architecture as a kind of pure formality—a fecund and open-ended
formality, though. The analytical properties of a form turned it into a stem cell
which outstripped and eluded any kind of symbolism or functionality.
The inchoate identity crisis of architecture in the post-war era was coming to
maturity in Eisenman. Even amidst the objections, we will levy here below, his
courage and bravado put that crisis on display and gave it responsive traction. His
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approach, however, was like the pharmacon of Derrida: both medicinal solution and
poison.342 His theories were determined by his ongoing and inherited aversion to
positivism. As noted above, the historical shift from humanism to modernism
demanded a rejection of any positivist position. To reiterate, it also introduced new
cultural findings and novel technological methods. In Eisenman’s mind, this invited
architects to apply the new technologies and thoughts of other disciplines to their
work. Architects had not yet taken up that invitation and still circled the drain of a
dying anthropocentrism. Therefore, Eisenman considered himself a vanguard.
Eisenman’s experimental thought openly manifested a shift from architecture’s
former terrestrial, tectonic, and interior self-understanding to an ethereal, remote,
and exterior validation. By stripping architecture of all actuality in function,
Eisenman was reaching beyond any “thisness” of a building in favor of a pure
potentiality that would define it.343 This has consequences for the elements and
motifs of making we have developed thus far. The surface that was once
instrumental for Semper and anthropology was no longer of interest. In fact,
surfacial elements distracted from geometric emergence. The tectonic agent
receded from prominence given that the form itself would define its future. Though
it had not happened quite yet, the mark-making process itself would fall into
disrepute in favor of computation.
Eisenman’s ideas would come to full fruition in conjunction with the work of
Jacques Derrida, who we have mentioned above. For Eisenman, Derrida addressed
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the anti-capitalist concerns of critical theory through an account of signs that could
both strip architecture of its symbolic pretense and give it an engine for new formal
growth. He did not just adopt Derrida as proof of his own position. Derrida’s
account of writing and difference revised and updated Eisenman’s work. Whereas
Eisenman had used Chomskian notions of grammar and syntax in his earlier
accounts of form, now he would turn to the traces, undecidability, and binaries of
différance.344 That geometric form he was so fond of before would now be read as a
series of fragments that could be recombined and arranged in any number of nonmeaningful compositions.345 The idea of pure, and deconstructed, fictions of writing
was now the exemplar of architecture.
The implications are nearly self-evident. In the same way that Derrida’s makingcum-writing questioned touch, ensconced repetition and variation, and preferenced
multiplicity, Eisenman would envision a architecture-cum-writing that heralded a
self-making surface that could evolve without the hand of a mark-making agent.346
From one angle, this turn towards writing was a turn inward. It has the appearance
of what I have celebrated as interiority. It was a move that would place building
within the text. But that text, that difference, is undeconstructable. You cannot get
inside of it. In a strict ontological sense, it is always defined by some receding
outside, as we outlined above. Architecture was not inside wiring but rather
accompanied writing to the very unapproachable edge of reality. The khora and
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death that provision making dwell so low in the order of things that they are
ultimately an exteriority. We cannot live in them. Thus, in typical fashion, in an
effort to resolve the problems of the Anthropocene and the Capitalocene, Eisenman
turned architecture and making inside out. To avoid the presumptions and dangers
of architecture’s past, he went deep into the building to find the outside that
perfected it and protected it from positivistic hegemony. This exteriorizing
potentiality may have satisfied theoretical conditions but it had negative affective
consequences for actual life. People have trouble living in Eisenman’s buildings.
People do not gather there except to marvel at it from the outside (even when
inside). There is no tectonism that can grant a phenomenological positionality.
there is no intragenerative making. Thus, his attempt to free architecture from
positivism actually sealed it in an unreachable and transcendent purity.

5.3.2 Greg Lynn
Even with Derrida’s meteoric rise and widespread significance, his ideas would
fall out of favor with architects in the late 90s. This does not mean they were
insignificant. They fell out of favor because they struggled to construct. Despite any
proposal to the contrary, construction remained the ineluctable core of
architecture. Derrida and writing were excellent at opening up possibilities and
avenues of resistance but they also left the architectural imagination in a state of
fragmentation.347 This era saw the work of Rem Koolhas and others construct
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buildings that testified to the accidental relationships of city fragments. Derrida’s
fragmentary effect would give way to another titan of architectural theory, Gilles
Deleuze—who we also mentioned earlier. Deleuze’s ideas of potentiality, force, and
repetition are still active in contemporary architectural theory.348 However, his
influence has still not overcome the presence and basic dominance of writing and
exteriority as the paradigm of making. Deleuzean models of architecture have
digitized them.
Greg Lynn was a student of Peter Eisenman and would emerge as a chief
proponent of Deleuze’s ideas. One specific text had a unique influence on Lynn—
Deleuze’s The Fold.349 In this piece, Deleuze examines the baroque period and the
work of Gottfried Leibniz. Instead of decrying the ostentation and superfluity of the
Baroque, Deleuze sees it as a premier example of simulacra, difference, and
repetition. Leibniz’s monadology operationalized the multiplicity that Deleuze
celebrated. The more monads, the more ornament. The more ornamentation, the
more life, so to speak. Given Deleuze’s monism, these ornamental and dressed
monads were folds in the singular substance of the world. Each instance of change
was an invaginated crease. The technical and complex beauties of life were folds
upon folds without any direction or prescribed form. Therefore, the Baroque
gestured towards a making and evolution that could proceed without determination
or telos.
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Lynn took this materialist explanation to heart and cross-applied it to the
technological affordances of architecture mentioned above. Since architecture
could not plan or oversee civilized development, it could provide a way to grow life
in an indirect and technologically advanced way. Lynn would use computing
algorithms to build according to the principles of the fold. The computer would
generate designs that unfolded according to certain given parameters.350 Lynn’s
approach can be read as an advancement of Eisenman. Whereas Eisenman’s
writing had yielded purely potential buildings, Lynn’s were actual and appeared
biomechanical.351 This process of clicking a button and letting the computer fold
freely was akin to planting a seed and letting the form guide itself autonomously.
This autonomy was a consummation of Eisenman’s pure outside. It put that pure
outside inside the computationally generated folds. It had all of the markings of
settling architecture’s ongoing desire for an autonomous self-understanding. This
Deleuzean model could be thoroughly real, unapologetically indeterminate,
ecologically aware, and indifferent to any systematic hegemony.
Because Lynn’s buildings inherited Eisenmen’s ambitions and assumptions, he
also inherited the same problems that would beset triumphal proclamations.
Namely, these buildings unfolded as blobs or extended horizontal creases. They
were not livable. They still stood as beacons of a virtual outside however deeply
inside of the code that generated them. Lynn had also not exactly left writing
behind. His use of Deleuze converted deconstructed fragments of writing into the
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modalities of a monistic form of writing—code. Writing’s exteriority and iterability
became the black box of the algorithm. Code was the inevitable heir of writing.
Drawing faded to the edges as the alphabetic algorithm accomplished all of the
mark-making. Ecological surfaces were silently nested into the basic computational
parameters. But the consequences of code were not only theoretical. The materials
needed for these buildings strained the earth. The human labor that brought such
buildings to life was routinely ignored. Thus, while presenting itself as the
corrective to anthropocenic, capitalocenic, and historical architectural problems,
Lynn’s model was on the verge of encoding them and locking them in.
One other development is worth noting. During this Deleuzean epoch, just as
drawing would subside, the notion of the diagram would come into vogue. But the
Deleuzean diagram is different than the Peircean one in critical respects. Peirce’s
diagrams are flexuous and inscribed. They evolve and change according to
redrawing, situatedness, and actuality. Deleuze’s diagrams are more akin to
potencies or assemblages-in-waiting. They do not necessarily take place but
provision the taking-place. This Deleuzean model of the diagram is predisposed to
the work of Eisenman and Lynn. It is a potential empowerment rather than actual
energy.352 Recall that Peirce, on the other hand, took the diagram as iconic.353 It has
some semblance of form. In this way, it is tectonic in the vein of Semper. The
diagram is not simply the potency to assemble discrete parts or folds. It is the
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capacity to grasp any material in its actual life, and in that grasping touch, inscribe
new—and actual—material lives.

5.4 Tectonics of Light
Not every architectural trajectory followed this exteriorizing tendency, however. As
we noted above, the different threads of architectural identity are largely defined by
the kinds of questions they ask. If we look back to that same era of emerging
anxiety about architectural identity we can revisit the work and questions of Louis
Kahn. Kahn, the Estonian-born architect, is famous for mystical sayings and
esoteric quips. His most well-known question is posed to a brick wherein he asks
what that brick wants to be.354 This seemingly odd pan-psychic inquiry sets him
apart from the exteriorizing inclinations of his contemporaries and their
descendants. That is because it evinces his central posture: listening. This posture
helped him withstand the modernist transvaluation. His willingness to listen to
materials and their desires confirms that Kahn was thoroughly tectonic and
thoroughly interior. Though he never explicitly advocated for tectonism or
anthropological architecture, his distinctively humane and materialist approach
places him within their legacy.
Louis Kahn designed and executed buildings from the 1930s up through the
1960s and stands as a foil to the linguistic turn of Eisenman and Lynn. Kahn’s work
not only predates their own but stands outside most architectural and categorical
groupings. This is not to say Kahn was wholly different but that his pathway to
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architectural prominence did not follow the standard path of his contemporaries.355
His first decade of building was collaborative and never evinced his complete style
or perspective. Afterward, he became an instructor and drifted from commissioned
work. In his 50s, the door to construction reopened to him. He was commissioned
to build a medical research facility that would inaugurate his own distinctive
philosophical vision. As a result of this late-blooming, his concepts of structure,
form, and order had matured and eluded fanciful influences. Again, this is not to
suggest that he was anomalous and independent. Rather, it is to say he knew how
to wield and synthesize influences with his own developed vision of architecture.
Kahn’s ideas are distinctively tectonic in their material emphasis and evocation
of kinship. His work is historically positioned against the background of the BeauxArts tradition and Brutalism. These two comprise his first tectonic synthesis. On
the one hand, he drew on the classical works of Greece and Rome, and on the other
hand, he pulled from modern building techniques and materials (including
concrete). Kahn’s famous works like the Kimball Art Museum, the Salk Institute,
the Phillips Exeter Library, and others might appear as quintessentially modern to
the untrained eye. They are geometric. They are simple in ornamentation. But they
are nevertheless set apart by their subtle consideration of materials, material
propensities, and material tectonic connections. Kahn was highly interested in the
desires and feelings of materials in themselves.356 He wanted to give room for the
bricks or concrete to express their own intentions. This spiritual deference was
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maintained in his buildings. Though apparently plain, he constructed the buildings
such that the materials who gave themselves to it, could have a hand in forming its
expression. He wanted continuity between the making of the building and its
making of space and room.357 This is his critical tectonic juncture. A simple way to
illustrate this would be the way he integrated mechanical and electrical elements
into the design features of a ceiling. Or, in the case of the Kimball Museum, its
vaulted corridors have gaps in their construction that let light peer through. In both
instances, the visitor can witness the former construction of the building. They can
encounter its memory and be a part of its future. Much like Semper, Kahn’s
approach to design and even dwelling was one of interaction with materials.
Furthermore, he wanted to honor their interactions with each other.
Kahn’s tectonism exceeds his predecessors in one crucial respect: light.358 In
the former models of Semper et al, the elements of architecture are joined around a
human activity and fire. For Kahn, this fire had evolved. But this was not out of step
with his predecessors. Recall that Semper had described the spiritual mutation of
woven tapestries into the “white” painting of Greek walls or monuments. He went
on to describe further transformation in the exteriorization of that weaving in the
scene of Greek drama. Kahn’s own focus on light can be read as an elaboration on
that primordial architectural fire. Importantly, this light afforded what both fire and
weaving did. Namely, connection and kinship. His heavy and geometric buildings
were built to accentuate the movement of light.359 As the walls protruded,
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overlapped, or even receded, they would shift light and its shadows. In an almost
phenomenological way, He considered light to be presencing in itself. It bestowed
action and engagement upon anyone who would move through his building. Light
allowed people to gather, for someone to converse with a book, or for a student to
touch and connect with a laboratory sample. Light belonged to the inhabitant but it
also tectonically joined them to the life of the building. The light revealed the past
of the building in its mechanical syntheses. The light created domains for
congregating, pathways for progression, and shadows for listening.
Kahn’s buildings were actualities upon actualities rather than folds upon folds.
This is confirmed by the fact that some of his buildings had nearly 900 sketches in
their past.360 Each drawing was itself an actual instance or moment in the life of the
building. Drawing illustrated the rhythm of its growth. Kahn was a consummate
drawer. For him, drawing was access to light and presencing. No drawing was a
strict parallel to the final building. Instead, drawings were flexuous perceptions that
allowed him to touch and feel the desires of the building materials. Kahn’s famous
quip— “you say to brick”— returns here in drawing. It could be read as a gesture
toward Deleuzean diagrammatics wherein the brick can be topologically converted
into anything. But if conceived alongside his drawings and buildings, as a “drawing
near,” it is a gesture toward the actuality of the material. It is as if to say, in the
spirit of Henry, what is it like to be you? In some manner, all drawing is that
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question. And, for Kahn, whatever answer the material would give should
reverberate in the building throughout its lifetime.

5.5 Regional Tectonics
Kahn stands out as an example of how to work within modern conditions without
embracing modern assumptions. But, in large part, his resistance is the result of his
age and position in time. Our final architectural specimen is able to resist the
exteriorizing trends of modernity and post-structuralism directly within the belly of
the beast. Kenneth Frampton, an English architect who has spent most of his
career in the United States, began his own work in the company of Peter Eisenman,
Manfredo Tafuri, and Rem Koolhas. He began in the very circles that would
produce writing and exteriority as a measure of architectural autonomy.
Nevertheless, he would not end up there. In the 80s, in a journal he co-founded,
Oppositions, Frampton wrote an essay about the causes of architecture’s fragile selfunderstanding. His position in this essay would set his architectural thinking on a
phenomenological path.
In the essay, “Towards a Critical Regionalism: Six Points for an architecture of
Resistance,” Frampton argues that architecture’s recurring identity crises have
been proportionate to its inability to fully respond to industrialization. Each attempt
—whether critical theory, structuralism, deconstruction, or future isms—did not
reconcile with the fact that industrialization had shifted architecture’s attention
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away from its ineluctable core: building.361 Highly influenced by Heidegger’s
famous work, Frampton was convinced that building had been submerged in the
labor of construction and its technologies.362 In some sense, Frampton’s proposal in
this essay was to extract architecture from its constant redefining; to liberate it
from a perpetual crisis of identity. He would reposition it in its proper role in the
phenomenological building of life. The existence of architecture, he thought, was
ethically necessary as a common experiential foundation for the individual
development of fully human lives.363 Building enables the kind of lives capable of
experiencing a shared social reality. The trouble for architecture as a discipline was
that in the age of industrialization and globalization, it had become impossible to
elevate building above mere labor. What this required, then was a critical
regionalism that returned the craft of making to places where topography, climate,
and culture conditioned building.364 Only this could avoid the allure of universal
absences and theories of exteriority that continued to seduce architecture.
Frampton’s posture in this essay was guided by his budding association with a
theoretical counter-movement within the late stages of 20th-century architectural
thought. That counter-position was phenomenology. The fragmentary remainders
of Derrida and the programmatic resolutions of Deleuze left many architects
wondering what had happened to the life and bodies of architecture’s inhabitants.
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This prompted a return to the sensorial and bodily in an embrace of
phenomenology.365 Given our extensive discussion above, this does not need much
elaboration. It is noteworthy, however, that the phenomenology within architectural
discourse has been largely guided by the Merleau-Pontian variety.
Phenomenological voices like Juhani Pullasmaa, Steven Holl, Peter Zumthor, and
others have focused on the flesh, chiastic integration, and perceptive embodiment.
This trend is not problematic in its own right. I simply add it here to show that, as
of yet, very few architectural theorists have engaged the kind of phenomenological
interiority I posited in the previous chapter. We will return to this point after a brief
examination of Frampton’s materialist phenomenological advocacy. Frampton’s
“Critical Regionalism” essay was diagnostic. As his work progressed, and as his
phenomenological affiliations deepened, his prescriptive recommendations came
under the aegis of tectonics. No other modern architectural voice has positioned
the issue so directly as has Frampton. He would go on to publish a monumental
work called Studies in Tectonic Culture wherein he would excavate the history of
the idea.366 His book accentuates the importance of tectonics role in realigning
architecture with the material world and revivifying its sense of purpose.
In the book, Frampton starts by redirecting the architectural imagination away
from the issues of space and scenes. He points attention back to the constructive
framework. Therein we find architecture’s spine: tectonics. He offers an updated
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and simplified definition of tectonics as simply “the art of joining.”367 In a word,
Frampton encourages architecture to find its poetic sensibility. architecture need
not distract itself with stylistic contests and futile searches for exterior validation. It
only needs to concern itself with earthwork and framework.368 In other words, land
and making. The latter of which is ultimately a tectonic art. Throughout the book,
earthwork and framework operate reciprocally to define the architectural practice.
They suggest that building is always somewhere (earthwork) and something
(framework). Frampton sees this as an updating of Semper’s fourfold into a basic
twofold. This two is irreducible in the tectonic practice. Despite adjusting Semper,
Frampton shares his conclusion that tectonic interaction with earthwork is always a
kind of listening and sensing of the earth’s propensities towards a particular
structuration. Like Kahn before him, Frampton advocates a tectonic culture that is
familiar with the distinctions and usefulness of materials without reducing their
construction to some preconceived imposition. In Ingold’s terms, tectonics is
intragenerative.
As I noted, no architectural thinker has fully engaged the ontological interiority
as outlined by Michel Henry. Objectors may claim that some phenomenological
allusions to neuroscience accomplish this. But, as we laid out in the previous
chapter, mental internalization is not the radical interiority of Henry. It is instead
another exteriority. It is not entirely necessary that architecture take up Henry’s
mantle. However, if it did, architecture could complete a return to the
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anthropological and expand its influence in vernacular making and living. That is,
by rethinking the life that is always tectonic, architecture (as first joining) becomes
the purview of all that actually live, feel, and move. Furthermore, a fully interior life
opens diagrammatics. Drawing, sketching, and modeling become mechanisms for
kinship, shared life, and continued making. finally, by rethinking tectonics under
Henry’s frame of interior life and affectivity, architecture roots in habitation would
dilate further. Habit, read as repetition and flexuous variation, is itself a dwelling
place for life. It always underwrites habitus and habitat. Therefore, basic everyday
life would be perpetually and inescapably architectural. The summative point is that
architecture might not only reduce itself from identity dysfunction but could also
expand its scope of influence. This could help humans address the problems of the
Anthropocene with pervasive and accessible tools—theoretical and pragmatic. An
architectural affectivity that avoided the pitfalls of exteriority, I submit, would
radically impact the Capitalocene and Anthropocene by returning us to life on the
surface.

5.6 Tectonics Contra Technique
This case study represents the culminating moment of SYSTEMATIC
COMBINING jigsaw matching methodology. Throughout the preceding chapters,
we established three structural elements within making. We discovered three
ontological motifs that directed those elements. We observed the theoretical
differences between writing and drawing with respect to those motifs and elements.
We highlighted the critical ontological predilection towards exteriority in writing.
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We then proposed a return to interiority as a basis for recovering a viable
exteriority. All of these steps were on full display here in the case study.
architecture is not only comprised of surface, agency, and markings, its shape and
history are guided by its attitude toward number, touch, and repetition. We have
seen that this shape is vulnerable to the same exteriorizing trends that have
affected a phenomenology of making.
Altogether, what architecture gives our study, is a single word to comprise the
elements, the motifs, and the theories of making. Namely, tectonics. It helps us
see that in anthropological, phenomenological, and common perspectives,
architecture is, above all, always a first joining. What began technicity now has its
fullest expression in tekton. The basis of making lies in connecting rather than in
tooling, skill, or training. Tectonics helps us describe our social behaviors in the
terms of geological behaviors. In the same way that tectonic plates shift, we collide,
construct, and connect. Regardless of how we shift, tectonics confirms that kinship
is always about touching. Finally, tectonics helps us see that drawing is never
merely an operation or concept but is always a joining (and separating).
Therefore, we have a testable and fundamental novel theory of making. Making
is comprised of surface, agents, and markings. Making is moved along by touch,
repetition, and number. Making has an ontology of interior life and self-affectation.
We can affirm the conclusion that drawing is the best means of operationalizing
making and its constituent parts because it is material, habitual, and tectonic.
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AFTERWORD
The Next Questions
Here at the end, we arrive at the same questions we started with. We have been
circling them throughout the study. What is doing? What is mattering? What is
making a living? But, as T.S. Eliot said, we come to them as if for the first time with
new eyes. In many ways, we come to them with answers. We do, we make, and we
matter because this has been the bedrock of human living since our beginning. We
stand, we perceive, and we move according to making. These claims all address the
question of why we make. But they also gesture towards the issue of who makes. In
short, the answer is all of us. Whether academic, corporate head, or daily line
worker, everyone bears this task. And, as we have seen, when the responsibility or
opportunity to make is lopsided, living is threatened. We all make to live and we
must all live with what we have made. We know more than just what making is and
who does it. We have also outlined what making is. It is living. Living is interiority,
affectivity, and actuality. We have sketched making’s figurative proportions in
surfaces, agents, and markings. We have shaded in its dimensions with ontological
motifs. Beyond knowing what living is, we have also drafted a blueprint for how to
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do it. We need something material, something habitual, and something tectonic.
This is drawing. Now, we are faced with when and where to draw. These are the
next questions and we can diagram them briefly.
First, where will we make? This is not just a geospatial question. It is not strictly
a topographical question either. This issue of where draws our attention to those
intragenerative surfaces we sketched out above. To restate the question with that in
mind: where are the surfaces of our making? Formerly, they were grass, field, and
fabric. In our more recent past, the surfaces of making were stone, iron, or refined
metals. But as architecture has shown, our surfaces now are glass, plasma, copper
wiring, and—ultimately—light. The materials we work with now are coordinated in
computational, intelligent, or digital machines. It is incumbent upon us all, then, to
discern how our elements (surfaces, et al.) and motifs (touch, et al.) operate at
these surfaces. We should also remember that any adjustment to surfaces is
simultaneously an adjustment to the entire constellation or network of pieces that
comprise making. For example, if we shift from the surfaces of rebar and concrete
to glass and flickering light then agency and marks change too. We would then
need to reconsider the motifs and whether these new materials preference writing
or drawing.
The most natural lens for this sort of examination would be new media studies.
New Media would come with some obstacles. The first thing we need to address is
the centrality of writing within the field. Even with its emphasis on imaging, there
may be an exteriorizing ontology that runs in the background. This is evident in
foundational texts like Barthes’ Camera Lucinda. We would need to discover or
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craft a new ontology of drawing specifically directed at new media. For example, we
could position our work in relation to Vilem Flusser insofar as he rethinks media
from the starting point of lines and surfaces. We could locate a non-writing
apparatus for making in the work of scholars like Deborah Levitt. We could revisit
Architecture and its post-digital drawing resurgence. But given my advocacy for the
anthropological shape of making, we may want to base our engagement with new
media precisely in the ground. Namely, in media ecology. Jussi Parrika and others
have spent their careers showing readers the material backside of new media.
There is a series of unseen wires, mounds of electronic waste, and costly energy
resourcing behind every digital ethnographic proposal. Thus, it behooves a drawn
theory of making to understand how drawing on light and glass relates to the
ground—either benevolently or malevolently. Lastly, other scholars could help
provide ontological depth to digital or computational making. Beyond the obvious
use of Gilbert Simondon, scholars like Sean Cubitt focus our ontological interests
on light. A concentrated ontology of light would place drawing in a fecund relation
to the ground (as electricity), to humanity (as vision), and to making (as creative
software).
This is only one itinerary for answering the question of where we make. The
ontological issue must engage the ever-developing field of speculative realism.
Most know this field by its subsection of Object-Oriented Ontology. No other
philosophical movement addresses the issue of thingness—or in our terms
material, surface, etc——more openly. What is more, OOO and SR both see
themselves as a corrective to the very phenomenologies we leveraged above. OOO
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and SR also explicitly critique the term correspondence and consider objects to be
fundamentally exterior and incommensurate. thinkers like Timothy Morton
extrapolate this exterior in way that complies with our discussion above. His
hyperobjects are edgeless containers that bear the aura of Deleuzean immanence.
They also invite cross-comparison with Peirce’s hypoicons—which is the genus of
the diagram. These brief indicators suggest that the field is primed for and Henrydriven advocacy and engagement.
Going forward, we are also faced with when will we make? Or better, when we
should. Whilst where pointed us towards the digital and geological, the issue of
when points our theories back to the political and ethical. If we are going to resist
the political mechanisms that restrain drawing, they must be configured as an act of
making. We would want to look back to voices like Vaclav Havel who align poetics
with politics. Adopting any modern political theorist based on visibility alone could
undermine our progress if their work were not filtered through the ontological
scrutiny we applied to exteriority and interiority. For example, engaging Bratton’s
The Stack would help position our theory of making with the political authority of a
planetary computational mechanism. Yet, in so doing, we would need to constantly
recalibrate the interiority of the stack with the interiority of life. This would be
critical to knowing whether agents actually make or whether they are absorbed.
In all, the question of where and when is another way of situating making cum
drawing within the Anthropocene and the Capitalocene. Together, where and when
—and their climate and class backdrops—pivot around a heretofore unnamed
issue. It is an issue that any future theory of making must wrestle with. Namely,
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power. Whether the word refers to access or to electricity, making needs some
kind of force, movement, or enlivenment. This was intimated in Henry’s account of
barbarism. But as it appears in space in time, it is configured as power. Access to
making could mean the redistribution of wealth to the disenfranchised. Access to
power could mean the extension of an electrical or telecommunication grid to
remote villages. Empowerment could refer to any number of scenarios but one
condition seems inevitable: power depends on fuel and maintenance. What if the
climate crises, itself caused by the need for power, converges on the electrical grid
and heat corrupts the wiring infrastructure? How will we make our videos? And of
course, power is not physical but is social. What happens to access and power if the
electrical banking network suffers a hack or a dysfunction? Are we making money
for someone else? How will we redistribute power and wealth then? In addition,
power is not only economic but it is a resistance force. How will we grant
ethnographic voice to those who are illiterate or are estranged from the internet?
What does making look like when pollution floods our streets and backyards?
These potential hazards are summarized as a simple problem: what do we do—how
do we make—if the power goes out? Any power—social, economic, or electrical.
We have done it before. We need to think about how to do it again.

So, let’s get back to the drawing board.
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